



Reading and Analyzing Discourses

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SCLCR 2015

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 1 Introduction to Reading and Analyzing Discourses

ABSTRACT:

Discourse analysts are necessarily readers of the texts they analyze and their analyses are, in effect, readings of the texts. Christopher Hart, for example, offers a reading of the British National Party's 2005 manifesto. He argues that conceptual blending theory adds a significant dimension to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Tuen van Dijk characterizes CDA as studies of the concepts of power, dominance, and social inequality. Logistical Discourse Analysis (LDA) similarly uses conceptual blending theory and studies conceptions. However, LDA differs in its objective. LDA analyzes the relations between reading (conceptualization) and the analysis of concepts in research publications. Conceptions are not commonly understood as discursive structures, especially not as inter-discursive structures. Nor are they commonly understood as the outcome of conceptualization involving conceptual blending. I focus on conceptions as discursive structures that guide readers into constructing texts in very specific ways.

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1.0 Analysts are Readers

It would be difficult if not impossible to do a discourse analysis of a text without reading it. Moreover, discourse analysis, in particular, critical discourse analysis, results in readings of texts. As Teun Van Dijk notes in his “Critical Discourse Analysis” (CDA):

... most kinds of CDA will ask question about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are part of a conversation or a news report or other genres and contexts. (2001, pp. 353-354)

Discourse structures are “deployed” so that the persons reading them will interpret them in particular ways.

1.0.1 A Discourse Analysis is a Reading of Text

In his “Critical Discourse Analysis and Conceptualization: Mental Spaces, Blended Spaces and Discourse Spaces in the British National Party (2007),” Christopher Hart offers readings of various passages from the 2005 general election manifesto of the British National Party (BNP) entitled *Immigration: A Crisis without Parallel*:

If Tony Blair can say that it is 'neither racist nor extremist' to raise 'genuine concerns' about the *flood of asylum seekers*, then it is no longer feasible to pretend the crisis doesn't exist. (2007, p. 112)

Hart then proceeds to show how a conceptual “blending network” is constructed based on Fauconnier and Turner’s model of conceptual blending (2002, pp. 39-57):

... prompted by “flood” and “asylum seekers”, two mental spaces are constructed which enter into a conceptual integration network. Emergent structure arises in the blended space in which the two counter-part elements in each input space are fused through composition. The blending process, then, produces emergent structure in which the migration of people is conceptualised as a flood of water (a topoi of danger). ... The conceptualisation of an ongoing “flood of asylum seekers” immediately warrants the implementation of restrictive immigration policy in order to “stem the flood”.

In this reading of the 2nd paragraph of the BNP manifesto, Hart argues that using “flood” as a metaphor for “immigration” and using “asylum seekers” as a metaphor for the immigrants is a discourse structure that leads the reader to agree with the idea of implementing a “restrictive immigration policy in order to ‘stem the flood’” of persons of other races into Britain.

The basic argument of Hart’s article is that Conceptual Blending Theory “accounts for some of the conceptual operations performed during discourse” and is of “particular significance in CDA” because ideology involves “forming a coherent view of reality” that privileges one class over another. He notes that cognitive linguistics “provides tools with which CDA can specifically attend to conceptualization” as it is embedded in discourses (2007, pp. 108-109).

I agree with Hart’s view of the relation between conceptualization and discourse. In this study I analyze the relations between reading (as a process of conceptualization and re-conceptualization) and conceptions in research discourses.

1.2 Basic Relations in the Analysis of Conceptions

Logistical Discourse Analysis is based on a theory of reading as a process of conceptualization and re-conceptualization. However, its objective is not to analyze complete readings of a text as is the case in literary criticism but to analyze readings of discursive structures in texts, in particular, research conceptions.

Tuen van Dijk observes that critical discourse analysts focus on conceptions such as “power,” “dominance,” “hegemony,” “ideology,” “class,” “gender,” “race,” “discrimination,” “interests,” “reproduction,” “institutions,” “social structure,” and “social order” (2001, p. 354). In a manner that parallels CDA, I analyze research conceptions in Communication Studies. My focus is on conceptions as discursive structures embedded in research discourses. In addition to Hart’s use of cognitive linguistics, in particular, conceptual blending theory, I have developed a theory of reading based on conceptual logistics (CL), the study of the “routing” of conceptions as they are used in research discourses.¹ To

¹ The theory of discursive logistics is based on the works of Charles Fillmore (2006), Eleanor Rosch (1978), Michael Halliday (1978; 2002, 2009b; 1976; 1993; 2004; 1989), Ronald Langacker (1972, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2008), George Lakoff (1987; 1980; 1989), Charles Johnson (1980; 1999), Giles Fauconnier (1974, 1985, 1997; 1996; 2002), Giles Fauconnier & Mark Turner (2002;

distinguish my form of discourse analysis from CPA, I refer to it as logistical discourse analysis (LDA). It tracks the “logogenesis” (the unfolding of meaning) in texts. It shows the ways in which discursive structures such as conceptions instruct readers how to construct the meaning of texts.

Conceptions are not commonly understood as discursive structures, especially not as inter-discursive structures. Nor are they commonly understood as the outcome of conceptualization, Hart being an exception. LDA is designed to analyze textual units, in effect, segments of texts, namely conceptions. The analysis of conceptions such as “power,” “dominance,” etc. is of obvious importance in critical discourse. The analysis of research conceptions such as “framing,” “agenda setting,” etc. is of importance in understanding the conceptual changes that constitute the collective use and evolution of scientific inquiry.

Though I begin with the smallest discursive unit, the concept, my intention in what follows is to delineate the discursive outcome of conceptualization—conceptions and their conceptual development or logogenesis. I focus on several key relationships: words and concepts, conceptions and concepts, conceptions and conceptualization, conceptions as an object of analysis in LDA, conceptions as protologs and analogs, conceptions and their boundaries, conceptions and mental spaces, conceptions and conceptual blending, conceptions and conceptual logistics.

1.2.1 Concepts and Words

For Gilles Fauconnier “Language does not carry meaning, it guides it” (Fauconnier, 1994, p. xxii). He quotes Mark Turner's *Reading Minds* for a succinct account of this premise:

Expressions do not mean; they are prompts for us to construct meanings by working with processes we already know. In no sense is the meaning of [an] ... utterance “right there in the words.” When we understand an utterance, we in no sense are understanding “just what the words say”; the words themselves say nothing independent of the richly detailed knowledge and powerful cognitive processes we bring to bear. (Turner, 1991, p. 206)

Words, as expressions in a text, become concepts only when persons conceptualize them.

1.2.2 Conceptions and Concepts

In Ronald Langacker's view, the term “concept” refers to an outcome of the cognitive activity of conceptualizing, that is, of combining a word-form such as *finger* with a conceptual domain such as a hand. It is impossible to understand what a finger is without framing it against the background of a hand. (Langacker, 2002b, p. 147 ff.).²

1989), Paul Thagard (1992; 2005; 2012), James Paul Gee (1999; 2011; 2011), Stephen C. Levinson (2000), Rom Harré & Grant Gillett (1994), and Robin Wooffitt (2005).

² Two other linguists have views similar to Langacker's but use different terms. In Charles Fillmore's frame semantics our understanding of concepts is dependent upon how they are networked within the cognitive framework that is needed to contextualize them (2006). In Michael Halliday's view, meaning is dependent upon contexts of situations (2009a).

Concepts can only be understood within a related conceptual framework. The framework of hand and arm within which we understand the concept of a finger is a cognitive framework which is not usually made explicit because it is a commonplace aspect of our experiences. On the other hand, less familiar contextual frameworks are usually made explicit. Consider the difference in these sentences:

1. TV ears has probably saved many marriages.
2. TV ears, which receives the audio portion of a TV program without the volume on, has probably saved many marriages in which one spouse wants to watch TV in bed when the other wants to sleep.

The first sentence is virtually meaningless without the frameworks provided by the second. The concepts that are critical as a framework for understanding sentence #1 are:

- 2a. wireless set of head phones
- 2b. [watching] a TV program without the volume on
- 2c. in bed
- 2d. one spouse wants to watch TV and the other wants to sleep

With this framework in mind the sentence on TV Ear's website, "The feature that my wife likes best is that we can put the TV on mute when she goes to bed and I can still enjoy my shows," makes sense.

One of the familiar connections between concepts and conceptions is the TOPIC-COMMENT STRUCTURE of clauses, for example: "TV ears is a wireless set of head phones." TV Ears is the topic and "a wireless set of head phones" is the comment.

LDA goes beyond the clause. It concerns the analysis of discourse structures, in particular a TOPIC + **sequences** of COMMENTS about it. There is no standard terminology that refers to this commonplace discursive structure. In LDA, concept refers to a TOPIC & a COMMENT about it. By contrast, in LDA a conception refers to a TOPIC + **sequences** of COMMENTS about it.

Although there is no standard term for the "TOPIC + **sequences** of COMMENTS about it" structure, it is discussed indirectly as a process in the 2004 edition of *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. In their chapter on "Around the Clause: Cohesion and Discourse", Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen discuss logogenesis—the unfolding of meaning in a text (2004, p. 530). In describing logogenetic patterns in the unfolding a text's meaning, they use the term "theme" which they earlier pair with "rheme" as broader categories than topic and comment.³ In later chapters that consider discourses that go "beyond the clause," "theme" is one of the aspects of textual cohesion. Words that refer to elements of situations, for example, when repeated, provide "thematic prominence." For instance, when the word, "intelligent"—or one of its variants, occurs repeatedly in a description of a person it makes that attribute prominent.

A theme that is central to a discourse acquires (for readers) the status of a "dominant topical theme." Such themes provide "consistency" in the acquisition of new information because it becomes a "Given"

³ "The label 'Topic' usually refers to only one particular kind of theme, the 'topical Theme'." In their view, topic is related both to 'Theme' and 'Given' in the textural structures 'Theme' + 'Rheme' and 'Given' + 'New' (2004, p. 65).

to which "New" information can be added (2004, pp. 526-529). Continuing with my example in the preceding paragraph, once intelligent becomes in a reader's mind a given fact about a person, it provides a basis for related terms such as "innovative," "incisive," "knowledgeable," and so on.

A familiar example of this logogenetic pattern is characterization. A particular character (participant in a scene) acquires the status of a dominant topical "theme" because of its prominence in the text and provides a "Given" to which "New" information can be added. For example, a participant in a scene may have several "roles" in it. Further, the same participant in subsequent scenes may have additional roles in them. According to David Herman, who is a proponent of Halliday's functional view, the participant is a character in a storyworld and its varying roles as they unfold characterize him or her.⁴ From another perspective, which is not functional, characters in storyworlds have "traits." Seymour Chatman, for example, is a proponent of this view:

I argue—unoriginally but firmly—for a conception of character as a paradigm of traits; 'trait' in the sense of 'relatively stable or abiding personal quality,' recognizing that it may either unfold, that is, emerge earlier or later in the course of the story, or that it may disappear and be replaced by another. (1978, p. 126)

Chatman understands characterization as traits forming a paradigmatic "assemblage" that intersects with "the syntagmatic chain of events that comprise the plot" (1978, p. 127). In both views characters are an *ongoing* mental assemblages of traits and roles in readers' minds. Characters and characterizations are two linguistic structures that enable processing narrative discourses. Concepts and conceptualization are similar linguistic structures that enable processing non-narrative discourses.⁵

In this chapter, I focus on non-narrative discourse structures and draw a parallel with the narrative segments, character and characterization, to clarify the distinction between concepts and conceptions.⁶ Just as characters are understood as more and more complex figures as readers add roles and traits to them, so too, concepts are understood as more and more complex conceptual frames as readers add related frames and references to them.

2.3 Conceptions and Conceptualization⁷

These two concepts are the opposite sides of the same coin.⁸ Conceptualization refers to the cognitive

⁴ See David Herman's *Story Logic* for a detailed account of this functional view of character & characterization (2002, p. 133 ff.)

⁵ Discourses often contain both narrative and non-narrative segments.

⁶ The term, "conception," refers to the expression in a text of the outcome of the process of conceptualization.

⁷ Etymologically, conception is from the verb *concipere* (conceive) and turned into a noun with the addition of "-ion." 1300–50; Middle English *concepcion* < Latin *conception-stem* of *conceptiō*), equivalent to Latin *concept-* (see *concept*) + *-iōn*. Noun of action from *concipere* (see *conceive*).

Originally in the womb sense (also with ref. to Conception Day in the Church calendar); mental sense is late 14c. Meaning "that which is conceived in the mind" is from 1520s.

⁸ Recent discussions of "discursive psychology" (Harré & Gillett, 1994; Wooffitt, 2005) argue that it is a mistake to understand discourse as the representation of a mental state. Rather, it is a social interaction in a specific situation. In LDA

activity of construing meaning from situations. Conceptions refer to the *linguistic expression* resulting from construing meaning from situations—the expression of an abstract or general idea inferred or derived from specific instances. Conceptions are discursive structures bound together by the same topic forming a semantic network within which the inter-related concepts are understood as a meaningful unit to which I refer as a conception.⁹

To illustrate the relationship between conceptualization and conception consider the following example, Robert Entman's "Framing" (1993). An LDA of his essay would involve listing the sequence of sentences in his discourse that have the same topic—for instance, framing.¹⁰ Reading through this list would require conceptualizing the text clause by clause. This, in effect, would add the various ancillary concepts associated with this topic to the conception framing in the reader's memory system. This "encyclopedic" mental space is a semantic network in which the various conceptualizations of framing are related to each other as a kind of mental "concept map." (See Chapter 8.)

One of the basic assumptions of cognitive linguists is that "Linguistic meaning is encyclopedic" (Geeraerts, 2006a, p. 4; Langacker, 2000). From another perspective, "one cannot understand the meaning of a word (or linguistic expression in general) without access to all the encyclopedic knowledge that relates to that word" (p. 15). In this context, as a reader of the list of sentences about framing, my store of possible meanings for the expression are indefinitely expandable. However, as a discourse analyst, the possible meanings are limited to those encoded in a particular text.

1.2.4 Conceptions as an Object of Analysis in LDA

As I have already stipulated, words in texts do not convey meaning until they are conceptualized by someone (2.1). Words in texts such as research articles are conceptualized by readers; or, to put it

conceptualization is viewed as a social interaction in which language "does" things to affect the interaction. Harré and Gillett, in particular, criticize cognitive linguists for assuming the existence of mental states. I am using the term, conceptualization, to refer to the way in which reading, is a social interaction in which concepts are maneuvered in response to the another person's discourse. In my view this is an interpretation of Langacker's model of conceptualization as a grammar. I do not believe that the assumption that cognitive activity refers to mental states is a factor in LDA. See footnote #12.

⁹ Every research project is governed by the concepts used by its members. In many projects terms cluster around a key conception. For example, although the authors of frame analyses employ numerous other terms (schema, script, prototype, Idealized Cognitive Models, etc.), "frame" is the signature term of these research projects. Signature terms are often given the status of conceptual touchstones—delineations of conceptions that are proposed as standards. In some cases a particular delineation of a signature term is regarded as a standard. It functions in a research community as a conceptual "touchstone" and is often cited in discussions of the research projects associated with the term. For example, when a particular publication has been identified by other researchers as an exemplary delineation of a term, it becomes a touchstone. This is the case with Robert Entman's essay, "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm," with respect to the concept "frame" (1993). As I hope to demonstrate in later chapters, the notion of a touchstone concept that can be used as a standard definition is not viable. I mention the notion here because references to "touchstone concepts" (standard definitions) is a common practice among researchers, particularly in their textbooks.

¹⁰ The conception of framing would include the concept frame.

somewhat more crudely are “used” by their readers for various purposes—to learn about recent research in a particular area, to compare another research project to their own, to satisfy curiosity. Conceptions as “usage events” are the object of analysis in LDA.

Research articles, to begin with the obvious, are read. Reading, of any sort, is a “usage event,” a use of language. In Ronald Langacker's view, a usage event occurs when persons use their knowledge of a language system to construct or re-construct particular linguistic structures in a meaningful way. To accomplish this they construe the expressions in a text as instances of conceptualizing a specific situation. This task involves marshalling available resources including “memory, planning, problem-solving ability, general knowledge, short- and longer-term goals, as well as full apprehension of the physical, social, cultural, and linguistic context” (Langacker, 2000, p. 99).¹¹

In the context of LDA, a usage event is a “reading event” understood from the perspective of the person interpreting expressions in a discourse who is, of course, a reader. Numerous cognitive abilities are required in reading events. In the paragraphs that follow, I draw upon a semantic network of terms clustered around the verb λέγειν, which can refer to reasoning by using language, to characterize reading events.¹²

In my example from *Through the Looking Glass*, the word “glory” becomes the focus for gathering information about the meaning the passage being read. As the words related to it are gathered in memory, various conceptual changes occur. The first instance of the word can be called a “protolog” when the reader conceptualizes it. Subsequent occurrences of the term in clauses sentences governed by it—as in the example of “glory”—result in “re-readings” (re-conceptualizations of the concept) and can be called “analogs.”¹³ This process of conceptualizing and re-conceptualizing is logistical. It involves the movement of meaning, a process of reasoning about sequences of reading events to understand

¹¹ Langacker characterizes usage events in the “A dynamic usage-based model” chapter of his *Grammar and Conceptualization*:

It is not the linguistic system per se that constructs and understands novel expressions, but rather the language user, who marshals for this purpose the full panoply of available resources. In addition to linguistic units, these resources include such factors as memory, planning, problem-solving ability, general knowledge, short- and longer-term goals, as well as full apprehension of the physical, social, cultural, and linguistic context. An actual instance of language use, resulting from all these factors, constitutes what I call a *usage event* the pairing of a vocalization, in all its specificity, with a conceptualization representing its full contextual understanding. A usage event is thus an utterance characterized in all the phonetic and conceptual detail a language user is capable of apprehending. For immediate purposes it makes no difference whether we consider the speaker or the addressee, since each has to establish some connection between the linguistic system and a usage event that supposedly manifests it. In comprehension, the hearer has to interpret the event as the intended realization of particular linguistic structures. In production, the speaker has to select linguistic structures capable of evoking the desired contextual understanding, and has to then ensure that the event can indeed be so interpreted. (Langacker, 2000, p. 99)

¹² One of the meanings of the Latin verb “legere” is “to read.” It comes from the Greek verb λέγειν whose meanings include: to collect, gather, select, and speak. λέγειν is derived from λόγος which means word, speech, discourse, or reason. λόγος is related to λογιστικός (the Latin form of which is logisticus) which means to reckon or reason. It is also related to ἀνάλογον which means corresponding. This semantic network provides the basic terminology for logistical discourse analysis together with the addition of proto + λόγος meaning the first discourse. All of these cognitive activities—to which the verbs refer—are components of reading events.

¹³ In LDA I term the topic or focal concept “logos” (or “log”). Combined with the prefixes “proto” and “ana” to indicate the temporal relation between concepts or conceptions The terms, protolog and analog are related to the Greek λόγος —word, saying, speech, discourse— which can mean a part of a discourse or an entire discourse. In this case the protologs and analogs are structures within discourses or discourses within a corpus.

them.¹⁴ As the reading advances, the meaning of the text changes as readers interpret it much as I did with the passage from Lewis Carroll.

1.2.5 Conceptions and Protologs and Analogs

Reading is a cognitive process that has a temporal dimension. Reading events ("readings") occur in temporal sequences. As readers conceptualize texts they produce concepts whose meanings evolve into conceptions. The string of clauses in which the same concept (word-form) is the TOPIC of numerous COMMENTS accumulate meanings and produce complex concepts or conceptions. The topic is the focal concept and the comments describe it with ancillary concepts.

The discursive structure of TOPIC + sequences of comments is invariably a protolog/analog sequence. This phenomenon pertains not only to single discourses such as research articles but also to sequences of articles. The first text in which a conception is expressed can be construed as a protolog in relation to subsequent texts containing the same concept (word form). For example, Entman's 1993 conception of framing followed by his 2003 conception—the former is a protolog in relation to the latter. The 2003 text is part of the evolution of the meaning of his conception of framing, that is, as a re-conceptualization of it.

Analogs are construed as instructions about how to re-conceptualize a conception. The analogs appearing in a sequence of discourses about the same problematic are construed as a process of re-conceptualization: protolog > analog A > analog B > analog C > analog ⁿ.

LDA analyses are usually presented in the form of charts that show the relations between the protolog and analog terms used and their co-texts. The data presented in the charts can be summarized as a description of the evolution of a conception underlying a particular term. Or, in the case of discourse sequences authored by different researchers, it is considered a description of a usage tradition.

1.2.6 Conceptions and their Boundaries

Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Dionysis Goutsos argue in "The Study of Discourse," the first chapter of their *Discourse Analysis*, that the basic unit of analysis is a text (2004, p. 6).

Discourse analysis endorses its own distinctive view of data. In the same way that, for example, experimental phonology has to work with isolated words or sentences in an artificial environment, the study of discourse calls for the analysis of real texts in actual environments and the spurning of fabricated examples. Actual (as opposed to invented) texts are critically important because they constitute appropriate evidence for studying the function of linguistic

¹⁴ As I mentioned earlier, Halliday and Matthiessen use the term logogenesis to refer to "the creating of meaning in the course of the unfolding of text" (2004, p. 530).

devices.¹⁵ As stressed above, the study of discourse is a study of contexts and situated use. Only actual data can be relied upon in studying important aspects of the context such as the stance of discourse participants towards the texts which they create. The main interest in discourse studies is not to make a point of theory; texts, instead, are both the starting and endpoint of analysis. In consequence, discourse analysis subscribes to the principle of the empiricist tradition that 'language should be studied in actual, attested, authentic instances of use, not as intuitive, invented, isolated sentences'. (Georgakopoulou, 2004, p. 22)

Georgakopoulou and Goutsos point out that "By taking text as the basic unit of analysis, we assume that it can be regarded as an autonomous unit, an entity that has some unity or self-sufficiency" (6). For them a text is "a concrete, material record of the process of communication" (6.) Moreover, "As a record, every text has discrete limits (beginning and end) and constitutes a self-contained whole" (2004, p. 1).¹⁶ Texts, from this point of view, set boundaries on conceptions.

Because texts have beginnings and endings, they provide boundaries for conceptions. The end of Entman's article, "Framing," is also the "end" of his conception of framing in that instantiation of it. He went on to discuss framing in later articles. The conception of framing in his 1993 essay is distinguishable from his conception of framing in his 2003 "Cascading Activation." (See Chapter 8.) The boundaries of his conceptions of framing are texts.¹⁷

1.2.7 Conceptions and Mental Spaces

In Fauconnier and Turner's model of conceptual blending "mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action" (2002, p. 102). The activity of conceptualization (combining and un-combining concepts) takes place in our minds. Recently, mental space theory, pioneered by Gilles Fauconnier, has provided a notational system to link cognitive activities such as "combining" or "adding" to linguistic expressions (Fauconnier, 1994, 1999; Fauconnier & Sweetser, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 2002).

Concepts in this model are mental spaces and so are conceptions. Earlier I distinguished between a concept and a conception by stipulating that the former has the structure of TOPIC + COMMENT and the latter, TOPIC + sequence of COMMENTS. With the "topic," identified as a "mental space," it is quite common for subsequent sentences continue to unfold its meaning by adding "comments" (also mental spaces) to the topic. For example, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's delineation of the concept of a mental space in their *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*:

¹⁵ The "fabricated examples" included in this paper are not instances of discourse analysis. Rather they are examples of the linguistic structures characteristic of a specific form of discourse analysis—LDA.

¹⁶ As a "self-contained whole," a text is an article, book chapter, or essay. There are other possibilities aside from these—letters, email messages, interviews (published research texts are the main units of analysis in LDA).

¹⁷ In some cases different texts may contain the same conception. In 1993, Entman authored "Framing" and co-authored another with Andrew Rojecki on the Anti-nuclear movement. Not surprisingly the conception of framing in both are virtually identical. Nonetheless, the two conceptions can be distinguished because they are applied to different situations. Conceptions are encyclopedic and their conceptual frameworks reflect their uses.

As we have seen, mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models. ... mental spaces operate in working memory but are built up partly by activating structures available from long-term memory. Mental spaces are interconnected in working memory, *can be modified dynamically as thought and discourse unfold*, and can be used generally to model dynamic mappings in thought and language. (2002, p. 102, italics mine)

Each sentence in this paragraph adds ancillary concepts as comments on the topic of mental spaces. The subsequent paragraphs continue this logogenetic pattern which ends with the end of the text.

Mental spaces are expressed in language as linguistic structures. Thus, the logogenetic pattern I traced above on the model of topic + comment has the linguistic structure of a clause. A complex of clauses forming a unit by virtue of the cohesive device of a TOPIC governing the COMMENTS is regarded in LDA as a conception. As the meaning of mental spaces unfolded in the passage above, its relevance to LDA emerges, namely that a conception is a semantic network of mental spaces governed by a focal concept as the heading of this section indicates.

1.2.8 Conceptions and Conceptual Blending

In the context of mental spaces, it is worth noting that Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner argue that: "conceptual blending is a basic mental operation with highly elaborate dynamic principles and governing constraints ... whose result is to bring together elements of different domains" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 37). Paul Thagard describes a closely related concept, convolution, as a combination of representations (concepts) resulting in a new representation (conceptual change) (Paul Thagard & Findlay, 2012, p. 109 ff) LDA tracks conceptual blending (conceptual change).

The significance of tracking conceptual blending is that it is the way in which conceptual changes are introduced into a discourse. Conceptions are the string of clauses in which the same concept (word-form) is the TOPIC of numerous COMMENTS.

Conceptions, by definition,¹⁸ have the following structure:

- An initial topic (concept) + ancillary concepts = the PROTOLOG CONCEPTION followed by
- the same topic + additional ancillary concepts = an ANALOG CONCEPTION #1 followed by
- the same topic + additional ancillary concepts = an ANALOG CONCEPTION #2 followed by
- the same topic + additional ancillary concepts = an ANALOG CONCEPTION #3 followed by
- and so on.¹⁹

¹⁸ "Definition" is used here in a special sense—rather than the record of widespread usage, a specific usage is stipulated as the meaning of a term in the context of this paper.

¹⁹ In certain cases, the pattern involves subtraction rather than addition.

The analogs, by definition, are changes in the focal topic, which is the conception being tracked. LDA tracks changes in conceptions.

1.2.9 Conceptions and Conceptual Logistics

Conceptual logistics is the theoretical model on which *logistical* discourse analysis is based. In LDA, logistics²⁰ is a synonym for Halliday and Matthiessen's term, "logogenesis"—"the creating of meaning in the course of the unfolding of text," which usually is expressed as a protolog/analog sequence. Such conceptual changes are the focus of conceptual logistics. Conceptual change, as Kuhn, Thagard, and others argue is the core of scientific inquiry (Bird, 2009; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; T. Kuhn, 1965; T. S. Kuhn, 1977; T. S. Kuhn, Conant, & Haugeland, 2000; Paul Thagard, 1992; Paul Thagard & Findlay, 2012; Vosniadou, 2008).

In his *Conceptual Revolutions*, Thagard notes that:

In the philosophy and history of science, the question of revolutionary conceptual change became important with the 1962 publication of Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. [But] the importance of the problem of conceptual change is not restricted to the history and philosophy of science. Conceptual change is of general psychological interest, since people other than scientists experience it. (1992, pp. 3-4)

In the "Why Conceptual Change Matters" chapter of *The Cognitive Science of Science*, he offers three reasons:

First, understanding conceptual development matters for the general appreciation of the structure and growth of scientific knowledge.

Second, conceptual development is not just an occurrence in the history of science, but also in the history of every child.

The third reason why conceptual change [matters is] its relevance to science education. (2012, pp. 195-196)

Influenced by Kuhn, Thagard, and other philosophers of science and cognitive scientists, I developed a theory of conceptual logistics which is the basis of this study.²¹

²⁰ In contemporary usage, logistics which initially referred to the moving and quartering of troops, now pertains to organizing supplies. However, if we construe supplies as concepts that need to be moved through mental spaces and quartered in cognitive frameworks, this sense of logistic[s] describes conceptual logistics and LDA. Given the current use of the term, popularized by TV ads for UPS, refers to the organization, routing, and distribution of packages. The term, packages, metaphorically, can refer to the processing of packages of meaning. This corresponds to the model of mental spaces as described by Fauconnier and Turner as "conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action [as] assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models" (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 102).

²¹ Though I authored the theoretical accounts of conceptual logistics, I am deeply indebted to my colleagues, Gordon Carlson and Jordan Stalker both of whom joined me in founding the Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research (SCLCR) and provided very constructive criticism and innovative ideas. Carlson translated much of theory of conceptual logistics into various learning tools on sclcr.com.

1.3 Concluding Remarks

In the previous section, I called attention to the philosophers of science and cognitive scientists who believe that conceptual change is not only crucial to understanding the development of scientific inquires, but also to understanding our thought processes and to the education of scientists. Logistical Discourse Analysis is a tool for tracking conceptual change. It is based on a theory of conceptual logistics and a theory of reading as conceptualizing and re-conceptualizing clauses in texts.

The title of this study, *Reading and Analyzing Texts*, contains an ambiguity central to discourse analysis—analysts are readers of texts in two capacities. They have to read the text in order to analyze it. They have to analyze the linguistic units in texts in order to construct readings of them. Using discourse analysis to construct readings of texts that reveal their conceptual developments requires tracking the conceptions in them.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 2 Units of Analysis in LDA

ABSTRACT:

In Logistical Discourse Analysis (LDA) the basic object of analysis is a conception which is understood as a conceptual network of comments on a particular topic. In this context, there are several “units of analysis” because conceptions have various discursive structures: reading events, protologs, protolog/analog pairs, protolog/analog sequences, alternative conceptions, and histories of conceptions.

CONTENTS:

- 2.0 The Basic Object of Analysis in LDA is a conception
 - 2.0.1 Conceptual Networks
- 2.1 Units of Analysis
 - 2.1.1 Protolog/Analog Reading Events
 - 2.1.1.1 Protologs
 - 2.1.1.2 Protolog/Analog
 - 2.1.2 Protolog/Analog Text Sequences
 - 2.1.3 Alternative Conceptions
 - 2.1.4 Histories of Conceptions
- 2.2 The Discursive Turn among Some Social Scientists

2.0 The Basic Object of Analysis in LDA is a conception.

To illustrate this point, consider the following sequence of sentences as a discourse:

Communication is an interaction with ourselves or with others. Our communication may not be comprehensible all time and *for* everyone. But we must communicate and we must express ourselves. It is a necessary and important human activity. Communication is a social process involving countless ways in which human beings keep in touch with one another. We use communication to express our inner purposes, attitudes, and feelings; to describe events and objects of the external world and to share ideas. Interest in the study and practice of 'communication' has increased since WWII. As a result, definitions of 'communication' have varied widely in terms of purpose, nature, level of abstraction, and scope. In public communication, three elements play critical roles—Ethos, Logos, and Pathos. Ethos refers to the character of the speaker, Logos is power of reason and evidenced in text and speech and Pathos concerns emotions elicited in an audience. The patterns of social communication constitute the world, as we know it. (Based on “Concept of Communication” (Narula, 2006)

Nine of the ten sentences are direct comments on the concept of communication. The ninth sentence is indirectly related to the concept of communication.

1. Communication is an interaction with ourselves or with others.
2. Our communication may not be comprehensible all time and for everyone but we must communicate and we must express ourselves.
3. It is a necessary and important human activity.
4. Communication is a social process involving countless ways in which human beings keep in touch with one another.
5. We use communication to express our inner purposes, attitudes, and feelings; to describe events and objects of the external world and to share ideas.
6. Interest in the study and practice of communication has increased since WWII.
7. As a result, definitions of 'communication' have varied widely in terms of purpose, nature, level of abstraction, and scope.
8. In public communication, three elements play critical roles—Ethos, Logos, and Pathos.
9. Ethos refers to the character of the speaker, Logos is power of reason and evidenced in text and speech and Pathos concerns emotions elicited in an audience.
10. The patterns of social communication constitute the world, as we know it.

We can say that communication is the focal concept and that interaction, comprehensible, activity, social process, express, interest, ethos, logos, pathos, social pattern, and the world as we know it are ancillary concepts used as comments on the focal concept communication.

The author of these ten sentences is putting into words the mental activity of *conceptualization* and we, as readers, can construe all ten sentences as his *conception* of communication. In other words, conceptions are comprised of the clauses that comment on the “focal concept,” in this case on communication. This linguistic structure is the basic object of analysis in LDA.

2.0.1 Conceptual Networks

Within a discourse conceptions are related to other conceptions forming a network. The focal concept is networked to ancillary concepts. However, the ancillary concepts can become the focal point of their own networks. What emerges is a comprehensive network in which ancillary concepts are nodes that are related to other concepts at various levels of specificity. As a focal concept, communication may be related to sender, receiver, message, context, and code. On the next level, code may be related to encoding, decoding, cultural codes, and text. Only the size of the discourse limits the levels of specificity. The concept map on “communication” below illustrates this pattern.




Figure 1

In figure 1 communication is the focal concept and appears in the center of the map. Sender, receiver, message, context, and code are already directly related to it by the lines coming from the focal concept communication. Code, although an ancillary concept to "communication," also forms a conceptual network. As the concept map shows, it is related to the concepts mentioned above: encoding,

decoding, cultural codes, and text by lines emanating from it as a node in the Communication network. "Encoding" is an ancillary concept in the "code" network at a different level of specificity.

Conceptions, from this point of view, are conceptual networks. Each ancillary concept expands the meaning of the focal concept in the network.

2.1 Units of Analysis

Conceptions, as the focal point of conceptual networks, contain various "nodes" or "ancillary concepts."²² At the same time, they may be related to another discourse or several other discourses in which they are also the focal terms.²³ Units of analysis have the same boundaries as the object of analysis—texts. However, the textual boundaries of conceptions can be grouped in several ways. The following list is not exhaustive:

1. PROTOLOG/ANALOG READING EVENTS: A conception, as a sequence of reading events, is a unit of analysis bound by the text which enables it. Within a text the first reading event in which a focal concept occurs in a topic/comment structure is usually followed by analogs constituting a conception.
2. PROTOLOG/ANALOG TEXT SEQUENCES: A particular author's conception often occurs in sequences of texts published at different times in which the first publication is a protolog and the subsequent ones are analogs.
3. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS: A conception may be related to a discourse in which it is the focal term but is a contrasting conception by a different author. For example, the term "frame" is a focal concept in numerous discourses authored by different researchers—Minsky, Goffman, Fillmore, Entman, etc. Each of these authors have a different conception of the same term.
4. CONCEPTUAL HISTORIES: From another perspective, the authors who have different conceptions of a "frame" may have been influenced by earlier authors and borrowed aspects their conceptions of a "frame" thus constituting a history of the term as it has evolved in the various uses of it by a succession of authors. Each of these relations can become a *unit* of a discourse analysis focused on the term, "frame."

Throughout this study, I will use the conception of a "frame" or of "framing" as examples to illustrate different aspects of LDA. In particular I will use Robert Entman's articles and book chapters concerning his mode of frame analysis as the main example

2.1.1 Reading Events

²² Focal concepts are governed by the objective of the analysis. A concept, for instance "code," is ancillary to the concept "communication" as the focal concept governing the structure of a conception of communication. However, another analysis may have as its objective the concept, "code," in this particular discourse which would make it the focal concept governing the structure of a conception of codes.

²³ I use the expression "term" rather than the expression "concept" in this passage to avoid confusion. Terms are concepts—the term, "frame," refers to a concept of "frames."

As I stipulated in the Introduction, a reading event is a "usage event," a use of language. In Ronald Langacker's view, a usage event occurs when persons use their knowledge of a language system to construct or re-construct particular linguistic structures in a meaningful way. To accomplish this they construe the expressions in a text as instances of conceptualizing a specific situation (Langacker, 2000, p. 99). Following the linguistic clues, readers re-construct the meaning of a text in order to approximate the original construction of the text which constitutes a usage event. In any logistical analysis, the user of language is invariably a reader, hence the unit of analysis is a reading event or a reading.

A reading event is the smallest unit of analysis in LDA. It might be a single sentence or a group of sentences depending on the topic. The focal concept in a particular analysis, for instance "frame," may be the topic of a sentence or, owing to anaphoric devices, the topic of several sentences. In LDA a reading event is defined as a TOPIC/COMMENT construction. From this point of view, a conception is a collection of discrete reading events in a semantic network governed by a specific TOPIC.

2.1.2 A Protolog/Analog Text Sequences

Entman, whose methodology is frame analysis, has conducted dozens of analyses using his evolving conception of framing.

(1989). *Democracy without citizens: media and the decay of American politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

(1991). Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. *Journal of Communication*, 41 (4), 6-27.

(1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43, 51-58.

(1993). with Rojecki, A. Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the U.S. Anti-Nuclear Movement. *Political Communication*, 10, 155-173.

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(2005a). Media and Democracy without Party Competition. *Mass Media and Society*, 251-270.

(2005b). The Nature and Sources of News. In K. Jamieson & G. Overholser (Eds.), *Institutions of American Democracy: The Press*. Oxford, U. K.: Oxford University Press.

(2007). Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power. *Journal of Communication*, 57.

(2009). with Livingston, S., & Kim, J. Media Framing Biases and Political Power "Doomed to Repeat: Iraq News, 2002-2007. *American Behavioral Scientist* 51.

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If I choose his well-known 1993 essay on framing as the protolog in my analysis of his publications, it is followed by a sequence of analogs. I could have chosen his 1991 conception or even his 1989 conception where he uses the term schema explaining in a footnote that he prefers it to the term frame. Whichever publication I chose as a protolog, LDA would show the evolution of his conception as he researches different news reports of different situations involving US policies. Each situation presents him with a different historical event and with correspondingly different coverage of it. When a sequence of analogs is the focus of analysis, the expectation is that the differences in the situations being researched will result in changes in the focal concept designed to "fit" them.²⁴

2.1.3 Alternative Conceptions

Differing conceptions of the term, framing, have been used in a variety of disciplines. They are alternative uses of the term related to differing circumstances in which it was used. As an Artificial Intelligence researcher, Marvin Minsky's (1974) use of the term reflects his engagement with information systems. The same year (1974), Irving Goffman proposed a conception of framing from a sociological perspective. He based his conception on an earlier psychological formulation (1955) by Gregory Bateson. Charles Fillmore proposed a linguistic formulation of the term (1982). William Gamson, a sociologist proposed a formulation of the term (1989) based on Todd Gitlin's *The Whole World is Watching* (1980) who, while acknowledging Goffman's use of the term, based his on Gaye Tuchman's use of the term (1978).

When alternative conceptions of a term are the focus of analysis, the expectation is that the term is used in different research situations. Gitlin acknowledges Goffman's use of term in analyzing everyday life but chooses to base his use of the term on Tuchman who is concerned, as Gitlin is, with media frames.

²⁴ When a conception is used in research, usually the situations in which it is used change. For example, Entman's study of White House news frames after 9/11 is followed by *Projections of Power* which draws upon the various frame analyses he conducted. They consider different situations, the Soviet downing of a Korean airplane, the war against Iraq, military actions against Grenada, Lybia, and Panama. His 1993 essay concerns a theory of framing which is situated differently than his studies of news-frames.

Unfortunately, many Communication textbooks offer only one definition of a term and do not acknowledge its varied use by different communication researchers, not to mention its contrasting uses in other disciplines. Kuhn's 1990 conception of a lexicon as a resource for researchers who are formulating their projects makes excellent sense in this context. Scientific inquiry does not advance using standard conceptions but by formulating new conceptions.

2.1.6 Histories of Conceptions

One of the most famous histories of a concept is A. L. Kroeber's and Clyde Kluckhohn's *Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Their objective, much like that of Entman in researching the concept framing, was to gather as many definitions, statements, and commentaries on the concept of culture and examine them for "affinities" in order to formulate a definition that can "assist other investigators in reaching agreement and greater precision in definition by pointing out and commenting upon agreements and disagreement in the definitions thus far propounded" (1952, p. 6).

LDA is a tool that can produce histories of concepts. However, my intention in developing it, is almost the opposite of Entman's or Kroeber & Kuckhohn's. If, for example, I used LDA to produce a history of the concept, framing, it would **not** have as its objective a synthesis of the data that I collected. Rather, my objective would be to provide a "lexicographic" perspective for the formulation of a new conceptions of framing to fit novel research situations. It would be futile to attempt a synthesis of Minsky, Goffman, Bateson, Fillmore, Gamson, Gitlin, and Tuchman because the situations they investigated governed the construction of their conceptions. Creating an abstract definition by synthesizing all of its predecessors independently of a problematic situation would be an empty exercise.

It is not the affinities in the various conceptions of framing that are important but the contrasting differences. For example, Bateson's understanding of framing provides a perspective from which the limitations of Entman's conception come into view. To synthesize the two conceptions would not fix the limitations brought into view—namely that frames are dependent upon an individual's experience and that there is no way of ascertaining that newspaper readers share the same cultural frames aside from interviewing them. The perspective Bateson provides would more productively lead a researcher to incorporate ethnography into her new conception of framing. Another perspective that histories of conceptions can provide is to identify "blind alleys" that investigators should avoid.

Foremost, histories of conceptions provide concepts that can be creatively blended together to invent new conceptions.²⁵ In addition they are primers for learning how to blend concepts together.

2.2 The Discursive Turn among Some Social Scientists

²⁵ Entman's claim to have synthesized the available definitions of framing is dubious. It can be demonstrated that he borrowed concepts from the available definitions and blended them into an altogether novel conception.

The idea that histories of concepts, by revealing past conceptual changes, are "primers" for learning the art of conceptual blending—which Paul Thaggard argues is synonymous with scientific creativity, fits quite well with the discursive turn in social science as well as with the Thomas Kuhn's view of scientific lexicons. Recent theories argue for a direct connection between discourse and cognition (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Te Molder & Potter, 2005). In their view, the mental activities associated with conceptualization need to be understood as discursive responses to social interactions. This suggests that the discourse analysis of conceptualization by revealing how a text instructs readers to reconstruct the author's original conception provides the analyst with linguistic cues on how to combine concepts.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 3

Key Premises on which LDA is Based

ABSTRACT:

The *sine qua non* of research is discourse. It provides not only a lexicon of concepts organized in conceptual networks but also patterns of organization. Premises specific to LDA include:

- Research is governed by the conceptual networks that constitute models of the situation being analyzed.
- Analyzing research discourse is necessarily a comparative procedure.
- Discursive structures are instructions to readers about how to re-conceptualize the author's conceptions.
- The linguistic unit, conception, is an instructure embedded in the discourse.

CONTENTS:

3.0 Key Premises on which LDA is Based

3.1 Every research project is governed by the concepts used by its members

3.2 Analyzing changes in research conceptions requires a comparison of published versions based on a problematic.

3.3 Statements about conceptions are instructions to readers

3.4 Texts contain instructures that provide guides for readers to construct the text as a discourse

3.5 Conceptions in texts are re-conceptualized as discursive structures by readers

3.6 Conclusion

3.0 Key premises on which LDA is based

LDA was designed and developed to analyze conceptual changes in research publications, specifically in Communication Studies. The idea behind LDA had its origins in debates in the philosophy of science about Thomas Kuhn's conception of a paradigm and his responses to his critics. What made these debates especially fascinating was that, while they were about conceptual changes in scientific inquiry, Kuhn was changing his conception of paradigms. The debates had relatively little effect on scientists. The hard scientists were not often interested in theoretical accounts of what they were doing. Social scientists, who found the concept of a paradigm a way of justifying their status as a discipline, referred to Kuhn's work in testimonial fashion. When the debates waned as *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* gained wide acceptance, Kuhn continued rethinking his conception of a paradigm and by 1990 had abandoned it. Nonetheless, the concept of a paradigm remained a focus of discussions about the extent to which specific studies could be counted as scientific disciplines. This was a critical issue in Communication Studies which was struggling to find a disciplinary identity as it evolved away from speech communication and shifted its focus to mass media studies after the Second World War.

Ironically, just as Kuhn was about to present his new conception of the structure of scientific revolutions in 1990, two volumes of *Rethinking Communication* were published (Dervin, Grossberg, O'Keefe, & Wartella, 1989). The first volume was entitled *Paradigm Issues* and the second was *Paradigm Exemplars*. As Communication Studies gained a foothold in the academy, these considerations virtually disappeared. Although the debate died out, the concept of a paradigm was retained, in particular, the phrase "paradigm shift," which was attributed to numerous publications involving conceptual changes.

The impetus to develop Logistical Discourse Analysis (LDA) to track conceptual changes came from three considerations: (1) textbooks in Communication Studies pay little attention, if any, to conceptual changes, (2) conceptual change in the sciences became a research topic (Paul Thagard, 1992; Paul Thagard & Findlay, 2012; Vosniadou, 2008), and (3) Thagard and others regarded conceptual change as central to scientific inquiry.

Given this history, it is not surprising that a number of "premises" related to conceptual change are specific to LDA and distinguish it from other types of discourse analysis. The governing premise of LDA is that **the sine qua non of research is discourse**. The other premises are derived from this. Research is governed by the concepts used by researchers because they communicate with each other through discourses that convey their conceptualizations of projects. Conceptual change is central to the development of research and can be traced only by comparing the discourses in which the concepts occur. Moreover, discourses have to be read or heard which means that researchers have access to the conceptions in them only by re-conceptualizing both their semantic and episodic textual structures. These premises are derived from the work of linguists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers of science in the context of analyzing conceptual change in research.²⁶

²⁶ The linguists involved are Charles Fillmore (2006), Eleanor Rosch (1978), Michael Halliday (1978; 2002, 2009; 1976; 1993; 2004; 1989), Ronald Langacker (1972, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2008), George Lakoff (1987; 1980; 1989), Giles Fauconnier (1974, 1985, 1997; 1996; 2002), Giles Fauconnier & Mark Turner (2002; 1989), James Paul Gee (1999; 2011; 2011), Stephen C. Levinson (2000), Paul Werth (1999), and Robin Wooffitt (2005). The philosophers and social scientists are Charles Johnson (1980; 1999), Paul Thagard (1992; 2005; 2012), Thomas Kuhn (1977; 1962; 1977; 2000), Rom Harré & Grant Gillett (1994), Dudley Shapere (1977), and Steven Toulmin (1972).

3.1 Every research project is governed by the concepts used by its members.

Notice now that a lexical taxonomy of some sort must be in place before description of the world can begin. Shared taxonomic categories, at least in an area under discussion, are prerequisite to unproblematic communication, including the communication required for the evaluation of truth claims. (Thomas Kuhn, “The Road since Structure,” 1990, pp. 92-93.)

The lexicon of terms that characterizes research projects refer to the situations being analyzed. The situation dictates the terms that describe it. These terms form a semantic network that functions in the inquiry as a model of the aspect of the situation being investigated. The aspect of the situation which is the focus of the analysis is, in one sense or another, a problem. In the study of communication, researchers focus on two broad categories of problems—unknown ramifications and malfunctions. Unknown ramifications usually accompany new developments in communication technologies that present novel situations—for instance, the advent of the World Wide Web which changed the way many persons typically communicate. Malfunctions usually occur in established communicative situations in which miscommunication occurs.

When the unknown ramifications or the miscommunications are investigated, conceptual models of the situations are developed to enable the research. I will refer to this phase of research as the development of a problematic—the articulation of a hypothesis about the problem.

Problematics structure the ensuing investigation. Since problematics are hypothetical conceptual models of communicative situations, the network of concepts underlying them, which are accessible only through discourses, govern the conduct of the researchers.

3.2 Analyzing changes in research conceptions requires a comparison of published versions based on a problematic.

... scientific development must be seen as a process driven from behind, not pulled from ahead-as evolution from, rather than evolution toward. In making that suggestion, as elsewhere in the book, the parallel I had in mind was diachronic, involving the relation between older and more recent scientific beliefs about the same or overlapping ranges of natural phenomena. (Thomas Kuhn, “The Road since Structure,” 1990, pp. 96-97.)

The initial articulation of a problematic is usually found in the first discourse in a sequence of related publications. In LDA this instance is considered a *protolog* and all subsequent revisions of the conception are *analog*s to it. This is a pattern of “evolution from.”

protolog] analog A] analog B] analog C] analog n]

The sequence is governed by a problematic—the articulation of a hypothesis about the problem being searched or the description of a model of the problem. A problematic changes as situations or the

perception of them change. The question of "revolutionary" conceptual changes that constitute a NEW problematic, as I mentioned in the Preface, is described by Thomas Kuhn:

To indicate what is involved I must revert briefly to my old distinction between normal and revolutionary development. In *Structure* it was the distinction between those developments that simply add to knowledge, and those which require giving up part of what's been believed before. In the new book it will emerge as the distinction between developments which do and developments which do not require local taxonomic change. (The alteration permits a significantly more nuanced description of what goes on during revolutionary change than I've been able to provide before.) (presented in 1990 and published posthumously in 2000, p. 97)

From this perspective, a new problematic is one that requires a different conceptual network than the previous one, which, practically speaking, is discernable when the ancillary concepts accompanying a focal concept are replaced by new concepts which are related to each other in new ways. The scope of the changes distinguishes between revolutionary changes that require a new lexicon and modifications of the existing lexicon.

LDA tracks both revolutionary and non-revolutionary changes in the conceptual networks constituting a conception.

3.3 Statements about conceptions are instructions to readers

Language does not carry meaning, it guides it. (Fauconnier, 1994, p. xxii).

Expressions do not mean; they are prompts for us to construct meanings by working with processes we already know. (Turner, 1991, p. 206)

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, statements about conceptions are, in effect, instructions to readers about how to construct their meanings (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Langacker, 1999, 2002a, 2002b; Lee, 2004). Discourses about conceptions are understood as sets of instructions to readers about how to re-construct the author's conception. In this context, analogs are construed as instructions about how to re-conceptualize their protologs to fit different situations that require changes in the conceptual networks that model them. The analogs appearing in a sequence of discourses about the same problematic are construed as a process of re-conceptualization.

Citing Peter Harder's *Functional semantics: a theory of meaning, structure, and tense* in English (1996), Ronald Langacker writes:

From an interactive perspective, linguistic structures are usefully thought of as instructions issued by the speaker for the addressee (Harder 1996). We can make this evident by slightly rephrasing the descriptions of various notions. We have described an expression's profile, for example, as the entity it puts onstage as the focus of attention. Alternatively, we might say that it constitutes an instruction to focus attention on that entity. A nominal grounding element, described as singling out a referent from the range of candidate instances, can equally well be characterized as an instruction for the hearer to find the referent. And instead of saying

that believe invokes a mental space representing the subject's conception of reality, we can describe it as instructing the hearer to invoke it. The directive force of expressions should not be overstated—seldom does it rise to the level of ordering. Usually it is just a matter of eliciting the hearer's cooperation based on default expectations: minimally, that the hearer will attend to what is said and apprehend it in accordance with established convention. (2008, p. 460)

In their *Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics*, Croft and Cruse note that Charles Fillmore argues that the meaning of concepts is related to experience rather than to a logical system independent of experience. They emphasize one of the important implications of this view:

Fillmore uses a tool metaphor to describe the understanding process (1982, p. 112):

... a speaker produces words and constructions in a text as tools for a particular activity, namely to evoke a particular understanding: the hearer's task is to figure out the activity those tools were intended for, namely to invoke that understanding. That is, words and constructions evoke an understanding, or more specifically a *frame*; a hearer invokes a *frame* upon hearing an utterance in order to understand it. (2004, p. 8 italics mine)

For Fillmore, a writer or speaker uses words, symbolizing units of meaning, as tools to construct a text in a way that allows readers or listeners to re-construct its meaning, namely by invoking frames. For example, the first sentence in J. O. Greene's article on the concept of action assembly in the *Encyclopedia of Communication Theory*, (2009): "Action assembly theory [AAT] is an approach to explicating the processes by which people produce verbal and nonverbal messages" instructs the reader to place the concept in the category of "an approach." It goes on to instruct the reader to place "an approach" in the context of "explicating." And so on. As readers process the numerous instructions in the article concerning action assembly, they construct [conceptualize] the meaning of the conception.

3.4 Texts contain instructures that provide guides for readers to construct the text as a discourse

From an interactive perspective, *linguistic structures* are usefully thought of as instructions issued by the speaker for the addressee (Peter Harder, *Functional semantics*, 1996, italics mine).

To produce a text, the author has to make countless semantic and syntactic choices. In doing so, he or she constructs a verbal artifact. Texts are constructions comprised of structured word choices intended to be understood as meaningful discourses. Readers in acts of reading attempt to re-construct the writer's text by using the linguistic devices to approximate the author's choices.

Generally speaking, texts are sequences of words that have a marked beginning and ending. Words structure texts in part by the way they are positioned. In clauses, subjects are followed by predicates. Clauses are combined into sentences the beginning of which is marked by a capital letter and the end by a period. Sentences are combined into textual units. The concept of a discourse refers to textual units that have been combined into meaningful wholes. The meaningful discourse that the writer implants in his text is inert after he completes it until it becomes the symbolic action of a reader.

The words of a text can be considered cues to its meaning. The words of a text do not exist in a vacuum. They are related by linguistic markers to other words or co-texts. There are various types of linguistic devices that function as cues. In *Cohesion in English*, M. A. K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan identify the linguistic devices that allow texts to be cohesive, principally reference, substitution, ellipsis, and conjunction (M. A. K. Halliday & Hasan, 1976). Each of these categories of cohesive devices contain numerous words and phrases that function as reference, substitution, ellipsis, or conjunctive devices. Halliday's and Hasan's term is "tie," suggesting that these devices *tie* textual elements together. In LDA, the term "tie" describes writing a text, whereas the term "cue" describes reading a text. It is through such devices linking words to each other that texts can be understood as coherent, thus meaningful.

Writers employ "ties" that "cue" readers how to re-construct the texts coherently. These "instructions" are conceptual tools that inform readers how to re-build the text a writer built. These ties/cues are usually employed to form textual structures. These are larger textual segments that function in texts as modules of potential meaning, for example, speech acts such as questions, statements, etc. Speech acts are, in turn, elements in larger structures, for example arguments or descriptions. These modules are the building blocks of texts. Their "architectural" structure may be called an **instructure**, that is, the structure the writer embeds *in* the text and the reader interprets as a set of **instructions**.

3.4.1 Instructures as Implied Text Worlds

How do we make sense of complex utterances when we receive them (as hearers or readers)?

I will suggest that an important part of the answer ... is that we build up mental constructs called text worlds. We can for the moment think of these as conceptual scenarios containing just enough information to make sense of the particular utterance they correspond to. (Paul Werth, *Text Worlds*, 1999, p. 7.)

A central aspect of the cognitive process of *constructing* a text as a discourse is creating mental models or constructs of the various scenarios that situate the text and that contextualize specific clauses in it. For instance, to understand what you are now reading you create consciously or, more likely, unconsciously a mental picture of a writer drafting a text. You might form a mental image of a text similar to the page you are reading and a mental image of a situation as the event of writing the sentences on the page. You infer that, if you are reading this text, someone wrote it.

By integrating the instructions in the text with your remembered experiences, a textworld is **incarnated** in your imagination. Depending on how you have construed the context of situation—my writing this discourse which you are reading—most likely from past experiences of writing texts that are read. When I write "I am sitting in a chair," the chair you imagine might look like the chair you sit in when you write. However, if I now write "I just fell through the seat of my chair," chances are that you did not have a mental picture of me sitting on an old wicker chair and you would have to re-imagine the scenario. As we proceed through discourses we create mental worlds, populated by persons and things, scenarios and their duration, which Paul Werth calls a "text world" (1999). Some narratologists, David Herman for instance, similarly suggest that to read narratives you create a mental "story world" (2002, pp. 5-6).

In LDA, discourses, from the reader's perspective, are considered incarnate text worlds. They are rarely made conscious although, if readers were asked to describe the incarnated situation, they could readily

do so.

3.5 Conceptions in texts are instructures.

Every linguistic expression, at its semantic pole, structures a conceived situation (or scene) by means of a particular image. In conceptualizing a scene for expressive purposes, the speaker (and secondarily the hearer, in *reconstructing* the speaker's intent) is obliged to make choices with respect to the various parameters ... (Ronald Langacker, *Foundations*, 2002, p. 128, italics mine.)

In LDA conceptions are discursive structures that conceptualize or model a specific situation. From the point of view of readers, they are instructures.

3.2 Conclusion

Discourses provide not only an array of concepts organized in conceptual networks but also patterns for using them, for example, descriptions that map spaces, arguments that ask you to make inferences, explanations that invite you to believe something, narratives that tell you a story. These patterns can be understood as instructures, that is, as sets of instructions. The linguistic unit, a conception, is an instructure embedded in the discourse.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 4

The Reader's Situation

ABSTRACT:

Reading is a communicative situation. In the absence of writers, readers have to reconstruct the text from various linguistic structures embedded in it as instructions placed there by writers. Using pre-texts, contexts, texts, and instructures readers re-construct written texts into meaningful discourses. Their typical reading strategies in the process of re-assembling the original conceptions from textual units are to seek coherence among them, contextualize them, frame them, and integrate them. Analysts are, *de facto*, readers but their agendas go beyond re-constructing the text into a meaningful discourse. They focus on specific analytic objectives.

4.0 The Reader's Situation

- 4.1 Readers and Their Readings
- 4.2 Four Typical Reading Goals
 - 4.2.1 Readers Seek Coherence
 - 4.2.2 Readers Contextualize Texts
 - 4.2.3 Readers Frame & Re-frame Texts
 - 4.2.4 Readers Integrate Conceptions In Texts
- 4.3 Discourse Analysts Are De Facto Readers
- 4.4 The Logistical Discourse Analyst as A Reader

4.1 Readers and Their Readings

The salient aspect of the situation in which readers read is that the person or persons with whom they are communicating are not usually present. As a result, the readers' task is to re-construct the written texts without the writer or writers being present. In the preceding section, I argued that the structures of a writer's text can be understood as instructures, that is, as sets of instructions that are guides to reconstructing it. The reader's situation is described in figure 1:




Figure 1

Readers bring expectations to a text from their past experiences of texts which I term “pre-texts” in the sense that they exist prior to the reading. At the same time, readers draw clues from the textworld that enable them to contextualize it from their experiences. The reader's interaction with a text can be described as converting or translating the cohesion cues in the text to coherent meanings framed by their pretexts and contexts. Texts are inert until activated by reading—once written, they can only be re-situated for re-construction by readers.

The reader's expectations include the interaction of the six traditional components of communication: sender, message, code, context, receiver, and effect. Since I am describing these components from the perspective of readers, the terms in Figure 1 reflect their perspective: the concept of a text replaces that of a message, the cognitive framework the reader brings to the act of reading is named pre-text, the context is understood as the reader's construal of the communicative situation created by the author, and a coherent discourse is considered to be the effect the reader anticipates. Using pre-texts, contexts, texts, and instructures readers re-construct written texts into meaningful discourses.

Since the reconstructed meaning of a text resides in the minds of readers, we can stipulate that the result of re-constructing a text is a “reading.”²⁷ These reside in readers' memory systems. They are not full re-constructions of the text as it was processed but summaries of those aspects of the text which were salient to individual readers. This distinguishes ordinary readers from analysts—whereas ordinary readers produce readings summarily, analysts are more thorough and comprehensive. Whereas ordinary readers have personal habits of reading, analysts structure their readings guided by research

²⁷ Although it is not customary to refer to the writer's production of a text as a “reading,” writers do read the texts they have constructed largely to ascertain if they are readable. We can refer to this test run as a reading.

objectives and by methods of reading.²⁸ However, there are basic reading goals that all readers follow in deriving meaning from texts.

4.2 Four Typical Reading Goals

Readers and analysts alike have four reading goals: (1) finding a text's coherence, (2) recognizing how it is situated, (3) constructing its framework of meanings, and (4) integrating its concepts. Readers render texts coherent text-worlds with a meaningful frameworks by integrating their words into a whole. In other words, readers look for ways to reduce their uncertainty about the meaning of texts by seeking coherence, finding similarities to their experience of the world, choosing among alternative expectations as they proceed,²⁹ and—in effect—defragmenting it by integrating its elements

4.2.1 Readers Seek Coherence

In his influential study, *Understanding Reading*, Frank Smith defined meaning as "the reduction of uncertainty" (1971, p. 35)

The potential informativeness of a sentence lies in the extent to which it will reduce uncertainty in the listener, while the degree to which the receiver comprehends a sentence lies in the number of alternatives that are eliminated. Such a theory of meaning implies that one cannot discuss the "meaning" of a sentence as such, but only its meaning to a particular listener.

As I noted earlier, readers anticipate the textual choices writers make from a large array of possibilities. Their anticipation is based, in part, on the elements of potential cohesion the text offers at any moment of reading. In effect, readers comprehend texts by tracking their cohesion which at the level of discourse is understood as coherence. As De Beaugrande and Dressler note, a text makes sense because it exhibits continuity whereas a senseless or nonsensical text is one in which readers cannot discover continuity. Moreover, the overall sense of continuity is captured in a "textual world" (1981, p. 84).

4.2.2 Readers Contextualize Texts

As Charles Fillmore persuasively argues, meaning is dependent on the cognitive frameworks we bring to the reading of texts (1982). The frames that make up these frameworks are meaningfully related to our past experiences of the various situations in which we have been participants or observers. In his *Text Worlds*, Paul Werth argues (in parallel with Fillmore) that writers construct text worlds (experiential frameworks) that their readers can re-construct (1999).

²⁸ Janice Radway (*Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Fiction*) has done an excellent study of personal reading strategies that contrast sharply to those of literary critics (1984).

²⁹ As the linguist Michael Halliday reminds us readers understand the purport of the author's choices against a background of textual alternatives with which they are familiar (2002, pp. 23-81).

In considering the various contexts underlying discourses, we need to be mindful of the fact that re-constructing them is a process. With this in mind, LDA analyzes discourses as symbolic actions taking place over time within a continuously shifting frameworks.

4.2.3 Readers Frame & Re-frame Texts

In his *The Study of Language beyond the Sentence: from Text Grammar to Discourse Analysis*, Miguel Ángel Martínez-Cabeza points to specific relations of cohesion (as a textual feature) and coherence (as a discursive feature) to demonstrate some of the ways texts instruct their readers. Noting that cohesion is a necessary but not sufficient component of meaning and that inferences from “frames” are required to understand what the text leaves unstated, he writes: “The role of the receiver is not the reversal of the producer’s ... but a parallel” (2003, p. 83).

As readers move through the text, re-constructing it as a discourse, their expectations of what will come next are paramount. (For example, when texts reveal semantic choices that surprise readers, they revise their interpretation of the discourse which, in turn, arouses new expectations or frames.) Following Debra Tannen's account of the expectations of readers/listeners in *Framing in Discourse* (1993), I refer to readers expectations of the choices writers will make as the text unfolds by the term, “framing.” As I noted in the Preface, the sentences-already-read frame the sentences-being-read. This cognitive operation—conceptual blending—is repeated as the text is reconstructed by readers.

4.2.4 Readers Integrate Conceptions in Texts

In *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, Ronald Langacker argues that we possess cognitive abilities, for example “recall,” which allow us to construct conceptual worlds:

I have seen golf balls, for instance, and I have seen cubes, so it is easy for me to imagine what a cube-shaped golf ball would look like, though I cannot remember ever seeing one. . . . (2002b, p. 113)

This ability has been called the conceptual blending or integration of mental spaces by Giles Fauconnier and his colleague Mark Turner in their *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (2002).

LDA is based on the assumption that writers or speakers use concepts as tools to construct texts which readers or listeners reconstruct by following the ways the text instructs them to integrate its components. Langacker's example “I have seen golf balls, for instance, and I have seen cubes, so it is easy for me to imagine what a cube-shaped golf ball would look like” is an instance of conceptual blending. He constructed his sentence in a way that invites his readers to imagine a golf ball, then to imagine a cube, and then to blend the two in an image of a cube-shaped golf ball. Because we can recall experiences—seeing golf balls and cubes, we are able to follow his instruction to “imagine what a cube-shaped golf ball would look like” by integrating the two experience frames—golf ball & cube.

On another level, we have to understand that the frames we are using to make sense of a text undergo revising as we proceed through the text. As I suggested earlier, the chair you imagine when I write “I am

sitting in a chair” might resemble the chair you sit in when you write. However, if I continue with the sentence “I just fell through the seat of my chair,” chances are that you did not have a mental picture of me sitting on an old wicker chair and you would have to re-imagine the scenario. Re-imagining the text world is an instance of integrating frames. To integrate the initial frame with a subsequent frame requires reframing it. Reframing is, in Fauconier’s terms, “*conceptual integration*” (Fauconnier, 2000).

Fillmore and Langacker work with sentences. But, texts that go beyond the sentence similarly provide instructions for their hearers or readers. Modifying Fillmore's premise that understanding depends on framing by adding conceptual integration, we can say that readers invoke frames to understand the parts of texts that evoke them; and then, most often, re-frame them as their reading proceeds. Re-framing is an instance of conceptual integration and is a critical component of building textworlds.

These four goals guide readers in re-constructing the text as a meaningful discourse.

4.3 Discourse Analysts Are De Facto Readers.

Researchers who analyze texts are, *de facto*, readers of them. However, the agenda of researchers goes beyond re-constructing the text into a meaningful discourse. They focus on specific analytic objectives.³⁰ These objectives focus the attention of researchers on particular textual elements which are typically abstracted from the discourse as a source of data.

Research agendas normally result in what might be called coding templates that define linguistic units that are the target of the search. When analyzing the content of texts, some form of coding is usually involved.

Coding is 'the process whereby raw data are systematically transformed and aggregated into units which permit precise description of relevant content characteristics' (Holsti, 1969, p. 94). That is, it is the processes in which recording units are identified and linked to the conceptual categories. The rules by which this is accomplished serve as the operational bond between the investigator's data and his theory and hypotheses. If coding is performed by humans, it is necessary that the coder is able to accurately identify the recording units (e.g., clauses). The coder also has to apply the concept categories correctly. (Popping, 2000, p. 19)

According to Popping a textual unit is identified by the particular *category* to which it belongs. For example, to analyze an argument requires the category “argument” (a model of argument structures). The category argument links various statements to each other by identifiable linguistic devices, for example the connectives: given, if, then.

GIVEN statement a = b
IF statement b = c
THEN statement a = c.

³⁰ See The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton, 2001).

This discursive structure can be used as an analytic category to identify "arguments." In the process of analyzing a text, such categories are used as "lenses" to identify discursive structures. In effect, the category is a template to which the text is matched.

For example, in Deborah Tannen's "What's in a Frame? Surface Evidence for Underlying Expectations" (1993), she describes a discourse analysis to test the hypothesis that the structure of expectations are often culturally determined. The texts she examined were transcripts of a small group of young women who narrated the story of a short film they had just seen to another woman.

In connection with a project directed by Wallace Chafe, a movie was shown to small groups of young women who then told another woman (who they were told had not seen the film) what they had seen in the movie. The film was a six-minute short, of our own production, which included sound but no dialogue. It showed a man picking pears from a tree, then descending and dumping them into one of three baskets on the ground. A boy comes by on a bicycle and steals a basket of pears. As he's riding away, he passes a girl on a bike, his hat flies off his head, and the bike overturns. Three boys appear and help him gather his pears. They find his hat and return it to him, and he gives them pears. The boys then pass the farmer who has just come down from the tree and discovered that his basket of pears is missing. He watches them walk by eating pears. (1993, p. 21)

To identify data from the transcripts that would be relevant to the hypothesis, she "isolated sixteen general types of evidence which represent the imposition of the speaker's expectations on the content of the film" (1993, p. 21). The film was shown in ten different countries and the responses of the subjects compared. In Tannen's case, she compared responses from Greek subjects in Athens Greece to American subjects from Berkeley, California.

The sixteen "general types of evidence" were a list of "evaluative" linguistic phenomenon drawn from William Labov's model of narrative (1972). Tannen cites the transcript of an American as an instance of an expectation: "That's all I remember. You should have caught me ... ten minutes ago when I remembered." Tannen remarks that "The use of a *negative statement* is one of the clearest and most frequent indications that an expectation is not being met" (Tannen, 1993, p. 23). In context, the subject's expectation is that she should remember the details of the story. This expectation does not manifest itself as often in the Greek subjects as it did in the American subjects.

As Popping suggests, the linguistic unit is identified by the category to which it belongs. In Tannen's case, the category is "negative statements." Ordinary readers would not have similar agendas. They might have more personal categories that they look for—e.g., romance, action, suspense, but they would not look for the linguistic markers of these structures.

4.4 The Logistical Discourse Analyst as a Reader

Like other discourse analysts, logistical discourse analysts are readers. They differ from other discourse analysts because their specific objective is the analysis of conceptions. The principal textual features that LDA seeks to identify are conceptions understood as a semantic units—aggregates of concepts related to a conceptual topic.

LDA draws upon frame semantics for its principal analytic category (Fillmore, 2006). In Fillmore's view,

... a speaker produces words and constructions in a text as tools for a particular activity, namely to evoke a particular understanding: the hearer's task is to figure out the activity those tools were intended for, namely to invoke that understanding. That is, words and constructions evoke an understanding, or more specifically a frame; a hearer invokes a frame upon hearing an utterance in order to understand it. (Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 8)

LDA focuses primarily on frames (conceptions) that function as instructions for learning the concepts central to research in a field. Understanding a conception as an instruction requires examining its component concepts as micro-instructions — describing them as something that has been constructed in a manner that allows them to be reconstructed by persons other than the author(s).

Logistical discourse analysts as readers examine how concepts are conceptualized in discourses. This objective distinguishes LDA from other forms of discourse analysis.

Conclusion

To develop the logistical analysis of research texts, I used a model of reading based on cognitive linguistics together with a model of conceptualizing (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Thagard & Findlay, 2012). The model of reading described in this chapter also links reading to learning.³¹ Research articles instruct readers how to conceptualize unfamiliar concepts in order to comprehend conceptual innovations. Consequently, analyzing them must take into account how they are read.

This brings us to the dynamics of reading discourses. In the next chapter, I examine reading as a dynamic process of framing and re-framing texts in an effort to re-construct the coherent framework that writers constructed.

³¹ There are five inter-related cognitive models of learning used in LDA drawn from the recent researches of cognitive scientists and learning theorists. Paul Thagard's *Conceptual Revolutions* provides a model of conceptual change in scientific inquiry (1992). In "Concepts and Conceptual Systems" he outlines what would be required for a full representation of a concept (28). In *The Cognitive Science of Science* (2012), he describes scientific creativity as a process of convolution. In *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (2002), Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner outline the process of conceptual blending (which Thagard relates to convolution) as a model of the way we think. Fauconnier's early work on "mental spaces" (1994, 1999) is strongly linked to Ronald Langacker's model of conceptualization in his *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (2002b), *Grammar and Conceptualization* (2000), and *Concept, Image, and Symbol: the Cognitive Basis of Grammar* (2002a), which delineate the relationship of this cognitive activity and its expression in language. Frederic Reif's *Applying cognitive science to education: thinking and learning in scientific and other complex domains* (2008) provides models of the learning process as an intellectual performance involving declarative and procedural knowledge. He also offers accounts of "Producing Instruction to Foster Learning" (377-399) and "Implementing Practical Instruction." Gunther Kress in *Multimodality: A social semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication, Multimodal Teaching and Learning* (with Carey Jewitt, Jon Ogborn, and Charalampos Tsatsarelis) (2001), and *Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary Communication* (2001) provide a model of multimodal learning through discourse. L. Dee Fink's *Creating Significant Learning Experiences* (2003) provides a correlative model of designing a course as a significant learning environment, that is, as an environment that fosters the cognitive abilities required in learning. Ambrose, et. al.'s *How Learning Works: 7 Research-Based Principles for Smart Teaching* (2010) synthesizes contemporary learning theory.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter Five

A Model of Reading

ABSTRACT:

Using a "A Discourse on Discourse" as a case in point, this section proposes a model of reading suited to the discourse analysis of research articles. It describes reading as a dynamic process in which readers frame and reframe the sequence of linguistic units of the text as they intersect with what has already been read and remembered. The individual reader and his or her perspective is the starting point of the description. Readers as individuals have reading horizons bounded by the cognitive frameworks they bring to a text. This model of reading consists of four very general cognitive processes readers typically use to construct texts—seeking coherence, framing, re-framing (integrating concepts), and contextualizing by shaping textworlds from remembered experiences. These processes of construal draw upon cues and instructures in the text to reconstruct its meaning.

CONTENTS:

5.0 A Model of Reading

5.1 Reading Discourses

5.2 A Discourse on Discourse

5.3 The Reader's Point of View

5.4 Reading "A Discourse on Discourse"

5.5 Framing & Reframing "A Discourse on Discourse"

5.6 Conclusion

5.0 A Model of Reading

The model of reading I propose is a process of framing and reframing (conceptualizing and re-conceptualizing) during which readers bring pre-textual expectations to a text from their past experiences of texts and draw clues from the textworld that enable them to contextualize it from their personal experiences. The reader's interaction with a text can be described as converting or translating

the cohesion cues in the text to coherent meanings framed by their pretexts and contexts.

5.1 Reading Discourses

A Discourse instructs its readers how to read it. More accurately textual cues evoke conceptual frames that enable readers to construct discourses. In the previous chapter, I considered four very general cognitive processes readers typically use to construct texts—seeking coherence, framing, re-framing, and contextualizing by shaping textworlds from remembered experiences. In this section, I will offer an example of a discourse to illustrate textual instructures, the discursive structures that provide the materials from which readers construct texts as discourses.

5.2 A Discourse on Discourse

The following five sentences constitute a discourse:

A discourse is a situated text. A text is a sequence of clauses with a beginning and an end. They are always situated in time and space. They are constructed in ways that provide instructions for their reconstruction. This discourse is a text I constructed in my study in 2015 as an illustration of discourse structures.

Readers begin with the first sentence and move through to the fifth. Technically, readers begin with the first clause and move through to the last.³² For readers, constructing the meaning of a discourse from the instructions built into the text is a dynamic process. While the sequence of sentences consecutively frame each other, the remembered elements of the sentences already read not only frame the sentence being read but are frequently themselves reframed by the connectivity activated in readers minds. Reading is a continuous process of framing and reframing along the two intersecting axes of the discourse.

³² There are more than 8 clauses in the text. In order to keep the diagram that follows simple enough to discern the structure of framing/re-framing, I kept it at 8.

As the diagram of reading dynamics suggests reading is a process of framing and reframing from cues that lead to a coherent framework that permits readers to grasp the meaning of the text. This cognitive process turns texts into meaningful discourses. By contrast, writing is a cognitive process that turns intended discourses in the author's mind into texts. Texts are complex linguistic structures that instruct readers how to re-construct the intended discourses of writers. As I noted earlier, in LDA the linguistic devices deployed in texts to instruct readers are termed "cues" and "instructures."³⁴ This symbolic interaction can be summed up in the statement that textual instructures evoke discursive structures. I begin with the way in which readers are situated when communicating with writers.

5.3 The Reader's Point of View

The Reader's Situation was described in chapter 4 with the diagram:




Figure 2

A reader's point of view in this situation is that of a single individual construing a written text.

5.3.1 The Reader's Horizon

As I have implied in earlier remarks, a reader's horizon is bounded by the conceptual framework [pre-texts] he or she bring to the reading situation. The more capacious the pre-texts, the richer and deeper the meaning derived from the text.

According to Maria A. Langleben there are "grades of reading":

The efforts invested by the reader [R] in his quest to make a text [T] connected can be graded; his duty is: [a] to verify the grammatical wellformedness of the T; [b] to check the reasoning of lexical combinations suggested by the T; [c] to discover overt content structures intended by the author of the T; [d] to reveal covert content structures that might be hidden in the T. (1989, p. 441ff.)

³⁴ Langacker argues that "To qualify as a discourse, the component expressions must be apprehended in relation to one another (not as isolated occurrences). Each pertains in some way to what has gone before—whether by building on it, reacting to it, or just by changing the subject—and sets the stage for what will follow. Hence one aspect of an expression's import, often a crucial one, is how it relates to previous or following expressions" (2008, 460). Cues show how expressions relate to each other.

Langleben's argument hinges on her theoretical model of the "barriers" texts put up for their readers. She assumes the reader's goals are to verify, check, discover, and reveal "objective" elements in texts. Though I believe that grading human readers is, at best, impractical, and, at worst, foolhardy, her argument is suggestive. It is likely that readers' horizons differ to the extent to which they have successfully responded to the cues and instructures in texts. Such differences present a difficult problem in LDA as the analyst has to work *as if* he or she were a reader. I will return to this problem in a later section.

5.4 Reading "A Discourse on Discourse"

I have stipulated at the outset of this section that reading is a process of framing and reframing from cues that lead to a coherent framework readers use to comprehend the meaning of a text. I will discuss each part of the process separately even though the cognitive processes involved cannot be separated while reading. Readers do not normally break up texts into parts in order to see how the parts fit together into a whole but analysts typically do.

5.4.1 Coherence in "A Discourse on Discourse"

The continuity of "A Discourse on Discourse" is made possible by the inter-relations among its various cues [cohesive devices] and discursive structures—e.g., clauses forming an argument. In place of the right angle diagram above, I will use a table showing the sequence of the main clauses:

#	CLAUSES	TOPIC	COMMENT
1	A discourse is a situated text.	a discourse	= situated text
2	A text is a sequence of clauses with a beginning and an end	a text	= a sequence of clauses with a beginning and an ending
3	Texts are always situated in time and space.	[Texts]	= always situated in time & space
4	They are constructed.	[Texts]	= constructed
5	to provide instructions for their reconstruction	[Texts]	= in ways that provide instructions for their reconstruction
6	This discourse is a text	This discourse	= is a text
7	I constructed in my study in 2012.	I	constructed [this text].
8	as an illustration of discourse structures	[This discourse]	= an illustration of discourse structures

Table 1

5.4.2 Cohesive devices

The words, "a," "they," "with," "in," "and," "to," "for," "their," "my," and "as," are extremely important as cohesive cues because they "tie" concepts together, functions that can be easily recognized by English speaking subjects but functions that readers do not typically make conscious. For analysts, words such as "they" in sentence 4 of "A Discourse on Discourse" shows that sentences 3 and 4 have the same topic and both comments in these sentences apply to "texts."

5.4.3 Topics and Comments

Clauses contain topics and comments. Though there may seem to be two topics in this discourse [discourse & text], there are actually five. "A discourse" is not the same topic as "this discourse." "A discourse" refers to any discourse. "This discourse" refers to the five sentences above. "A text" refers to any text. "Texts" refers to all texts as an aggregate which implies that they can be treated as a whole even though there are many different kinds of texts. The difference between "a text" and "texts" is not as critical in construing the meaning of the paragraph as the distinction between "a discourse" and "this discourse." The subject of seventh clause, which is a component of the fifth sentence, is a fifth topic—"I."

As we read the text, the first topic, "a discourse," is defined. The second topic, "a text," is understood as a part of a discourse since it is framed by the first clause even though the concept of a discourse is not in the clause defining the second topic. The third topic, "texts," is semantically related to the second topic as its plural. This reframes our conception of "a" text putting us in mind of many texts which we now understand as not only comprised of clauses but also situated in time and place. The fourth and fifth clauses have the same topic as the third clause thereby extending the "definition" of texts to include construction and instructions. The sixth and eighth clauses are self-referential. Since the seventh clause situates the paragraph in space and time identifying the author "I," the place, "study," and the time, 2015, we are instructed in the eighth clause to read the whole as an illustration of discourses as situated texts.

The topic/comment structure of clauses, in effect, provides cues for reading a discourse because it ties specific concepts in the text to each other.

5.5 Framing & Reframing "A Discourse on Discourse"

As readers progress through the topic and comments of "A Discourse on Discourse" they initially frame the topics, discourse and text, and then re-frame them. As Langacker remarks in his chapter on "Discourse" in his *Cognitive Grammar*, "From a theoretical standpoint, we can sensibly say that all linguistic elements are both prospective and retrospective. Where they differ is in the specificity of the expectations they engender" (2008, p. 461). Framing is a prospective construal and re-framing is a retrospective construal.

The 5th clause clearly invites the reader to reframe all of the preceding sentences. In this example, it should be noted, each subsequent sentence reframes the preceding sentences. The 7th clause also reframes the preceding clauses by raising the question of authority and bringing to mind Georgakopoulou and Goutsos' warning that "the study of discourse calls for the analysis of real texts in

actual environments and the spurning of fabricated examples” (2004, p. 22) which, in this instance, I have bracketed in favor of providing a clear example, having earlier made the same point with “real texts in actual environments.”

#	CLAUSES	FRAME	RE-FRAME
1	A discourse is a situated text.		
2	A text is a sequence of clauses with a beginning and an end	discourse = text [a written document with numerous words & sentences] in a place at a time	discourse = text = written doc with numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place at some time
3	Texts are always situated in time and space.	discourse = text = written doc with numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place at some time	discourse = text = written doc with numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place = space at some time
4	They are constructed.	discourse = text = numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place = space at some time	discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place = space at some time
5	to provide instructions for their reconstruction	discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units in a place = space at some time	discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space at some time
6	This discourse is a text	discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space at some time	this discourse = discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space at some time
7	I constructed in my study in 2012.	this discourse = discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space at some time	I constructed this discourse = discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space = my study at some time = 2015
8	as an illustration of discourse structures	I constructed this discourse = discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space = my study at some time = 2012	I constructed this discourse = discourse = text = construction of numerous words = clauses as sentence units = instructions for reconstruction in a place = space = my study at some time = 2012 to illustrate discourse structures

Table 2

5.5.1 Contextualizing the "Discourse on Discourse"

Though contextualizing any discourse is complex, I will focus on the overarching type of contextualizing—constructing a text world.

The textworld that emerges from the "Discourse on Discourse" is one in which a text is constructed to illustrate the components of discourses. This one is situated with me as its author in my study in 2015. This text world arises sequentially as its various topics on the paradigmatic axis are contextualized by the comments on the syntagmatic axis. The first five clauses are statements, so they presuppose a writer whose tone is academic relating concepts to each other to form something of a model of a discourse. The last three clauses confirm this scenario naming the writer, the place, notably a study, and the time, 2015.³⁵

The 5th sentence, in particular the 7th clause, reveals the most crucial information about the text world, namely that I constructed the discourse. This FRAME could lead to substantial REFRAMINGS of the previous sentences. For example, that I constructed the data which functions as evidence in my argument casts the argument in a completely different light as potentially quite subjective. What might have seemed self-evident now invites reconsideration. The first claim, that "a discourse is a situated text," may now be seen as a definition of a discourse that is not a standard one. Whereas the meaning of this sentence may have been self-evident [of course every written document was written at some time in some place, using this common sense observation as a definition] but functioning as a premise it is not self-evident. Additionally, your horizon as a reader may or may not include the difference between traditional discourse linguistics which studies written texts independently of their situational contexts and the more recently developed cognitive linguistics in which discourses are considered to be inseparable from their situatedness—an aspect that distinguishes them from texts.

This is a simple and partial reading of the "discourse on discourse" but it is intended only as an illustration of one aspect of discourses—their dynamic textworlds. I try to suggest how a text world comes into being in a reader's imagination. If the reader knows who I am [an Emeritus Professor of Communication] and where I live [Chicago, IL], he or she forms a more complete and concrete text world, particularly if he or she has visited me and seen my study with its shelves harboring numerous books on cognitive linguistics. The characterization of "I" deepens with additional input from a reader's past experiences of me—for example, knowing that I have taught courses in discourse analysis.

Had the last three clauses not been a part of the discourse on discourse, a reader would have a shallower picture of the textworld. The deeper—more detailed—the text world, the more meaningful it is for a reader. Whether shallow or deep, textworlds are tools for reading.

5.6 Conclusion

The conception of reading advocated in this paper is that reading is a process of framing and reframing from cues that lead to a coherent framework with which readers can grasp the meaning of a text.

³⁵ I take the situation to consist of two scenarios—the scene of writing and the scene of reading. Similarly, there are two situational contexts, the cognitive frameworks of the writer and of the reader. However, since the analysis is from the standpoint of the reader, the scene of writing and the context of writing are construed from the reader's point of view.

Within the boundaries of readers' horizons, which are limited by the pertinence of their pre-texts, readers approximate the writers' intentions to the extent that they respond appropriately to the cues and instructures of a text that are made available to them as they read.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 6 A Model of the Analyst

ABSTRACT:

As I argued in an earlier chapter, the analyst is a reader with an agenda. LDA takes a “competent” reader’s perspective from which the analysis is conducted. This perspective draws upon the linguistic devices in the text that imply aspects of a writer who constructed the text. The competent reader is a personification of the knowledge base the analyst uses to determine the statistically most likely interpretation of the text. “It” (the competent reader) has several functions—tracking the framing/reframing dynamic built into texts, tracking textual instructures such as conceptions, arguments, stories; and evaluating texts. Finally, since the analyst as a person has an agenda, he or she usually comments on the extent to which the goals included in the agenda were met.

CONTENT:

6.0 A Model of the Analyst

- 6.1 The Analyst's Main Perspective is from the writer's Point of View
- 6.2 The Analyst as the Competent Reader
- 6.3 The Competent Reader has several Functions
- 6.4 The Analyst's Commentary

In what follows, I describe how an analyst functions in LDA. The model of an analyst I am about to describe, to begin with, is **a generalized idea** and includes numerous functions that are not always used in a specific type of analysis. After identifying the analytical perspective that governs the analysis, I then propose several functions of the logistical discourse analyst drawn from analyses I have conducted.

6.1 The Analyst's Main Perspective is from the Writer's Point of View

In LDA analysts view texts from the writer's perspective because they are examining how the texts were

constructed. Of course, as persons, their situation relegates them to the status of readers. Typical readers, however, do not analyze how the text was constructed. When typical readers reconstruct texts from linguistic cues, they do so to enable them to conceptualize the meaning of the text. Analysts, on the other hand, identify the textual units, the linguistic devices that ties them together, and their functions in the textual system. Their situation parallels persons who in order to learn how something works, take it apart, and then put it back together again. To demarcate the difference, I refer to the reader's *reconstruction* of the text and to the analyst's *reassembling* the text.³⁶ Whereas readers reconstruct the author's construction in the sense of repeating it, albeit approximately, analysts re-assemble the structures of the text, having dis-assembled it. From the point of view of an author, the analyst examines how readers are guided in reconstructing the original construction.

THE LOGISTICAL ANALYST'S PERSPECTIVE




figure 6.1

Analysts re-assemble texts written by other persons from the writers' perspectives as shown in figure 6.1.

1. Having read the text beforehand, the analyst re-reads it searching for any linguistic markers of its original construction.
2. Having identified as many markers as possible, the analyst then takes the perspective of a person constructing the text.

³⁶ The analyst's method is not auto-ethnographic, reflecting on his or her acts of reading. Granting that auto-ethnographic elements are an unavoidable aspect of an analysis, the focus of the analyst is not on acts of reading but on the structures of the text that permit them.

3. Bracketing out personal pretexts and contexts, the analyst assumes the role of the “competent reader” (see 6.2) and begins slowly re-assembling the text clause by clause.

The readings that result from an analysis are impersonal. They are robotic by comparison with an actual person's readings. They are governed by the functionality of the linguistic devices embedded in texts. Pretexts are restricted to the knowledge which is required to make sense of textual structures—e.g., the sentence, "The nature of RAM prescribes frequent saving," cannot be comprehended without some knowledge of how computers work. The knowledge assumed by an analyst in this case is generic, in most respects drawn from Grice's theory of implicature, in particular the “maxims of conversation” associated with “the co-operative principle” (Pragmatics, Levinson, 2000). Following the “maxim of quantity”—be as informative as required by the exchange and not more informative, an analyst contextualizes the sentence about the nature of RAM as a general reference to the implied audience, namely skilled users of computers because an explanation of RAM is omitted. Whereas ordinary readers contextualize texts like the sample sentence from their experiences of computers, analysts restrict the context of the sample sentence to computers in general not to a specific type of computer nor to a particular manufacturer of hard drives or a particular user.

6.2 The Analyst as Competent Reader

During the period when Reader-Response Criticism and Reception Theory was developed (60s-70s), there were many discussions of how best to conceive readers of literary texts in analyses of them. The discussion swirled around the implied reader, the ideal reader, the model reader, the resisting reader, the narratee. The reader I postulate as a logistical discourse analyst comes closest to the notion of an ideal reader. Given the emphasis in LDA on the recognition of language functions tied to linguistic devices and the difficulty of identifying the characteristics of an ideal reader, I propose the concept of a “competent” reader.

In the previous section I argued that the analyst's "main perspective" was from the point of view of the writer but that the analyst's situation was that of a reader. In other words, the analyst is a reader whose point of view is the writer's. As I indicated in the previous paragraph, I will call this type of reader, a competent reader. By using this adjective, I hope to evoke earlier discussions of "competence" in which competence was distinguished from performance.³⁷ The acts of reading of a typical reader of texts constitute a performance. This performance depends upon the person's "communicative competence," upon knowing the various "rules" and "functions" that texts have. In the case of analysts, competence includes knowing specialized functions, for example, the function of the various anaphoric devices that make texts cohesive.

My choice of the “competent” reader is also motivated by the circumstance that LDA focuses on conceptual constants—not only upon the functions of linguistic devices but also upon the general and abstract concepts that exist in our memories and activate the recall of past experiences. These are the focus of Fillmore's and his collaborators' research into semantic “frames” (2006) They are the way in which concepts are used and are derived from the computation of a vast body of usage events. Correlatively, the words that make up the frames can be considered the synsets identified by

³⁷ In LDA, this distinction is not used in Chomsky's sense but in the sense proposed by Dell Hymes (1966).

George Miller and his collaborators who have gathered the data used to compile WordNet.³⁸ On the premise that the meaning of concepts cannot be separated from their use, the material available in WordNet and FrameNet serves as “data” about the semantic relations “available” in discourses as “meaning potential.”³⁹ Since the data is a description of usage events, the meaning of concepts in a discourse can be considered accessible to a competent reader.⁴⁰ Competent readers (analysts), with the assistance of reference works such as FrameNet, WordNet, *Cohesion in English*, and similar collections of data about language use have access to a knowledge base which, metaphorically, we can call an *Encyclopedia of Communication Competence*.

In order to emphasize the difference between a competent reader and actual readers, I imagine the competent reader as a figure much like C-3PO, the robotic translator from *Star Wars*. Just as C-3PO when queried returns a translation of an unintelligible language or provides the cultural context of the foreigners who speak it, the competent reader identifies the textual structure and the context of situation that makes the discourse meaningful.



Figure 6.2 The Competent Reader

The competent reader's capabilities are limited. To know the extent or contents of an actual reader's knowledge base (or pre-texts) is not possible. Each case has to be profiled in terms of what a reader *might* know about the text before reading it. However, because the competent reader's pre-textual and con-textual expectations (frames) are text-specific, it is possible to determine what is included in the competent reader's knowledge base from the data sources mentioned, namely the corpus of researches into language use which I have postulated metaphorically as an *Encyclopedia of Communication Competence*.

My justification for inventing the fabrications—the competent reader and the *Encyclopedia of Communication Competence*—is that they are convenient fictions that personify or incarnate abstract concepts which would be very difficult to comprehend without the aid of analogies to readers and

³⁸ <http://wordnet.princeton.edu/>

³⁹ This expression was introduced by Michael Halliday in his studies of language acquisition in children. He describes it as “a resource, a network of options each one of which can be interpreted by reference to the child's model of reality and of his own place in it. The reality and hence the meaning potential is constantly under construction, being added to, differentiated within and modified” {THE ESSENTIAL HALLIDAY, “Functional Semantics of Language Development,” 9-10}. In my view reading a text parallels Halliday's delineation of a child's acquisition of language. Readers, so to speak, acquire the language of the text as meaning potential, the resource from which their acts of reading are derived.

⁴⁰ This does not imply that the ways in which the meaning of the text is “incarnated” in an individual's working memory is typical. It is not typical but, rather, individual and personal.

encyclopedias. Using these analogies to refer to abstract concepts makes it easier to understand the functional relations between the actual person and the analyst he or she also is.

As a human reader, an analyst is a kind of method actor under the direction of the competent reader who draws upon its knowledge base (the numerous data sources which I have pictured as an encyclopedia). The analyst performs a script derived from a text by the competent reader. He or she identifies particular textual structures in order to ascertain their "meaning potential" in the textual system. The analyst does not interpret the text, the competent reader, so to speak, does that for him or her in its function as the director of the performance. In LDA, the analyst identifies textual units, bracketing out personal responses, and, in effect, submits to the directions of the competent reader. When a personal interpretation occurs to the analyst, he or she yields to the judgment of the competent reader. In sum, a particular reader, trained for the part, plays the role of an analyst under the direction of the competent reader who has comprehensive knowledge of language use. Whatever the analyst believes about the meaning of the text as a reader is irrelevant.

6.3 The Competent Reader's Functions

LDA is descriptive. It describes the language of a text with respect to its *typical construal*. The framing structure constituted by the linguistic devices that instruct readers determines the construal sequence.⁴¹ This overarching structure is generated by the interplay between clauses on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes of the discourse from which readers construct a textworld. The interplay creates a framing structure or scaffold from which readers are given perspectives for construing the text. The framing structure is dynamic, operating prospectively and retrospectively, constructing and reconstructing the meaning of the text. In LDA, this pattern pertains to all discourse analyses. However, within this general framework, different types of LDA are distinguished by their objectives which foreground certain components of the text and background the others.

6.3.1 Framing/Reframing Structures

LDA is comparative. It compares one textual structure to another similar structure in order to identify the differences. In some cases the comparisons are internal, for example, a framing/reframing analysis describes the unfolding meaning of a text by comparing frames along the syntagmatic axis of a discourse as they are changed by frames along the paradigmatic axis, noting how a preceding frame differs from a subsequent frame.

Describing a text usually involves reporting the potential meaning of the sequence of textual units. The sequence or succession of topics and comments is the syntagmatic axis of a discourse. With respect to framing, any clause on this axis has the potential⁴² not only to frame the upcoming events by way of inciting expectations about what will happen, but also has the potential to re-frame events that have

⁴¹ The term, "instructure," refers to the complete set of instructions provided by the linguistic markers in the author's construction of an integral component of the text.

⁴² The adjective, "potential," in this sentence is an abbreviation for Halliday's concept of "meaning potential."

expectations, so that, when Alice finds him sitting on a high, narrow wall, she expects him to fall which leads to a conversation about what might happen and the King's promise. It does not surprise us that at the end of the chapter "a heavy crash shook the forest from end to end," and at the beginning of the next, the King, his men and horses appear. But while we are expecting them to try to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, the King says to a messenger who has just arrived:

'I feel faint -- Give me a ham sandwich!'

On which the Messenger, to Alice's great amusement, opened a bag that hung round his neck, and handed a sandwich to the King, who devoured it greedily.

This, of course, thwarts the expectations we have derived from the riddle. As I describe the end of chapter 6 in *Through the Looking Glass* and the beginning of chapter 7, I am describing the interplay between the framework of expectations the text has built up in my mind and the sequence of textual units on the syntagmatic axis. "Paradigmatic scaffolding" activates elements in the reader's cognitive framework which are continuously changing as expectations are or are not met by the text, which, as an analyst, I report.

When analyzing a complete texts, the competent reader describes the way meaning unfolds in them. For the most part, however, analysts employing LDA techniques describe textual structures rather than complete texts. Aside from rather short texts or passages from texts, for instance newspaper articles, the role of the Competent Reader is limited since describing a complete text with respect to its dynamic interplay of paradigmatic and syntagmatic frames would be an enormous task and for most analytical purposes not a very useful one. While it is helpful to illustrate the dynamics of reading to show how they function in small texts such as "A Discourse on Discourse," most logistical discourse analyses take as their objective some structure of the text that is manageable, for example, tracking conceptions.

"Micro level" analysis (describing framing/reframing structures) make it impractical to carry out with large texts because of the extensive details it would involve. Choosing a specific textual structure and comparing it to similar structures in different texts is not only far more practical but also much more instructive. [For a detailed example, see chapter 7, "Analyzing News Framing."]

6.3.2 Analyzing Conceptions

The textual structure I identified in earlier chapters—a conception—is the central objective of LDA. In a given text, for instance a research article, the meaning of the conception develops as concepts are added to the logogenetic sequence governed by a focal concept forming the discursive structure TOPIC + sequences of COMMENTS. My analysis of Humpty Dumpty's conception of the word "glory" is an illustration of this type of LDA.

Generally, significant conceptual changes are not found in the analysis of a single text—for example, Entman's "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm" (1993) presents a relatively coherent conception of framing. Significant conceptual changes usually occur in texts written at different times as was the case with Entman—his conception of framing changed dramatically when he published "Cascading Activation" (2003) ten years after his 1993 article.

The same can be said of Thomas Kuhn's re-conceiving the concept of the structure of scientific revolutions. As I mentioned earlier, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* was published in 1962 and "The Road since Structure" was presented in 1990 and first published in 1991. In his presentation,

which can be construed as an instance of LDA, Kuhn acknowledged that his conception had changed radically and described the differences. [For a detailed example, see chapter 8, “Analyzing Conceptual Change.”]

6.3.2 Analyzing Narrative Structures.

The story of *Through the Looking Glass* (1872) has the structure of some of the oldest stories in western culture—the quest.

The Red Queen reveals to Alice that the entire countryside is laid out in squares, like a gigantic chessboard, and offers to make Alice a queen if she can move all the way to the eighth rank/row in a chess match. This is a reference to the chess rule of Promotion. Alice is placed in the second rank as one of the White Queen's pawns, and begins her journey across the chessboard by boarding a train that literally jumps over the third row and directly into the fourth rank, thus acting on the rule that pawns can advance two spaces on their first move. [Alice journeys through the next three squares] ... Bidding farewell to the White Knight, Alice steps across the last brook, and is automatically crowned a queen, with the crown materializing abruptly on her head. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Through_the_Looking-Glass.)

This paragraph offers a summary of *Through the Looking Glass* that, in effect, describes the “minimal story” of the book. According to Gerald Prince, the “linguistic representation” of the units of a “minimal story” are (1) an event expressed in a clause (2) conjoined to another event by some conjunctive expression, (3) which results (expressed by a causal conjunction) in (4) a change of the initial situation. (5) These units are ordered chronologically — “the first event precedes the second in time and the second precedes the third”⁴⁴ The minimal story given above summarizes *Through the Looking Glass* as a *Quest story*.

The first event in the main story of *Through the Looking Glass* is Alice’s meeting the Red Queen in the “Garden of Live Flowers.” The two persons are conjoined when the Red Queen makes Alice a Pawn of the White Queen and tells her to move to the eighth square of the chessboard, if she can, where she will become a queen. Alice sets out on her journey (or quest) after the red queen disappears. As she moves through the various squares she encounters numerous figures on the way who delay her. Nonetheless, as a result of arriving at the eight square as the pawn, she becomes a queen. This is not quite like the quests of Jason or Perceval, but its narrative structure parallels their quests.

In the section on “Analyzing Conceptions” (6.3.2) the objective is to “discover” conceptual changes by comparing conceptions as the focal concept was framed and re-framed in the reading of a text, or, as in the case of Entman and Kuhn, comparing conceptions in different texts. The unit of analysis was a discursive structure, namely, a conception. In analyzing narratives, the objective is to discover similarities in narrative structures, e.g., plots such as the quest narrative. Similar plot structures reveal differences in content. Though both Alice and Perceval go on quests, Alice’s quest is for a crown and Perceval’s is for the Holy Grail. Quest narratives usually are quests for identity. This is the case for both Alice and Perceval. Alice becomes a queen; Perceval becomes the person who succeeded in obtaining the Grail. These similarities highlight the differences between the two quests. Alice’s is secular;

⁴⁴ This characterization of a minimal story is based on Gerald Prince’s *A Grammar of Stories* (1973) which I have chosen because it is based on linguistic markers.

Perceval's is religious. Alice's is a story of individuation. Perceval's is a story of community. And so on. [For a detailed example, see chapter 9, "Analyzing Cultural Configurations."]

6.3.4 Analyzing Arguments

When the objective is an argument, the analysis is characterized by checking the linguistic markers—claims, grounds, warrants—to identify the textual structure of an informal argument.⁴⁵ Analyzing the text of the passage from *Through the Looking Glass* quoted in the Preface, I noted that the text implicitly contains an argument:

If there are 364 day when you might get a present;
But only 1 (designated) "for" birthday presents;
it would be glorious (beautiful, pleasing) to receive 364 presents on non-birthdays instead of 1.

Humpty's warrant justifies his remark about feeling "glorious." Without the reference to the argument, Humpty's conclusion—There's glory for you—would not be intelligible.⁴⁶

6.3.5 Evaluating Texts

Judgments, for the most part, depend on comparisons. In LDA discourse structures are compared to other discourse structures usually to discover if they are similar or different and to what extent. If criteria is stipulated, the structures can also be evaluated on the basis of privileging one structure over another.

To take a simple instance of an evaluation, consider a textbook that directs students to memorize concepts by providing chapter sections that imply memorizing—key concepts followed by the remark that flash cards are available on the textbook's website. This is a common educational practice. Compare this practice to ones recommended by learning theorists, for example, Frederick Reif's model of learning as a belief transformation that enables students to do things that they were not previously able to do. As Reif suggests:

... suppose that a student is asked the question "What is a triangle?" and responds by saying "A triangle is a three-side polygon". On the basis of the student's performance on this question, a naive teacher might well conclude that the student knows what a triangle is.

But suppose that the student is shown a sheet of paper displaying various geometric figures and is asked to point out which of them is a triangle. Or suppose that the student is asked to draw a triangle. If the student can perform neither of these tasks, would the teacher still say that the student has significant knowledge about triangles? In this case, the student's performance consists merely of his ability to *state* a verbal definition of a triangle. But if he cannot *use* this definition to do anything with it (for example, if he can neither recognize nor construct a

⁴⁵ I draw upon Steven Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* (1976) to identify the linguistic markers of an argument.

⁴⁶ I have not included a detailed instance of analyzing arguments.

triangle) then the student's knowledge is purely nominal rather than effectively usable. (2008, pp. 16-17)

The student's "ability to state a *verbal* definition" is the result of memorization. The student's inability to point to or draw a triangle is consequence of ONLY memorizing the definition of a triangle. Reif's model of learning, the premise of which is that declarative knowledge without corresponding knowledge procedural knowledge (knowing how to use the concept), provides a template with which one can evaluate textbooks. The comparison of nominal versus usable knowledge provides a model for the evaluation of textbooks that instruct students to memorize concepts. [For a detailed example, see chapter 10, "Evaluating Texts."]-

6.4 The Analyst's Commentary

Each LDA is an argument: given the way these texts or textual segments are comparatively structured, we can conclude "x." The texts themselves are the primary data. The theoretical functions of the linguistic devices in them are the warrants. The commentaries of the analysts may be simply inferences drawn from the evidence. For instance, that Thomas Kuhn's conception of the structure of scientific revolutions changed substantially after 1962. In circumstances where his 1962 conception is cited after 1990 to justify calling recent research a "paradigm shift," an LDA of Kuhn's relevant writings would be useful in challenging such a claim.

In most cases, logistically oriented discourse analyses are prolegomena to future research. For instance, analyses of Robert Entman's conceptions of framing easily lead one to the hypothesis that the changes are related to changes in his conception of the method of frame analysis and to changes in the problems he addressed. While this remark may seem to be a statement of the obvious, its implications are related to how one views the use of language in research.

If the problem Entman is addressing in his research is how news events are framed, then when he addresses a different problem, can we still call what he is doing frame analysis? The concept of "cascading activation" governing his 2003 essay is used to identify instances of the "contestation" of Bush's initial frame for the attacks of 9/11. Can this still be construed as an instance of "framing" events? Framing and contesting framing are different intellectual activities. Moreover, to identify instances of contestation, he employs "a new model of the relationship between government and the media." In earlier work, Entman employed a much simpler model of this relationship and did not concern himself with whether the news frames he studied were contested. Such issues usually go unexamined. LDA reveals them. (See the discussion of Entman's conceptions of framing in chapter 8, "Analyzing Conceptual Change.")

Concluding Remarks

Entman's 1993 essay is entitled, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." Ironically, in his 1993 article Entman objects to what he does in his 2003 article by further "fracturing" the concept of framing. What happened to his notion of logical system of terminology constituting a paradigm? Kuhn anticipated the problem Entman encountered in his switch from the concept of a paradigm to that of a lexicon. As Humpty Dumpty says, 'The question is ... 'which is to be master-- that's all.'

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Part Two

Examples of Logistical Discourse Analyses

Before I retired I frequently taught seminars in Discourse Analysis. Part of the course was devoted to Logistical and Configural Discourse Analysis. After I retired, I did my most extensive logistical discourse analysis on a series of introductory textbooks to Communication Study. Over these years, my analyses covered all of the types of LDA mentioned in the previous chapter. Part Two of this study offers summaries of them, foregrounding the various “objectives” of LDA analyses.



Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 7

Analyzing News Framing

ABSTRACT:

This chapter focuses on analyzing the framing/reframing dynamic of texts. Four newspaper articles about a sexual harassment trial are analyzed.

CONTENT:

7.0 The Study of News Framing

7.1 The Isiah Thomas Sexual Harassment Trial

7.1.1 LDA of the news reports of the trial

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7.2.1 Richard Sandomir, NY Times

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7.3 Comparison of the Journalists' Framing of the Testimonies

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7.3.2.1 Sandomir's Sequencing

7.3.2.2 Destefano's Sequencing

7.3.2.3 Baumbach's Sequencing

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7.4 Concluding Remarks

7.0 The Study of News Framing

When used in a comparative analysis, a frame/reframing (f/r) LDA shows the writer's slant on an issue. An f/r-LDA has advantages over standard frame analysis, which is usually some form of content analysis, because it catches more subtle aspects of the way a discourse frames an event. Rather than identify salient words and phrases as in content analysis, f/r-LDA charts framing as a process. Focusing on the persons participating in the story-world of the event or on a focal question raised by them, this f/r-LDA tracks how these are framed.

Newspaper accounts of trials are suitable texts for an f/r-LDA. The story-world of trials contain lawyers asking questions and witnesses answering them in the context of judging whether a defendant is innocent or guilty of a particular crime. Journalists reporting on the events of a trial tend to favor one verdict or another which becomes evident in the way they frame them. In some cases the slant of the reporter is blatant but in others it is more subtle.⁴⁷

7.1 The Isiah Thomas Sexual Harassment Trial

In the fall of 2007 I analyzed the framing/reframing dynamic of four newspaper accounts of the Isiah Thomas sexual harassment trial. My objective was to study the contrasting ways that the events of the trial were reported by following the evolving interpretation of the event sentence by sentence. Below is the text of my analysis for one day of the trial—September 18, 2007.

The prosecution lawyers for Anucha Browne Sanders began their sexual harassment case against Isiah Thomas and the Madison Square Garden (MSG) before a Federal Grand Jury. Thomas was at that time the coach and general manager of the NY Knicks basketball team and Dolan was the chairman of MSG. On September 18 taped depositions from two MSG officers—James Dolan and Rusty McCormack—were shown. Two witnesses also testified on that day of the trial—Sanders' sister and Jeff Nix, a former MSG employee. Four major NY area newspapers reported the event.

The trial provides an instance of competing news frames: prosecution frame (Dolan fired Browne Sanders in retaliation for her complaint of sexual harassment) and a defendant counter-frame (Dolan fired MSG exec for interfering with an internal investigation of her sexual harassment claim). The outcome of the trial depended upon which frame would prevail. These newspaper reports provide a set of discourses about the same event and will serve as an example of f/r-LDA as a method in communication and media studies.

⁴⁷ f/r-LDA is not yet computerized and thus studies of large amounts of varied data would be too labor intensive to undertake. Short texts, for example different newspaper accounts of an event, are manageable.

7.1.1 LDA of the news reports of the trial

One of the methodological requirements of f/r-LDA is that it be comparative. A minimum of two comparable documents (texts) need to be identified. For the analysis under discussion, documents were deemed comparable because they were accounts of the same situation. The reason for this requirement is that the comparison of texts produces textual evidence that is replicable. In analyzing a single text, the claim that something that should have been included has been omitted is the result of the analyst's interpretation. On the other hand, omissions and inclusions revealed by comparing texts gain the status of facts. When two texts include an event but a third omits it, the result is a more reliable claim about textual omissions. In addition, several texts about one situation help the analyst to determine the chronological order of events. In turn, knowing about the chronology—even in part—can reveal the events that are reported out of their chronological order, which often reflects the emphasis placed upon them. In addition, the descriptors used by different writers to characterize the participants in an event, when compared, often reflect the author's attitude toward the persons involved.

Once I identified comparable texts about the Isiah Thomas sexual harassment trial, I faced a methodological problem. Comparing several texts requires that a text needs to be identified as the point of comparison and the remaining texts then become analogs to it. Generally, the choice is made on the basis of chronology—the text published first, the protolog, is the point of comparison. Alternatively, some texts might be considered “benchmarks,” “standard,” or an “exemplar.” In considering newspaper accounts of an event, none of these criteria apply. To solve the problem, I developed a chronology of events during the day of the trial based on the events mentioned in the four articles. This “chronology” served as the protolog in the comparative analysis (see [Appendix A](#) at the end of this chapter for the text of the chronology).

Comparing discourses requires a complex pattern of match-ups. If we were to take the sequence of sentences as they appear in the texts, the points of comparison would make any chart of them a jumble of lines connecting the comparable contents. So the first mode of comparison takes the various topic/comment units in the discourses in the order given in the news stories and notes when particular events are moved out of their original order to assess the framing processes. Then, a second comparison matching the journalists' treatment of the topics is made.⁴⁸ Finally a commentary on what the comparisons reveal how the authors framed the events.

7.2.1 The Framing/Reframing Structures of the News Stories

On September 19, 2007 four NY newspapers gave accounts of the events that took place at the Isiah Thomas / Anucha Browne Sanders sexual harassment trial on the preceding day—Richard Sandomir for the NY Times, Anthony M. Destefano for Newsday.com, Jim Baumbach also for Newsday.com, and Thomas Zambito for the NY Daily News.

KEY: The following abbreviations are used:

⁴⁸ Though I referred to the points of comparison as topics, I am not using it in the sense of TOPIC/COMMENT but in the sense of “the subject matter” [WordNet].

Symbol	Function	comment
CAPS	Shift in focus	The events are described from the journalists' perspective but the
<+>	blended	Two or more aspects of the event described are combined
=	result	Outcome of the preceding
—>	inference	The implication of the blending given the experiential context.
{—> }	Possible inference	
[text #text]	text # of sentence	
>[Frame]	Resulting frame	Frames are numbered according to the sequence of sentence
INIT text #text #	Framing sequence	The initials are of persons associated with the trial, the numbers reflect the number of times they are reframed
highlight	Info added	New information added to the evolving frame
Bold-blue	Editorial intervention	either by discussing an event out of the chronological order, by bringing information from another day, or by commentary.
{[]}	Context of remark	Indicates an item of "background knowledge."

initials	Person mentioned	
ABS	Anucha Browne Sanders	Former Knicks' senior vice president for marketing and business operations
IS	Isiah Thomas	Defendant: Head Coach and GM of Knicks
JD	James Dolan	Defendant: Chairman of MSG
RM	Rusty McCormack	MSG human resources senior VP
JN	Jeff Nix	A former Knicks assistant general manager and scouting director
KM	Kevin Mintzer	A lawyer for Browne Sanders
FB	Faye Brown	A former administrative assistant at MSG
SM	Steve Mills	President of MSG Sports, Browne Sanders's boss and oversees Thomas
AV	Anne Vladeck	A lawyer for Browne Sanders
HR	Hank Ratner	The Garden's vice chairman

MS	Marc Schoenfeld	The Garden's senior vice president for legal affairs
RB	Ruth Browne	Browne Sanders's oldest sister in whom she confided
SM	Stephon Marbury	The Knicks star point guard
JB	John Blasig	Her mentor and supervisor at IBM.

RICHARD SANDOMIR, New York Times

(Title) MSG Chairman Says Decision to Fire Knicks V.P. Was His Alone

~James Dolan—frame **JD 00**: JD firing is blended with the expression “his alone.” --> JD {insists} on his position as chairman of MSG.⁴⁹ > **JD is in complete control of MSG.**

INITIAL FOCUS is on JAMES DOLAN (from Sandomir's perspective)

[01] James L. Dolan said in a video deposition shown yesterday at the sexual harassment trial at which he and Isiah Thomas are defendants that he fired Anucha Browne Sanders without consulting corporate counsel, talking to her supervisor or reading the report of an investigation into her claims.

+ Sandomir includes the clauses: “without consulting corporate counsel, talking to her supervisor or reading the report of an investigation into her claims” out of the order of the testimony. See (03 & 06).

+ [reframe **JD 01**]: The act of unilateral firing <+> not consulting, talking, reading --> fired without studying situation. {Possible Inference: illegal firing [without due process]} > JD exercises his power unilaterally.

~ Isiah Thomas—frame **IT 00**: defendant in sexual harassment trial

[02] “All decisions at the Garden I make on my own,” said Dolan, the chairman of Madison Square Garden, whose image projected on a large screen inside the federal courthouse in Lower Manhattan.

⁴⁹ James L Dolan's official title is “Chairman, Madison Square Garden.” The MSG website describes his role in the following terms: “In his leadership role at MSG, Mr. Dolan is responsible for the company's overall growth strategy and oversees all of its operations.” <http://www.thegarden.com/corporate/james-dolan.html>

+ [reframe JD 02]: JD <+> large screen <+> federal courthouse --> JD's statement was made publically in a federal courthouse > JD **testified** that he exercises his power unilaterally and **has full responsibility** for his actions.

[03] "I specifically did not consult with counsel," he said, adding that the "overall health of the Garden was at jeopardy."

+ [reframe JD 03]: {Exercise of control} <+> MSG at jeopardy --> had to act quickly > JD acted unilaterally because MSG was "in jeopardy" {—> so no time to consult or read reports}.

[04] Dolan said that the danger Browne Sanders posed when she was said to have coerced employees into "corroborating her complaint" — which he said impeded the Garden's investigation — outweighed a potential legal opinion about "why we would have Ms. Sanders stay in the job."

+ [reframe JD 04]: Had to {quickly} control situation <+> ABS coercing employees to corroborate her complaint <+> outweighed obtaining a *potential* legal opinion —> logic is confusing, Because ABS was coercing ..., to corroborate sexual harassment in-house complaint, JD had to act quickly {did not have time to consult lawyers or read a report about the complaint} owing to the "danger" ABS posed. {Why would an in-house complaint pose immediate danger even if ABS was "coercing" employees to corroborate?} > JD's **reason** for unilaterally exercising his power is **suspect**.

SHIFT OF FOCUS to ANUCHA BROWNE SANDERS & LAWSUIT

[05] At the time, she was the Knicks' senior vice president for marketing and business operations.

~ **Anucha Browne Sanders** — [frame ABS 01]: ABS <+> senior VP marketing & business ops --> ABS was a high ranking official of the Knick's > **ABS was a high ranking official of the Knick's**
editorial insertion of background info

[06a] Browne Sanders is suing Thomas, the Knicks' coach and president of basketball operations, for verbally abusing and sexually harassing her,

+ [reframe ABS 02]: ABS <+> suing IT --> complaint becomes a lawsuit > **ABS is willing to take her complaint to court** & have it decided by a jury

+ [reframe **IT 02**]: IT may have verbally abused & sexually harassed ABS
editorial insertion of background info

[06b] and [Browne Sanders is suing] the Garden for firing her in retaliation for making her claims.

+ [reframe **ABS 03**]: ABS <+> suing MSG --> ABS is willing to take on a corporation > ABS is proactive in making the case that her firing was illegitimate;

+ [reframe **JD 05**]: JD may have retaliated and thus acted illegally.
editorial insertion of background info

SHIFT OF FOCUS back to JAMES DOLAN

[07] Dolan said he made his decision to fire her without knowing the status of the Garden's investigation or reading anything more than newspaper accounts detailing Browne Sanders's accusations.

+ [reframe **JD 06**]: JD (1-5) <+> didn't know status of MSG investigation, only read newspapers --> If JD is in complete control, he is willfully ignorant of procedures in MSG > willfully ignorant of MSG procedures. {—> of due process in this case? Though JD knew about her complaint, he didn't check its status.}

[08] He said he learned about Browne Sanders's suspected tampering with the investigation from Rusty McCormack, the Garden's senior vice president for human resources.

+ [reframe **JD 07**]: JD learning of tampering <+> from RM VP HR --> learned of ABS' "coercion" but not of the "details" of her complaint aside from news reports > JD (1-6) learned about tampering from RM ;

~ Rusty McCormack — [reframe **RM 01**]: MSG senior vice president for human resources

[09] Dolan said he discussed the Browne Sanders case with McCormack on a helicopter flight to Manhattan from Cablevision headquarters on Long Island.

+ [reframe **JD 08**]: Learning <+> helicopter ride with RM --> JD is offering evidence of his learning about ABS' interference >

[10] Hank Ratner, the Garden’s vice chairman, was with them, he said.

~ **Hank Ratner** — **[frame HR 01]**: MSG’s vice chairman —> HR is vice chairman under JD, so 2nd in command.

+ **[reframe JD 09]**: **HR <+> was with them** --> HR can corroborate JD’s conversation with RM >

[11] Dolan testified that he told McCormack and Ratner, “They needed to let her go.”

+ **[reframe JD 10]**: (ref text #02) “decision on my own” <+> **JD telling RM & HR to let ABS go** --> learning from RM <+> JD’s exercise of control --> {JD emphasizing that he, not RM or HR made the decision.} >

SHIFT OF FOCUS to RANDY McCORMACK; SANDOMIR’S PERSPECTIVE REINSERTED

[12] But in excerpts from McCormack’s video deposition, which was shown after Dolan’s, McCormack denied that he told Dolan anything about the investigation.

Note Sandomir’s editorial intervention, “But.”

+ **[reframe RM 02]**: **RM denied telling Dolan**

+ **[reframe JD 11]**: (01-11) JD’s story <+> RM’s deposition denying he told JD of ABS’ tampering; “But” links the two and **implies an alternative**. --> {one story contradicts the other—which to believe?}>

[13] He testified that he did not know who told Dolan the conclusion in his memorandum on the in-house investigation that Browne Sanders had to be “separated.”

+ **[reframe RM 03]**: **did not know who told Dolan**

+ **[reframe JD 12]**: (01-11) JD’s story <+> RM’s memo --> **{foregrounds “communication gap” in the two stories.}** >

[14] Kevin Mintzer, a lawyer for Browne Sanders, asked, “Did you have any conversations with James Dolan about separating Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?”

[15] “No, I did not,” McCormack said.

~ **Kevin Mintzer** — **[frame KM 01]**: “a lawyer for Browne Sanders” > Communication gap <+> (08-11) JD & RM conversations <+> mention of ABS’ lawyer KM. --> Sandomir’s quotation from KM <+> a testimony under oath --> {implies a fact} If (08-11) JD’s statements about RM, --> {why ask given 12? Reinforces 12}

+ [reframe RM 04]: did not have conversations with Dolan

+ [reframe JD 13]: Testimony under oath <+> RM not on trial <+> RM's answer: "no" --> {RM probably did not lie, so JD probably did.};

[16] "And did you have any conversations with Hank Ratner about separating Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?" Mintzer asked.

[17] "No, I did not," McCormack said.

+ [reframe RM 05]: did not have conversations with Ratner. Communication gap <+> (08-11) conversations between JD & RM which <+> (14) mention of KM. <+> (13) --> {JD probably lied.} --> {KM's question probably eliminates HR as source of info} > <+> {Testimony under oath} <+> RM's answer: "no" --> {RM probably did not lie & HR probably did not tell JD about ABS};

+ [reframe JD 14]: RM's testimony <+> JD's earlier claim --> JD probably lied

+ [reframe KM 02]: ref (10) Dolan said HR heard <+> RM's denial --> JD or RM lied > pursuing details of the process of the investigation to determine if it was "due" process.

[18] McCormack said the memorandum was written by Marc Schoenfeld, the Garden's senior vice president for legal affairs, in anticipation of a lawsuit, and he made a few edits before signing it.

+ [reframe RM 06]: Testimony under oath <+> MS as legal expert --> RM discloses author of memo <+> "in anticipation of a lawsuit" <+> (01) investigation <+> legal expert <+> RM ok'd it --> Legal expert wrote memo anticipating that ABS would sue {Does this imply that the legal expert believed ABS had a substantial case?} > initial author of the memo <+> RM few edits & signing it --> RM endorsed MS's recommendation;

~ Marc Schoenfeld [frame MS 01]: "the Garden's senior vice president for legal affairs"

[19] He added that the report was "not necessarily" intended to be read by Dolan or Steve Mills, the president of MSG Sports, who was Browne Sanders's boss and oversees Thomas.

[frame SM 01]: the president of MSG Sports, who was Browne Sanders's boss and oversees Thomas

[reframe SM 02]: Report {of investigation} <+> not necessarily to be read <+> ABS's boss <+> also oversees IT -> {Steve Mills is a person who SHOULD have read this report.}

[20] "And the statements you made concerning Ms. Browne Sanders," Mintzer said. "Did you intend them to be read by anyone?"

[21] “Not necessarily,” McCormack said.

+ [reframe **KM 03**]: Memo <+> (13) conclusion <+> (18) legal judgment <+> not to be read by anyone (19) --> {{[not a credible business procedure]}}⁵⁰

+ [reframe **RM 07**]: “not necessarily” {{evasive?}}

statements <+> ABS <+> “read” --> MS wrote the report of the in-house investigation but RM endorsed it > What RM earlier identified as his “conclusion” (separate ABS) had his consent;

[22] He also said he never read Browne Sanders’s performance evaluations — which were uniformly excellent — before signing the report.

Note Sandomir’s editorial intervention!

+ [reframe **RM 08**]: (21) Not reading <+> ABS’ evaluations --> {RM should have read them} Evaluations <+> uniformly excellent. --> {that they were “uniformly excellent” but unread makes firing ABS suspicious}. Not reading ABS excellent evaluations <+> signing report <+> signing memo --> {RM’s behavior parallels JD’s in (01, 07)}

[23] The report also recommended sensitivity training for Thomas, which, McCormack testified, he did not receive.

+ [reframe **RM 09**]: {{If RM signed off on the report which recommended sensitivity training would he not be the administrator to impose it.}} Report <+> sensitivity training <+> (01) sexual harassment <+> IT --> {report indicated IT did to some degree sexually harass ABS} report <+> not acted upon --> {RM & JD favored keeping IT & thus had to “separate” ABS}

+ [reframe **IT 03**]: report <+> sensitivity training —> indicated IT did, to some degree, sexually harass ABS >

[24] “When the lawsuit came, that was about as much sensitivity training as he’d ever want,” he said.

+ [reframe **RM 10**]: His “attempt at humor” = inappropriate: (23) report <+> WHEN lawsuit came <+> reason for not following sensitivity training recommendation --> {Legal expert correctly anticipated—& IT was given sensitivity training as a result—suggests that ABS’ charge against IT was justified.}

⁵⁰ In this case it would be odd for a business to conduct an investigation and not intend the report of it to be read only by the person who ordered the investigation. One would expect the company’s lawyers to review it.

[25] The Dolan and McCormack videos highlighted the final day of the case presented by Browne Sanders's legal team.

[26] The defense will begin presenting their case today.

Sandomir's editorial transition

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO WITNESSES FOR ANUCHA BROWNE SANDERS

[27] Three witnesses testified on Browne Sanders's behalf yesterday: Ruth Browne, her oldest sister; Jeff Nix, a former Knicks assistant general manager and scouting director; and John Blasig, her mentor and supervisor at a previous job at I.B.M.

+ [frame RB 00]: Witness <+> oldest sister --> sister would defend ABS.

+ [frame JN 00]: Witness <+> assistant general manager of MSG --> former MSG officer may have pertinent info.

+ [frame JB 00]: Witness <+> IBM supervisor --> supervisor at IBM can evaluate ABS' work}

[28] Nix, whose contract with the Knicks ended last month, testified that after the team beat Minnesota in December 2004, he saw Browne Sanders in the hallway outside the locker room pulling away from Thomas's embrace

Sandomir's editorial insertion --> "ended" does not imply he was fired, but the inclusion of this information raises that question & colors Nix's testimony

+ [reframe JN 01]: JN <+> testimony <+> image of ABS "pulling away" from IT's embrace --> Nix was eye witness of sexual harassment by IT.

+ [reframe IT 04]: ABS pulling away from IT <+> (23) > suggests Knick's lawyer knew of IT's harassment

[29] She walked away toward Nix, but passed him.

+ [reframe ABS 04]: ABS walks toward JN <+> but passed him --> {ABS did not plan to tell Nix what happened} > ABS at this point in time was not broadcasting IT's harassment ref: JD's testimony that she was coercing employees. See (04)

[30] "She looked upset," he testified.

+ [reframe **ABS 05**]: ABS <+> looked upset <+> (28) pulled away from IT's embrace --> {ABS did not want IT to embrace her.}

[31] He added that when he caught up to her, she told him: "You won't believe what he just said.

+ [reframe **ABS 06**]: JN <+> caught up to ABS --> {JN was concerned about ABS} Caught up to ABS <+> you won't believe ... --> {ABS sensed JN was sympathetic and this indicated that she could tell him what happened.}

[32] He said, 'I'm in love with you.'

+ [reframe **ABS 07**]: (31) "won't believe <+> IT saying "I'm in love with you" --> suggestion of implausibility > {Anucha did not believe IT was serious}

+ [reframe **IT 05**]: Preceding (31) <+> IT <+> "I'm in love with you" <+> (28) pulling away from embrace --> {IT was forcing his attention on ABS}

[33] Nix said he advised her to tell Mills.

[34] Browne Sanders has testified that she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but that he did nothing to change the situation

Sandomir brings in testimony out of order of events

+ [reframe **JN 02**]: JN <+> advice to tell Mills <+> (20) "Browne Sanders's boss and oversees Thomas." --> {sensible advice}

+ [frame **SM 01**]: JN's advice <+> ABS saying that she had already done so <+> nothing done --> {SM did not follow procedures (not due process)}

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO STEVE MILLS

[35] In snippets of his video deposition shown yesterday, Mills said he did not respond to her e-mail message complaining of Thomas's hugging and trying to kiss her.

Sandomir brings in testimony out of order of events

+ [reframe **SM 02**]: SM <+> did not respond --> {confirms ABS's statement but does not explain why SM did not respond}

+ [reframe **ABS 07**]: SM's testimony <+> (34) --> {SM's testimony supports ABS's claim}

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO JAMES DOLAN

[36] Dolan was asked in his deposition about the appropriateness of using “bitch,” a word Browne Sanders said Thomas called her, in a workplace.

[37] “No, it’s not appropriate,” he said.

[38] “It is also not appropriate to murder anyone.”

[39] “I don’t think that that has happened either.”

Sandomir brings in testimony out of order of events

+ [reframe JD 15]: JD <+> appropriateness <+> abusive language <+> ABS’ charge vs IT --> {ABS’s lawyer wants it on record that such abusive language is not appropriate at MSG}; JD <+> admission --> {ABS has right to charge IT}; Not appropriate <+> murder --> {odd parallel, why bring it up?}; Murder <+> did not happen at MSG -> {JD is claiming that the verbal abuse did not happen but in a confusing way.}

Sandomir’s article in the *New York Times* paints a picture of an effective prosecution of the three charges—against Isiah Thomas as a person who is accused of using abusive language and making unwelcome sexual advances as well as against James Dolan for retaliatory firing. This is accomplished by drawing three portraits as they unfolded in the testimony that the prosecution attorneys brought together into a description of MSG as an environment hostile to women.

The focus of Sandomir’s account is upon the consistency of the depositions and witnesses. He implies weaknesses in Dolan’s reason for not consulting or studying the case by juxtaposing Dolan’s claim that Browne Sanders posed a “danger” to MSG with her charges; they are incommensurate. Sandomir’s emphasizes the fact that Dolan did not take the time to study the situation. Then, in his account of McCormack’s deposition, Sandomir emphasizes that Dolan did not consult McCormack or Ratner. The portrait of Dolan as CEO that emerges is of a person who exercises his power without studying the situation. Having painted a portrait of Dolan, he turns to McCormack in the second part of his article who is portrayed as similar to Dolan in his efforts to keep Thomas and remove Browne Sanders. Even with the same goals in mind, McCormack contradicts Dolan. Then, Sandomir focuses on Nix’s testimony to paint a portrait of Thomas sexually harassing Browne Sanders. The three portraits combined “argue” for the prosecution. Sandomir’s article could be construed as an accurate description of the evidence *as it was put forth by Browne Sanders’ lawyers*. However, Sandomir’s carefully structuring the testimony slants readers toward the prosecutions claims.

SUMMARY: Effective prosecution attorneys portraying the defendants to be “guilty as charged.”

DESTEFANO, Newsday.com [KEY]

[00] (title) Dolan: I canned MSG exec for interfering

+ [frame **JD 00**]: JD <+> “canned” --> dyslogistic⁵¹ --> JD forcefully dismissed MSG exec

(01) A female Madison Square Garden executive was fired because she willfully interfered in a company probe of her sexual harassment allegations against Knicks coach Isiah Thomas, MSG chairman James Dolan said in videotaped testimony played Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan.

Editorial insertion of background info: + [reframe **JD 01**]: MSG exec <+> female <+> willfully interfered <+> company probe --> justified action for ABS’s Sexual harassment allegations

+ (frame **IT 00**) identified as a defendant and Knick’s coach

(02) Dolan, wearing what appeared to be a dark turtleneck sweater for the December 2006 deposition, appeared unapologetic as he was questioned by attorneys representing fired executive Anucha Browne Sanders.

Editorial insertion of background info: + [reframe **JD 02**]: JD <+> unapologetic --> {JD = unwilling to make an apology suggests he didn’t need to.}

+ (frame **ABS 00**) female exec <+> ABS --> ABS identified as the female exec

(03) "With all due respect, Mr. Dolan, you said that she willfully violated company policies and undermined [the company] investigation of her charges," said attorney Anne Vladeck, who represents Browne Sanders in her lawsuit against Dolan, Thomas and MSG.

+ [reframe?? **JD 03**]: “With all due respect” <+> (02) unapologetic <+> AV’s question <+> AV = ABS’ lawyer --> {“with all due respect” suggests that JD has not disclosed something that he should have. But, 04 portrays JD as acting appropriately in firing ABS} Sets up text #04

(04) "That's right by bringing in people who were attempting to influence the process," responded Dolan.

⁵¹ WordNet offers the following synonyms: “fire, give notice, dismiss, give the axe, send away, sack, force out, give the sack, terminate.” Though they range in degree, all these expressions have negative connotations.

+ [reframe JD 04]: offers sensible reason—"undermined" <+> bringing in people to influence process --> {JD responds to the implication of "with all due respect" by indicating what ABS had done to "interfere"}

(05) Poker-faced throughout most of the 10- minute excerpt of the deposition played in court, Dolan cracked a smile only when asked to recall if he consulted anyone before deciding to fire Browne Sanders in early 2006.

+ [reframe JD 05]: JD <+> poker faced --> not showing emotions. Preceding <+> cracked a smile --> happy to answer

(06) "Well, all decisions at the Garden I make on my own," Dolan said with a big grin.

+ [reframe JD 06]: grin <+> "Well, " --> {[confident of his answer]} JD <+> decide on my own --> {does not have to confer with anyone else; has complete control}; Remark <+> big grin --> JD pleased with his power}

(07) Dolan said he didn't consult with MSG lawyers about his decision and would have overridden the advice of lawyers if they told him not to fire her.

+ [reframe JD 07]: JD <+> didn't consult MSG lawyers --> {JD had complete power so didn't have to}; JD overridden <+> advice not to fire ABS {see text #08?}

(08) "Because I felt that the overall health of the Garden was at jeopardy here, and that that would override any opinion Counsel might have otherwise, that we should have Ms. Sanders stay in the job," Dolan said.

+ [reframe JD 08]: 2nd sensible reason—{overall health} <+> MSG in jeopardy --> {sound reason}

(09) Asked if the use of the word "bitch" was appropriate, Dolan said it wasn't.

+ [reframe JD 09]: "bitch" <+> appropriate <+> not --> {JD recognizes it is not appropriate}

(10) Browne Sanders has testified that Thomas routinely addressed her with that word.

Editorial intervention-out of chronological order: + (reframe IT 01) ABS <+> IT's use of bitch --> {ABS testified to IT's use of abusive language}

(11) "No, it is not appropriate, it is also not appropriate to murder someone," he said, without further explaining the analogy. Repeats (09)

+ [reframe JD 10]: denies firing was inappropriate — Murder <+> not appropriate --> Murder <+> did not occur at MSG --> {so, neither did abusive language} Remark <+> no explanation for analogy --> {Destefano wasn't sure what JD meant by it? [however, the implication is clear]}

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO LAWSUIT & ABS

(12) Dolan's deposition came during a day in which attorneys for Browne Sanders, 44, the former marketing head at MSG, rested their case in the \$10 million harassment and retaliatory dismissal lawsuit

Editorial intervention (out of chronological order): Lawsuit <+> a) harassment, b) retaliation --> prosecutions charges.

(13) Browne Sanders testified earlier that Thomas spewed a host of obscenities at her, also calling her a "ho" when she wanted to talk business.

Editorial intervention (out of chronological order): + reframe IT ABS' testimony about abusive language <+> time to conduct business --> {not only are the words abusive but also the occasion inappropriate.} [NOTE: later Destefano uses Faye Brown to point out that IT's behavior was experienced ONLY by Anucha Browne Sanders

(14) She also testified that Thomas made unwanted sexual advances towards her

Editorial intervention (out of chronological order): (reframe IT 02): ABS testimony <+> unwanted sexual advances --> {(12) first prosecution charge

(15) Thomas has denied acting inappropriately.

Editorial intervention (out of chronological order): (reframe IT 03) IT <+> denied charges --> {whom to believe?}

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO WITNESSES FOR BROWNE SANDERS

(16) Tuesday attorneys for Browne Sanders brought in a number of witnesses who testified that she had complained to them about Thomas' behavior and the obscenities he heaped on her

Editorial intervention (out of chronological order): Witnesses testified <+> ABS claimed IT = abusive --> {left out retaliation charge}

(the following events are out of chronological order)

(17) Faye Brown, a former administrative assistant at MSG, said Browne Sanders had complained to her about Thomas using the words "bitch" and "ho."

+ (frame **FB 00** & reframe **01**) Brown said <+> ABS claimed IT abusive --> {ABS told FB about IT but FB not an eye witness }

(18) Brown, who worked for Browne Sanders for about four years, was so embarrassed to use obscenities in court that she sometimes spelled them out instead.

Editorial intervention: + (reframe **FB 02**) FB <+> worked for ABS 4yrs. --> {probably favorable to ABS} FB <+> embarrassed to use words --> {offended by foul language}

(19) "She was in disbelief.

+ (reframe **ABS 01**): ABS? <+> disbelief --> [Odd choice of words: 1. (3) incredulity, disbelief, skepticism, mental rejection -- (doubt about the truth of something) 2. unbelief, disbelief -- (a rejection of belief) WordNet.]

(20) At times she would cry," said Brown, who isn't related to the plaintiff.

+ (reframe **ABS 02**): FB said <+> ABS cried --> {eye witness to ABS crying, hence upset.}

+ (reframe **FB 03**): FB <+> not related to ABS

(21) But Brown could turn out to be useful for both sides.

Editorial intervention: FB <+> useful to both sides --> {See text #22} Sets up text #22

(22) While each witness told the jury that Browne Sanders complained to them about Thomas' behavior and obscenities, they also said during cross-examination that they never heard Thomas use foul language or talk in disparaging terms about her.

Editorial intervention: Each witness <+> was told of abuse by ABS <+> no eye-witnesses --> {ABS could have lied to them}

SHIFT OF FOCUS TO MCCORMACK (the following events are out of chronological order)

(23) Another taped deposition played yesterday was that of Rusty McCormack, a senior vice president for human resources at MSG

Editorial intervention: + (frame **RM 00**): RM <+> a senior vice president for human resources at MSG --> {RM's position involves protecting employees from harassment}

(24) He said that employees were obligated to report harassment under company policy and that calling someone a "black bitch" -- as Browne Sanders says happened -- had overtones of racial and gender bias.

+ (frame **RM 01**): RM <+> said employees were obliged to report harassment --> {ABS was within her rights}; RM <+> ids "black bitch" as racial and gender bias --> {agrees that if IT called ABS by that phrase, it would be harassment}

(25) The defense is expected to begin its case Wednesday.

Editorial intervention: conclusion of article

Destefano's article represents the prosecution as ineffective in proving the charges against Dolan and Thomas. His unflattering portrait of Dolan during his deposition makes his description of the trial day somewhat ambiguous. He is less ambiguous about Anucha Browne Sanders—"A female Madison Square Garden executive was fired because she willfully interfered in a company probe of her sexual

harassment allegations ...” The emphasis in this sentence is on the first phrase “executive was fired because she willfully interfered.” That Dolan said this is the least emphatic part of the sentence. The expression, “was fired because,” is a statement of fact, uttered by Dolan. That it was spoken as “testimony” in “federal court” also suggests that it was a “true” statement. Nothing in the rest of the article is offered to challenge this statement. That Dolan was “unapologetic” and “poker-faced” or that he “cracked smile” do not imply that he was lying. The circumstance that the witnesses called in support of Browne Sanders heard of Thomas’ behavior only from her is not solid evidence for the prosecution. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Destefano’s discourse is the inclusion of Faye Brown’s testimony, noting that it “could be useful for either side,” pointing out that no one testified that Thomas had behaved inappropriately except Browne-Sanders. He also remarked that “While each witness told the jury that Browne Sanders complained to them about Thomas’ behavior and obscenities, they also said during cross-examination that they never heard Thomas use foul language or talk in disparaging terms about her.” Not having mentioned that Thomas attempted to kiss her and that he told her he loved her, the evidence for the charge that he had used inappropriate language was witnessed only by Browne-Sanders. [Note: Sandomir says that “three” witnesses testified for Browne-Sanders but did not mention Faye Brown.]

Destefano focuses almost exclusively on Browne Sanders’ charge of abusive language against Thomas. Destefano reports that Dolan said it did not happen and that Thomas denied Browne Sanders’ charges (which is not mentioned in the other articles). Whereas Destefano is specific about the abusive language used, he is not about the charge of unwelcome sexual advances. He represents the situation as one in which it remains to be decided who is lying about sexual harassment—Thomas or Browne Sanders. There is no clear evidence either way in his account. As for the charge of abusive language, none of the witnesses for Browne Sanders observed Thomas behaving inappropriately. Their only source of information about events was Browne Sanders. [NOTE: Destefano does not include Nix’s testimony regarding ABS’ corridor encounter with IT.]

SUMMARY: Ineffective prosecution attorneys failing to prove their case slants the report toward the defenses’ side.

BAUMBACH, Newsday.com

[Because Baumbach is clearly against Dolan, I have not included a full frame/framing analysis. For the basic analysis, see [Appendix B](#) at the end of this chapter.]

Baumbach’s article is an outright condemnation of Dolan and his legal team. It is by far the most searing description of Dolan and the most opinionated account of the trial day. It would have “resonance” for persons who agree with Baumbach, especially Knicks’ fans who were upset at his & Thomas’ management of the team. For them the caricature of Dolan as an incompetent but arrogant rich owner who is self-serving and destructive because he insists on making the decisions would confirm their own beliefs. Persons who were not predisposed to dislike Dolan would probably find the article too opinionated to be credible as an accurate account of the trial day.

Baumbach first paints a portrait of Dolan as an arrogant and incompetent MSG CEO. When he turns to McCormack’s deposition (22), he ridicules him briefly (23-24), then analyzes his testimony, pointing out that McCormack concluded his investigation after Browne Sanders was fired and signed the recommendation that the MSG VP for legal affairs drafted since MSG lawyers needed it on record

because they feared a lawsuit. The investigation is described as a pretense and a hoax since its other recommendations—concerning Thomas and Mills were not followed. He also implies that McCormack’s remarks about Thomas imply that he was guilty of sexual harassment. Baumbach ends his article with Dolan’s admission that abusive language was inappropriate at MSG. When Dolan tries to imply that such language did not occur with his odd parallel to murder, Baumbach underscores the incongruity of the parallel by describing the courtroom crowd’s reaction to it—laughter and gasps.

SUMMARY: Caricature of arrogant CEOs of large wealthy corporations who do not believe they can lose a lawsuit against a mere employee.

Zambito, Daily News Staff Writer

[Because Zambito is clearly against Dolan, I have not included a full frame/framing analysis. For the basic analysis, see [Appendix C](#). at the end of this chapter.]

The conspiracy theory aspect of Zambito’s article would have resonance for readers who believe that wealthy persons have numerous experts in their employ who work collusively to cover up any indiscretions that their employers commit. Though much less opinionated and caustic than Baumbach, Zambito decisively indicts Dolan’s organization. After portraying Dolan as a “knee jerk” administrator, Zambito writes: “Dolan could appear in person as soon as today when Garden lawyers begin their attack on Browne Sanders’ allegations by calling their first witnesses. Also expected to testify is Garden President and Chief Operating Officer Steve Mills.” The notion that a team of MSG lawyers would begin their “attack” on Browne Sanders’s “allegations” suggests that Dolan’s defense team was out to destroy her credibility. From this point on, he uses Jeff Nix’s testimony to describe how Mills operated behind the scenes to keep Browne Sanders from suing the Garden with the threat that they would start rumors about her having an affair with Nix. Pointing out that Mills was going to be a witness for the legal team hints at collusion in a strategy of attacking Browne Sanders’ credibility. Zambito’s account foregrounds collusion (“agreement on a secret plot,” WordNet).

SUMMARY: reporter at the trial exposing the ways in which the defendants colluded outside of the courtroom against the plaintiff.

7.3 Comparison of the Journalists’ Framing the Testimonies by Inclusion & Exclusion

As earlier chapters indicated, the comparison of texts in LDA is based on identifying a protolog. Ideally, the protolog in a court trial would be a transcript of the trial. However, I was unable to obtain one. In this case, choosing one of the news stories as a protolog was inadvisable because of the lack of a criterion for that choice. The solution to the problem was to construct a composite “chronology” of events based on references to factual aspects of the testimonies, omitting background information supplied by the journalists, their opinions, and prejudicial language used in the descriptions of the events—for example, “the arrogant way he conducted himself.”⁵² This composite chronology makes it

⁵² I developed this example of a f/rf LDA for a seminar in discourse analysis. I had no intention of publishing it as an instance of frame analysis. To do so, would have required an analysis of the entire trial. I have included the text of the analysis in this book because I do not have another example. My focus in the development of LDA is on

possible to identify what materials journalists included and excluded in their reports and whether the sequence of events was reported out of order. The omission of events and the order of events is particularly important in that departures from the protolog, especially the inclusion of events that did not occur during the day of the trial, because they are potential indications of whether the journalist is predisposing his readers to favor the prosecution or the defense.

7.3.1 Inclusions and Exclusions

First, I present a chart of the inclusions and exclusions of the four news stories based on the protolog as described above. [\[KEY\]](#)

Protolog [underscored words identify the event in the comparisons.]	SANDOMIR	DESTEFANO	BAUMBACH	ZAMBITO
Title: Dolan <u>fired</u> Browne Sanders	YES	YES		YES
DOLAN SAID:				
[01] "All decisions at the Garden I make on my own," ⁵³	YES	YES	YES	YES
[02] "I specifically did not consult with counsel,"	YES	YES	YES	YES
[03] the "overall health of the Garden was at jeopardy."	YES	YES	YES	YES
[04] Browne Sanders <u>coerced</u> employees into "corroborating her complaint"	YES		YES	
[05] which <u>impeded</u> the Garden's investigation	YES	"willfully interfered"	YES	"interfered"
[06] "That's right ... by bringing in people who were ... attempting to influence the process," Browne Sanders <u>willfully</u> violated company policies and <u>undermined</u> the investigation.		YES		
[07] which <u>outweighed</u> a potential legal opinion about	YES	YES	YES "overrule"	
[08] "Why would we have Ms. Sanders stay in the job."	YES	YES		
[09] He made his decision to fire her <u>without knowing the status of the Garden's investigation.</u>	YES			
[10] <u>Without reading anything more than newspaper accounts</u> detailing Browne Sanders's accusations.	YES			
[11] He said he learned about Browne Sanders's suspected <u>tampering</u> from Rusty McCormack	YES			

the analysis of conceptions. During the development phase I realized that LDA could be used in a variety of ways, not only to track conceptual changes.

⁵³ Quoted passages do not include underscored words.

[12] He discussed the Browne Sanders case with McCormack.	YES			
[13] Hank Ratner, the Garden’s vice chairman, was with them	YES			
[14] He told McCormack and Ratner, “They needed to let her go.”	YES			
[15]“I think I understand the concept,” when asked if he understood what “ <u>retaliation</u> ” meant				YES
[16]“Yes, I think she did” when asked if Browne had made a <u>formal allegation</u> ?				YES
[17] “No, it’s not appropriate, when asked about the appropriateness of using “ <u>bitch</u> ,”	YES	YES	YES	YES
[18] “It is also not appropriate to murder anyone. I don’t think that that has happened either.”	YES	YES ⁵⁴	YES	YES
Prologue	Sandomir	Destefano	Baumbach	Zambito
MCCORMACK SAID:				
[19] employees <u>were obligated to report harassment</u> under company policy		YES		
[20] that calling someone a “ <u>black bitch</u> ” -- as Browne Sanders says happened -- had overtones of racial and gender bias.		YES		
[21] he did not tell Dolan anything about the investigation.	YES			
[22] he did not know who told Dolan the conclusion in his <u>memorandum</u> on the <u>in-house investigation</u> that Browne Sanders had to be “ <u>separated</u> .”	YES		YES only mentions memo	
[23] “No, I did not,” when a lawyer for Browne Sanders, asked, “ <u>Did you have any conversations with James Dolan about separating Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?</u> ”	YES			
[24] “No, I did not,” when asked <u>did you have any conversations with Hank Ratner</u> about separating Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?”	YES			
[25] the <u>memorandum was written by Marc Schoenfeld</u>	YES		YES	
[26] <u>in anticipation of a lawsuit</u> , and he made a few edits before signing it.	YES		YES	
[27] they <u>needed</u> this paper “ <u>on record</u> ”			YES	
[00] the <u>investigation</u> said it was <u>not concluded until after Browne Sanders was fired</u>			YES	

⁵⁴ Left out “I don’t think that that has happened either” adding “without further explaining the analogy.”

[28] the report was <u>“not necessarily” intended to be read by Dolan or Steve Mills</u>	YES			
[29] <u>“Not necessarily,” when asked: did you intend the statements you made concerning Ms. Browne Sanders to be read by anyone?</u>	YES			
[30] he <u>never read Browne Sanders’s performance</u> before signing the report	YES			
[31] <u>Thomas did not receive the sensitivity training</u> recommended in the report	YES		YES	
[32] <u>“When the lawsuit came, that was about as much sensitivity training as he’d ever want,”</u>	YES		YES	
Prologue	Sandomir	Destefano	Baumbach	Zambito
NIX SAID				
[33] Browne Sanders told him <u>Thomas called her a "bitch" and a "ho."</u>				YES
[34] Browne Sanders told him about <u>a 2004 meeting</u> in which Thomas told her: "Don't forget, you f---ing bitch, I'm the president of this f---ing team."				YES
[35] he saw Browne Sanders in the hallway pulling away from Thomas’s embrace.	YES			YES
[36] She walked away toward Nix, but passed him.	YES			
[37] “She looked upset,” he testified.	YES			
[38] when he caught up to her, she told him: <u>“You won’t believe what he just said.</u>	YES			YES
[39] <u>[Thomas] said, ‘I’m in love with you.’</u> “It’s like “Love and Basketball.”	YES			YES
[41] he advised her to tell Mills. Browne Sanders	YES			
[42] Browne Sanders said she has testified that <u>she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but that he did nothing to change the situation.</u>	YES			
[43] "I was angry," Nix told jurors. "I said Steve Mills is a f---ing liar." (When he learned that <u>Mills</u> had allegedly told Browne Sanders that <u>Thomas would float rumors</u> that she and Nix were having an affair if she pursued sexual-harassment charges.				YES
Prologue	Sandomir	Destefano	Baumbach	Zambito
RUTH BROWNE SAID				
[44] she recalled near-daily conversations with her younger sister about the harassment she endured				YES

[45] her sister became <u>one of the NBA's top-ranking female executives</u> .				YES
FAYE BROWN SAID				
[46] Browne Sanders had complained to her about <u>Thomas using the words "bitch" and "ho."</u>		YES		
[47] Browne Sanders "was in disbelief. ... <u>At times she would cry,</u> "		YES		
PREVIOUS TESTEMONY MENTIONED IN THE NEWS STORIES:				
Prologue	Sandomir	Destefano	Baumbach	Zambito
ANUCHA BROWNE SANDERS SAID:				
[48] <u>she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but he did nothing</u>	YES			
[49] that <u>Thomas spewed a host of obscenities</u> at her, also calling her a "ho" when she wanted to talk business. She also testified		YES		
[50] that <u>Thomas made unwanted sexual advances</u> towards her.		YES		YES
[51] that <u>Stephon Marburv also harassed her</u>				YES
ISIAH THOMAS SAID				
[52] denied acting inappropriately		YES		
STEVE MILLS SAID:				
[53] <u>he didn't respond</u> to [Browne Sanders] e-mail about Thomas's hugging & trying to kiss her.	YES			

Comments:

- Sandomir’s inclusions are invariably of testimony that favors the prosecution’s case, for example his inclusion of Nix’s testimony which Destefano omits.
Sandomir’s omissions generally involve
 - a. remarks including offensive language, even when the statement favors the prosecution.
 - b. repetitious statements. However, he often chooses to omit the statements that include details which could favor the defense: For example, he includes 04—“Browne Sanders coerced employees into “corroborating her complaint” but omits 06— Anne Vladeck, ABS’s attorney, asks “Mr. Dolan, you said that she willfully violated company policies and undermined [the company] investigation of her charges...” “... by bringing in people who were ... attempting to influence the process.”
 - c. He omits Faye Brown’s testimony.

- Destefano’s inclusions are invariably of testimony that favors the defendant’s case, for example, his inclusion of Faye Brown’s testimony which Sandomir omits.

Destefano's omissions are invariably of testimony that favors the defendant's case putting it in the best possible light:

- a. The majority of McCormark's testimony that he did not tell Dolan of the memorandum recommending "separating" Browne Sanders as Dolan had claimed.
 - b. That the memorandum was written by Marc Schoenfeld in anticipation of a lawsuit, and he made a few edits before signing it.
 - c. That the investigation was not concluded until after Browne Sanders was fired (reported only by Baumbach)
 - d. That he never read Browne Sander's performance evaluations.
 - e. That Thomas did not receive the sensitivity training recommended in the report
 - f. Leaving out the entirety of Nix's very damaging testimony.
 - g. He is the only journalist who included Thomas denial of acting inappropriately.
 - h. Leaving out Ruth Browne's testimony while including Faye Brown who indicated that Anucha Browner Sander's told her that Thomas heaped obscenities on her but who "never heard Thomas use foul language or talk in disparaging terms about her."
- Baumbach omits more of the trial day testimony than any of the journalists. His article is the most opinionated and his opinions dominate. His article is also the most antagonistic to the defendants.
 - Zambito omits almost as much testimony as Baumbach. His article is dominated by drawing a portrait of Dolan as a rash "sports-media mogul" and testimony that does not fit this theme is omitted.

7.3.2 Sequencing the Testimonies

When events are arranged differently than the chronology, the "moved" event frames the event that follows or reframes the preceding event. This editorial choice changes the meaning of the events that are newly framed and are potential indications of whether the journalist is predisposing his readers to favor the prosecution or the defense.

[NOTE: the numbers preceded by "text" or "texts" refer to the statements listed in the protolog in the previous section.]

Sandomir's Sequencing [KEY]

Sandomir uses sequencing to support the prosecution:

1. Sandomir inserts the background information that "Browne Sanders is suing Thomas, the Knicks' coach and president of basketball operations, for verbally abusing and sexually harassing her, and the Garden for firing her in retaliation for making her claims," Before text #09 — He made his decision to fire her without knowing the status of the Garden's investigation.

Comment: Though it specifies the charges — verbally abusing and sexually harassing as well as retaliation— this sentence repeats the information in Sandomir’s first sentence. As a repetition of the juxtaposition of firing and acting unilaterally it reinforces the view that Dolan did not follow “due process.”

2. The exchange about the inappropriateness of using “bitch” and Dolan’s response (texts #17 and #18) are moved to the end of his article.

Comment: Judging from the circumstance that all four journalists mention this exchange and that, if Baumbach is correct, “a mixture of laughter and gasps came from the small crowd in the back of the room,” Dolan’s analogy stood out as “off-the-wall.” Since, from a rhetorical point of view the beginnings and endings of a discourse are the more emphatic than the middle of the discourse, suggests that Sandomir placed the puzzling exchange out of chronological order at the end of his article to emphasize its “off the wall” character. Whether he did so deliberately or not does not discount the fact that it comes at an emphatic point in his article.

3. Dolan’s testimony that he learned about Browne Sander’s “tampering” from McCormack (texts #11-#14) is followed by McCormack’s denial that he told Dolan of it (texts #21-#24)

Comment: Sandomir placed texts #17 & #18 of Dolan’s testimony at the end of his article and went immediately to texts #21-#24. This juxtaposition underscores the likelihood that Dolan lied.

4. Inserted the info: “Nix, whose contract with the Knicks ended last month,” before (text #35) “he saw Browne Sanders in the hallway pulling away from Thomas’s embrace.”

Comment: Opens the possibility that Nix was fired because of his support of Browne Sanders.

5. Inserted: “Sanders has testified that she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but that he did nothing to change the situation” and “In snippets of his video deposition shown yesterday, Mills said he did not respond to her e-mail message complaining of Thomas’s hugging and trying to kiss her” after his account of Nix’s testimony advising Browne Sanders to tell Mills.

Comment: Bringing in Browne Sanders and Mills’ testimony suggests that Mills, who was the President of MSG Sports and supervisor of Browne Sanders and Thomas, did not follow due process.

Destefano’s Sequencing [KEY]

Unlike Sandomir, Destefano uses sequencing to support the defense:

1. The first sentence of his prefatory remarks is: “A female Madison Square Garden executive was fired because she willfully interfered in a company probe of her sexual harassment allegations ...”

Comment: The phrase “because she willfully interfered” is a statement of fact indicting Browne Sanders. The noun, “allegations,” on the other hand, indicates that her accusation is unproven. However, that Browne Sanders “interfered” was not yet a proven fact. (The other accounts suggest that Dolan fired her peremptorily without investigating the report that she interfered—McCormack denied telling him about the memorandum as Dolan claimed).

2. Destefano's begins his account of Dolan's testimony by noting that Browne Sanders' attorney challenged the view that she "willfully interfered" to which Dolan responded: "That's right ... by bringing in people who were ... attempting to influence the process."

Comment: This supports Destefano's first sentence. He then moves on to Dolan's remark that "Well, all decisions at the Garden I make on my own" without indicating what Browne Sanders' lawyer asked next. Destefano's account of Dolan's testimony is structured by first referring to his suspect actions followed by reasons for them.

3. Skipped Dolan's testimony that McCormack told him of the memo in the presence of Ratner. And skipped McCormack's testimony denying that he did.

Comment: Omitting McCormack's damaging testimony certainly favors the defendant.

4. When reporting the inappropriateness of the word, "bitch," Destefano inserted the remark that Browne Sanders routinely made the claim that Thomas referred to her by the term. He included Dolan's remark about the inappropriateness of murder, but said that he didn't explain the analogy, leaving out Dolan's last sentence: "I don't think that that has happened either."

Comment: Dolan's bringing "murder" into the exchange about "inappropriate" acts only makes sense if the expression "that that has happened *either*" refers to using the word, "bitch." The analogy is implausible. If Baumbach's testimony that "a mixture of laughter and gasps came from the small crowd in the back of the room" is accurate, then Destefano's "without further explaining the analogy" is inaccurate at best and a cover up at worst.

5. Omitted McCormack, Nix, & Ruth Browne's testimonies but included Faye Brown's, adding "Brown could turn out to be useful for both sides. While each witness told the jury that Browne Sanders complained to them about Thomas' behavior and obscenities, they also said during cross-examination that they never heard Thomas use foul language or talk in disparaging terms about her."

Comment: The omissions and the inclusion favor the defendant's case. Brown's testimony was that Browne Sanders told her of Thomas' inappropriate language but she had never heard Thomas use "foul language." This suggests that Browne Sanders is the only source of the reports that Thomas acted inappropriately.

6. Destefano finally mentions McCormack's testimony (though it occurred before Brown's) but only mentions that "employees were obligated to report harassment" and that "calling someone a "black bitch" -- as Browne Sanders says happened -- had overtones of racial and gender bias."

Comment: Mentioning these two items instead of McCormack's denial that he had told Dolan of the memo as Dolan claimed removes damaging statements and underscoring "as Browne Sanders says happened" favors the defense.

Baumbachs Sequencing [KEY]

Baumbach does not follow the chronology of events and skips around. Usually he inserts a remark that frames a reference to one of the events of the trial. His article provides an opinion platform for his view which is very antagonistic and at times vicious.

1. Before reporting any of Dolan's testimony Baumbach inserted:

When James Dolan's video deposition appeared in court yesterday afternoon on the oversized television, you couldn't help but take note of how large his head appeared on screen. Based on the arrogant way he conducted himself on tape, that's how he likes it. ¶ In the span of an 11-minute taped segment in which he was asked pointed questions by lawyers, Dolan ran the full gamut of emotions. He laughed out loud, even cracked a bad joke. He sighed at a question. He even slouched so far down in his chair at one point that it made you feel as if he was sitting courtside in the fourth quarter of a game the Knicks trailed by 40. ¶ There's no telling whether Anucha Browne Sanders' attorneys will successfully convince the jury of seven that Isiah Thomas is guilty of sexual harassment. But after listening to Dolan's deposition, and that of senior vice president of human resources Rusty McCormack, it's become clear he wrongfully fired Browne Sanders.

Comment: This characterization of Dolan obviously favors the prosecution.

2. Of course Dolan took credit for the firing, seemingly even puffing his chest as he did so. "All decisions at the Garden, I make on my own," Dolan said. Words that surely make Knicks fans shake their heads and think about what's become of their storied franchise.

Comment: This characterization of Dolan as a person and as an administrator of MSG obviously favors the prosecution.

3. Dolan said he fired her almost immediately after McCormack told him over the telephone that Brown Sanders was impeding his investigation into her sexual harassment complaint. (Never mind that McCormack all but admitted in his videotaped testimony that the investigation basically was a crock.) What infuriated Dolan was McCormack's claim that she was coercing "her direct reports into collaborating her complaints." ¶ But Dolan didn't think to bring this accusation to Browne Sanders, as any sane boss would do.

Comment: Characterizes Dolan as a tyrant who acts impulsively to assert his power.

4. "And he refused to ask the Cablevision lawyers if firing her was appropriate after she had formally complained of sexual harassment by Dolan's top employees. No, this decision was bigger than his lawyers. ¶ Imagine that, Dolan worrying about the "**overall health of the Garden.**" Look what's become of the place now and what's on display each day in room 23A of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan federal courthouse in Manhattan. ¶ Imagine the embarrassment Cablevision as a company feels today after McCormack, its senior vice president of human resources, admitted in his deposition that he is not trained in equal opportunity employee laws. This guy even suggested that calling another employee a derogatory name is OK, as long as it's not to their face."

Comment: Continues the characterization of Dolan as an overbearing tyrant and mocks his management of the Knick's and MSG.

5. "As for Cablevision's supposed investigation into Browne Sanders' sexual harassment complaints against Thomas, McCormack said it was not concluded until after she was fired, making it convenient for him to come to the conclusion she should be "separated" from the organization"

Comment: Introduces "McCormack said [the investigation] was not concluded until after she was fired. No other journalists reports this. If it was true, then it supports the view that "due process" was not given to Browne Sanders and hence Baumbach adjective "supposed" investigation.

6. After preceding sentence Baumbach writes: "But when pressed on the videotape, he said he drew up a memo concluding the investigation only because the Garden's lawyers feared a lawsuit from her. They needed this paper "on record," he said."

Comment: This is damaging evidence against the defense's case.

7. After a reference to text #31 and report of text #32, he says that "Besides, McCormack later admitted he didn't write the memo, even though it's in his name" noting text #25

Comment: This is not an uncommon business practice. However, mentioning it at this point in his article suggests Baumbach was using it rhetorically against the defense.

8. Then he mentions texts #17 & #18 adding that "A mixture of laughter and gasps came from the small crowd in the back of the room. If we only knew what Dolan's Garden attorneys were thinking . . ."

Comment: None of the other journalists mention this which is not surprising since the court room audience's reactions to the remarks of a witness describe the atmosphere of the trial rather than its events. That Baumbach mentions it, again suggests that he is building a rhetorical case against the defense.

Zambito's Sequencing [KEY]

Zambito portrays Nolan as a sports mogul:

1. Preceding text #01: Firing ex-Knicks executive Anucha Browne Sanders was a slam dunk decision for Madison Square Garden boss James Dolan. ¶ A federal jury yesterday heard the sports-media mogul say he canned her after she lobbed sex-harassment allegations at Coach Isiah Thomas and star guard Stephon Marbury.

Comment: The expression "sports-media mogul" begins a theme of wealthy and irresponsible owners of sports teams. "Slam dunk decision" and "canned her after she lobbed" with the basketball references support the "irresponsible" theme.

2. Inserted before text #17-#18: Dolan, whose family empire is worth billions with assets that include Cablevision, the Garden, the Knicks, the Rangers and Radio City Music Hall, appeared on a big-screen TV dressed casually in a black sweater rolled up at the sleeves. ¶ As quickly as he explained her firing, Dolan brushed off claims that Thomas and Marbury used the B-word to refer to Browne Sanders, implying that his coach and star point guard never used the word

Comment: The editorial intervention "whose family empire ..." continues the theme of wealthy owners who "quickly" "brush off" accusations who are irresponsible.

3. The Cablevision chairman told Browne Sanders' lawyer it's "not appropriate" for Garden employees to refer to fellow employees as "bitch" or "black bitch." ¶ Then, Dolan added: "It is also not appropriate to murder anyone. I don't know that that has happened, either."

Comment: Identifying Dolan as "the Cablevision chairman" continues the association of Dolan with "wealthy owners." More than any of the other journalists, Zambito mentions the corporate titles of each witness in full—"Also expected to testify is Garden President and Chief Operating Officer Steve Mills."

Zambito also develops a theme of corporate tyranny:

1. After noting the testimony of the prosecution witness, Ruth Brown, Anucha Browne Sander's sister, Zambito writes: "Dolan could appear in person as soon as today when Garden lawyers begin their attack on Browne Sanders' allegations by calling their first witnesses."

Comment: The phrase "begin their attack on Browne Sander's allegations" implies that the defense attorney's aim to discredit her.

2. Then Sambito goes back to Nix's testimony, prefacing it with "Earlier, former Knicks assistant coach Jeff Nix took the witness stand and backed up many of Browne Sanders' claims involving Thomas. ¶ Nix, who worked for the team for 15 years until he was fired last month,"

Comment: Rather than report what Nix said, Sambito interprets the testimony. Further, Sambito's editorial intervention that Nix worked for the team for 15 years before being fired "last month," suggests that Nix was fired because of his support of Browne Sanders and adds to the themes of wealthy owners and corporations acting tyrannically.

3. "Nix, who served under eight Knicks coaches including Thomas, said he witnessed an incident that same year in which Thomas allegedly hugged Browne Sanders and professed his love for her."

Comment: Sambito's emphasis on Nix's lengthy service to the Knick's reinforces the suggestion that he was fired because of his support of Browne Sanders. It also reinforces the theme of corporate tyranny.

4. Ends with "'I said Steve Mills is a f---ing liar."

Comment: This remark comes after Sambito notes that Nix "learned that Mills had allegedly told Browne Sanders that Thomas would float rumors that she and Nix were having an affair if she pursued sexual-harassment charges." Sambito, having earlier identified Steve Mills as "Garden President and Chief Operating Officer, again reinforces the theme of "corporate tyranny."

7.4 Concluding Remarks:

The f/r-LDA of the four newspaper reports of the Dolan/Thomas sexual harassment trial bring to light a number of rhetorical strategies of which casual readers would not be aware.

Unlike Baumbach and Sambito's blatant antagonism to the defendants in the trial, Sandomir's article reads as a typically "objective" New York Times article. However, his careful structuring of the frame/reframing sequences works subtly to put readers in mind of the prosecution lawyers strategies. His juxtaposition of events both during the day of the trial and prior to it favors the prosecution. Sandomir's inclusions also work in favor of the prosecution, especially when compared to Destefano's omissions. Sandomir's sequencing of events, in particular his editorial interventions, also work in favor of the prosecution.

Destefano shows no blatant antagonism to Dolan even though his characterization of Dolan includes several negative attributes. None of them—unapologetic, poker-faced, big grin—indict him. They might work to disguise Destefano's favoring the defendants. His slant, like Sandomir's, is subtle. He begins the remark that "A female Madison Square Garden executive was fired because she willfully interfered in a company probe of her sexual harassment allegations ..." which frames the rest of his article. He

attributes the remark to Dolan but the sentence reads as a statement of fact. Destefano's rhetorical strategy is to first mention potential problems with the prosecution's case and follow with remarks that suggest their case does not have merit. For example, the sequence:

(03) "With all due respect, Mr. Dolan, you said that she willfully violated company policies and undermined [the company] investigation of her charges," said attorney Anne Vladeck, who represents Browne Sanders in her lawsuit against Dolan, Thomas and MSG. (04) "That's right by bringing in people who were attempting to influence the process," responded Dolan.

Vladeck's question begins "With all due respect," an idiom which [Wiktionary](#) exemplifies with the sentence "*With all due respect, Sir, I don't think that's the case*" which challenges the remark that had been made. Destefano follows her question with a very plausible response from Dolan. Later he introduces Fay Brown's testimony to suggest that witnesses for the prosecution only heard of Thomas from Browne Sanders and did not personally observe any harassment from Thomas. Further, Destefano's omission of remarks by witnesses during the trial day, which mirror Sandomir's inclusions, show that he leaves out the most damning evidence against the defendants.

Both Baumbach and Sambito are overtly hostile to Dolan. Not surprisingly, an LDA of their texts does not contradict their slants toward the prosecution. The structure of their articles confirms what is obvious at the surface. An LDA does show in detail the difference in their rhetorical strategies. Whereas Baumbach portrays Dolan as pompous and incompetent, Sambito portrays him as a wealthy and irresponsible corporate CEO.

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Appendix A:

Protolog [underscored words identify the event in the comparisons.]
Title (context) Dolan <u>fired</u> Browne Sanders
DOLAN SAID:
[01] "All decisions at the Garden I make on my own," ⁵⁵
[02] "I specifically did not consult with counsel,"
[03] the "overall health of the Garden was at jeopardy."
[04] Browne Sanders <u>coerced</u> employees into "corroborating her complaint"
[05] which <u>impeded</u> the Garden's investigation
[06] "That's right ... by bringing in people who were ... attempting to influence the process," Browne Sanders <u>willfully</u> violated company policies and <u>undermined</u> the investigation.
[07] which <u>outweighed</u> a potential legal opinion about
[08] "Why would we have Ms. Sanders stay in the job."
[09] He made his decision to fire her <u>without knowing the status of the Garden's investigation.</u>
[10] <u>Without reading anything more than newspaper accounts</u> detailing Browne Sanders's accusations.
[11] He said he learned about Browne Sanders's suspected <u>tampering</u> from Rusty McCormack
[12] He discussed the Browne Sanders case with McCormack.
[13] Hank Ratner, the Garden's vice chairman, was with them
[14] He told McCormack and Ratner, "They needed to let her go."
[15] "I think I understand the concept," when asked if he understood what " <u>retaliation</u> " meant
[16] "Yes, I think she did" when asked if Browne had made <u>a formal allegation?</u>
[17] "No, it's not appropriate, when asked about the appropriateness of using " <u>bitch</u> ,"
[18] "It is also not appropriate to murder anyone. I don't think that that has happened either."
Prologue
MCCORMACK SAID:
[19] employees <u>were obligated to report harassment</u> under company policy
[20] that calling someone a " <u>black bitch</u> " -- as Browne Sanders says happened -- had overtones of racial and gender bias.
[21] he did not tell Dolan anything about the investigation.

⁵⁵ Quoted passages do not include underscored words.

[22] he did not know who told Dolan the conclusion in his <u>memorandum</u> on the <u>in-house investigation</u> that Browne Sanders had to be " <u>separated.</u> "
[23] "No, I did not," when a lawyer for Browne Sanders, asked, " <u>Did you have any conversations with James Dolan</u> about <u>separating</u> Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?"
[24] "No, I did not," when asked <u>did you have any conversations with Hank Ratner</u> about separating Ms. Browne Sanders from M.S.G.?"
[25] the <u>memorandum was written by Marc Schoenfeld</u>
[26] <u>in anticipation of a lawsuit</u> , and he made a few edits before signing it.
[27] they <u>needed</u> this paper " <u>on record</u> "
[00] the <u>investigation</u> said it was <u>not concluded until after Browne Sanders was fired</u>
[28] the report was " <u>not necessarily</u> " <u>intended to be read by Dolan or Steve Mills</u>
[29] " <u>Not necessarily,</u> " when asked: <u>did you intend the statements you made concerning Ms. Browne Sanders to be read by anyone?</u>
[30] he <u>never read Browne Sanders's performance</u> before signing the report
[31] <u>Thomas did not receive the sensitivity training</u> recommended in the report
[32] "When the lawsuit came, that was about as much sensitivity training as he'd ever want,"
Prologue
NIX SAID
[33] Browne Sanders told him <u>Thomas called her a "bitch" and a "ho."</u>
[34] Browne Sanders told him about a <u>2004 meeting</u> in which Thomas told her: "Don't forget, you f---ing bitch, I'm the president of this f---ing team."
[35] he saw Browne Sanders in the hallway pulling away from Thomas's embrace.
[36] She walked away toward Nix, but passed him.
[37] "She looked upset," he testified.
[38] when he caught up to her, she told him: " <u>You won't believe what he just said.</u> "
[39] [Thomas] said, ' <u>I'm in love with you.</u> ' "It's like "Love and Basketball."
[41] <u>he advised her to tell Mills.</u> Browne Sanders
[42] Browne Sanders said she has testified that <u>she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but that he did nothing to change the situation.</u>
[43] "I was angry," Nix told jurors. "I said Steve Mills is a f---ing liar." (When he learned that <u>Mills</u> had allegedly told Browne Sanders that <u>Thomas would float rumors</u> that she and Nix were having an affair if she pursued sexual-harassment charges.
Prologue

RUTH BROWNE SAID
[44] she recalled near-daily conversations with her younger sister about the harassment she endured
[45] her sister became <u>one of the NBA's top-ranking female executives.</u>
FAYE BROWN SAID
[46] Browne Sanders had complained to her about <u>Thomas using the words "bitch" and "ho."</u>
[47] Browne Sanders "was in disbelief. ... <u>At times she would cry,</u> "
PREVIOUS TESTEMONY MENTIONED IN THE NEWS STORIES:
Prologue
ANUCHA BROWNE SANDERS SAID:
[48] <u>she regularly informed Mills of her encounters with Thomas, but he did nothing</u>
[49] that <u>Thomas spewed a host of obscenities</u> at her, also calling her a "ho" when she wanted to talk business. She also testified
[50] that <u>Thomas made unwanted sexual advances</u> towards her.
[51] that <u>Stephon Marbury also harassed her</u>
ISIAH THOMAS SAID
[52] denied acting inappropriately
STEVE MILLS SAID:
[53] <u>he didn't respond</u> to [Browne Sanders] e-mail about Thomas's hugging & trying to kiss her.

[RETURN TO TEXT](#)

Appendix B

BAUMBACH, Newsday.com [[KEY](#)]

(title) Dolan's taped deposition raises behavior questions
JD deposition <+> raises <+> behavior questions --> {Some behaviors questionable. Whose?}
(01) When James Dolan's video deposition appeared in court yesterday afternoon on the oversized television, you couldn't help but take note of how large his head appeared on screen.
[first phrase describes the setting INITIAL PERSPECTIVE = JD'S] you <+> noted <+> large head --> {JD's "big head" [=conceited]}
(02) Based on the arrogant way he conducted himself on tape, that's how he likes it.
Arrogant conduct <+> JD enjoyed --> {JD is arrogant}

(03) In the span of an 11-minute taped segment in which he was asked pointed questions by lawyers, Dolan ran the full gamut of emotions.

Pointed questions <+> gamut of emotions --> {questions affected JD}

(04) He laughed out loud, even cracked a bad joke.

JD <+> laughed out loud ; JD <+> cracked bad joke ; --> {inappropriate for court room}

(05) He sighed at a question.

JD <+> sighed at a question --> {JD bothered question was asked}

(06) He even slouched so far down in his chair at one point that it made you feel as if he was sitting courtside in the fourth quarter of a game the Knicks trailed by 40.

JD <+> slouched --> {drooping posture ["usually used in negative constructions" WordNet]}

slouch <+> parallels his posture watching Knicks lose --> {JD looks like he is going to lose the court case??}

(07) There's no telling whether Anucha Browne Sanders' attorneys will successfully convince the jury of seven that Isiah Thomas is guilty of sexual harassment.

No telling of <+> prosecution success --> {verdict is not clear yet} Prosecution <+> convince <+> jury <+> IT <+> sexual harassment --> {not yet clear that IT will be prosecuted}

(08) But after listening to Dolan's deposition, and that of senior vice president of human resources Rusty McCormack, it's become clear he wrongfully fired Browne Sanders.

<+> listening <+> JD + RM deposition --> {"But" signals contrast to 07} It's clear <+> JD wrongfully fired ABS --> {Baumbach believes JD is guilty (confirms 06 inference)}

(09) Of course Dolan took credit for the firing, seemingly even puffing his chest as he did so.

JD <+> took credit JD <+> puffing his chest --> {recalls JD's arrogance 02}

(10) "All decisions at the Garden, I make on my own," Dolan said.

JD <+> makes all decision on own --> {recalls 09 "took credit" & 02 "arrogant"}

(11) Words that surely make Knicks fans shake their heads and think about what's become of their storied franchise.

Knicks fans <+> shake their heads <+> about what's happened to their team --> {fans don't understand JD's decisions [that brought about several disastrous losing seasons]}

(12) Dolan said he fired her almost immediately after McCormack told him over the telephone that Brown Sanders was impeding his investigation into her sexual harassment complaint.

JD <+> fired ABS <+> almost immediately --> {firing was quick} After <+> RM told him of ABS's impeding his investigation --> {JD's reason for firing was RM's saying ABS interfered with investigation}

(13) Never mind that McCormack all but admitted in his videotaped testimony that the investigation basically was a crock.

RM implied <+> investigation = crock --> {RM's accusation that ABS interfered is suspect, [crock = nonsense; foolish talk, WordNet]}

(14) What infuriated Dolan was McCormack's claim that she was coercing "her direct reports into collaborating [sic] her complaints."

RM's claim <+> infuriated JD --> {JD furious at [insubordination]} SHIFT OF FOCUS TO RM
ABS <+> making her reports reinforce her complaints --> {[ABS was insistent about IT's sexual harassment so JD fired her for insubordination]}

(15) But Dolan didn't think to bring this accusation to Browne Sanders, as any sane boss would do.

JD <+> didn't think <+> talk to ABS --> {[normally the accused has right to know of accusation]} --> {"sane" <+> JD acted irrationally}

(16) And he refused to ask the Cablevision lawyers if firing her was appropriate after she had formally complained of sexual harassment by Dolan's top employees.

JD <+> refused to consult lawyers <+> after ABS complaint --> {recalls 12 thus focuses on timing of firing [ABS did not receive "due process"] & recalls arrogance 02} Sexual harassment <+> top employees --> {[treatment of top employees not standard]}

(17) No, this decision was bigger than his lawyers.

Decision <+> bigger than lawyers --> {bigger = more important, why? Arrogance again [wanted to display power]}

(18) "I specifically did not consult with counsel," Dolan said.

Preceding <+> specifically didn't consult counsel --> {"specifically" = especially not counsel [lawyers were not relevant]}

(19) "I felt that the overall health of the Garden was in jeopardy here and that would overrule any opinion of counsel."

Health of MSG <+> jeopardy --> {"health" not financially but environmentally [group "chemistry"]}
Jeopardy <+> overrule counsel opinion --> {recalls 18—counsel irrelevant; their opinion—not to fire implied—JD would overrule because of danger—ABS presented}

(20) Imagine that, Dolan worrying about the "overall health of the Garden."

Imagine <+> JD worrying about health of MSG --> {such an event is laughable}

(21) Look what's become of the place now and what's on display each day in room 23A of the Daniel Patrick Moynihan federal courthouse in Manhattan.

Look at <+> MSG now --> {[organization had been criticized by NBA commissioner for ineptitude]}
Look at <+> courtroom display --> {= embarrassing to be sued for sexual harassment in your company}

(22) Imagine the embarrassment Cablevision as a company feels today after McCormack, its senior vice president of human resources, admitted in his deposition that he is not trained in equal opportunity employee laws.

Imagine <+> Cablevision as company whose senior VP of human resources. RM, admits not trained in equal opportunity laws --> {[VP of HR should be trained] thus the company should be embarrassed at the trial's exposures}

(23) This guy even suggested that calling another employee a derogatory name is OK, as long as it's not to their face.

This "guy" <+> even --> {[informal ref] beyond the norm = derogatory and accusatory} RM <+> ok with calling employees derogatory names if not to their faces --> {VP of HR holds a position that contradicts his role in the company}

(24) As for Cablevision's supposed investigation into Browne Sanders' sexual harassment complaints against Thomas, McCormack said it was not concluded until after she was fired, making it convenient for him to come to the conclusion she should be "separated" from the organization.

Investigation <+> "supposed" --> {investigation not an investigation} RM <+> said investigation not concluded until after ABS was fired --> {firing ABS was illegal} This circumstance <+> convenient for RM to conclude ABS should be fired. --> {the investigation confirmed firing ABS after the fact, so = invalid action}

(25) But when pressed on the videotape, he said he drew up a memo concluding the investigation only because the Garden's lawyers feared a lawsuit from her.

When pressed <+> on the videotape --> {ABS's lawyers got him to admit} RM composed memo <+> because MSG lawyers feared a lawsuit --> the investigation confirmed firing ABS after the fact fearing a lawsuit, {so = invalid}

(26) They needed this paper "on record," he said.

MSG lawyers <+> needed the recommendation to fire "on record" --> confirms 24 {RM faked document lawyers needed in case of lawsuit}

(27) And it only gets worse.

It <+> gets worse --> {it refers to questionable behavior & recalls title of article}

(28) In the memo, McCormack wrote that Thomas should undergo sensitivity training and Garden president Steve Mills should meet with human resources officials about the experience.

RM <+> wrote IT should undergo sensitivity training --> {if IT needed sensitivity training isn't this tantamount to admitting he was guilty of sexual harassment?} RM <+> wrote that SM should meet with "human resource officials" --> {Why would they need to do so if there was no sexual harassment?}

(29) But neither person followed through with the suggestions.

RM's recommendations <+> not followed --> {throws additional suspicion on docs coming out of investigation.}

(30) "When the lawsuit came about, that's about as much sensitivity training [Thomas] could want," McCormack said. [expression suggests that the consequences of IT's actions resulted in punishment enough.]

RM <+> lawsuit = only sensitivity training IT could want --> {remark implicitly indicts IT}

(31) Besides, McCormack later admitted he didn't write the memo, even though it's in his name.

RM <+> did not write memo but signed it --> {the recommendations were not RM's but he agreed with them}

(32) Marc Schoenfeld, senior vice president of legal affairs, drafted it.

MS <+> senior VP legal affairs --> {if an MSG legal officer wrote the memo is it related to the fear of a lawsuit? If so, memo is the "needed paper" 26}

(33) When Dolan was asked if he thought that it was appropriate for an employee to refer to a colleague as a "bitch," he leaned back in his chair.

JD <+> asked if calling colleague a "bitch" was appropriate --> {ABS lawyers want JD to admit abusive language (07 prosecution charge) was inappropriate} JD <+> leaned back in his chair --> {{leaning back in a chair suggests a gesture of confidence¹² which would be arrogant in context.}}

(34) "It's not appropriate," he said.

JD <+> calling colleague a "bitch" not appropriate --> {lawyers got JD to admit charge would be justified}

(35) "It's also not appropriate to murder anyone.

(36) I don't know if that's happened here."

(37) A mixture of laughter and gasps came from the small crowd in the back of the room.

JD <+> murder = inappropriate --> {"out of right field"} It (murder) <+> did not happen at MSG --> {implies IT calling ABS a bitch did not happen either} Previous response <+> laughter & gasps --> {laughter suggests JD's remark was incongruous to some in the courtroom; gasps suggest that it was shockingly incongruous to others [audience responses imply JD's parallel was unintelligible to them]}

(38) If we only knew what Dolan's Garden attorneys were thinking.

If only <+> we knew --> {[if we could be "flies on the wall"]} MSG attorneys <+> were thinking --> {[implies attorneys were thinking that JD's remark was not helpful to their case]}

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Appendix C

ZAMBITO, Daily News Staff Writer [[KEY](#)]

(title) James Dolan fired Browne Sanders for interfering with probe

JD <+> fired <+> ABS <+> interfering--> statement of fact

(01) Firing ex-Knicks executive Anucha Browne Sanders was a slam dunk decision for Madison Square Garden boss James Dolan.

headline <+> JD <+> slam dunk --> JD fired ABS without hesitation {{slam dunk = dislogistic metaphor}}

(02) A federal jury yesterday heard the sports-media mogul say he canned her after she lobbed sex-harassment allegations at coach Isiah Thomas and star guard Stephon Marbury.

federal <+> jury --> important trial prev <+> media mogul <+> canned --> {{dislogistic description of JD}} prev <+> after charge --> {suspicious} charge of sex har <+> IT & SM --> {{NBA sex scandal again}}

(03) "All decisions at the Garden I make on my own," Dolan said in a pretrial deposition played for jurors at the scandalous trial that has rocked the NBA.

quote <+> JD --> {JD = arrogant} prev <+> scandalous --> confirms 02 prev <+> rocked NBA --> suggests accusation thought to be true by NBA personnel}

(04) Browne Sanders, 44, a former college basketball star, is suing for \$10 million in Manhattan Federal Court.

statement of facts about trial

(05) Dolan said he didn't bother to consult his lawyers before firing Browne Sanders in December 2005 because he felt she was interfering with a Garden investigation of the claims.

JD <+> bother <+> consult --> {inappropriate behavior for exec.} JD <+> felt --> {didn't know for a fact}

(06) "I felt that the overall health of the Garden was at jeopardy here and that that would override any opinion on counsel," Dolan said at the grilling taped last year.

JD <+> overall health of MSG <+> jeopardy --> {strange metaphor} prev <+> override counsel --> {{sounds "fishy"}}

(07) Browne Sanders is hoping the admission helps prove she was illegally fired.

(08) Dolan, whose family empire is worth billions with assets that include Cablevision, the Garden, the Knicks, the Rangers and Radio City Music Hall, appeared on a big- screen TV dressed casually in a black sweater rolled up at the sleeves.

statements of facts about Cablevision JD <+> deposed (03) <+> "dressed casually in a black sweater rolled up at the sleeves" --> {inappropriate behavior at a deposition for a federal court case}

(09) As quickly as he explained her firing, Dolan brushed off claims that Thomas and Marbury used the B-word to refer to Browne Sanders, implying that his coach and star point guard never used the word.

"As quickly as" <+> explained <+> firing --> {fits with "dressed casually" [given situation = arrogance]} ; prev <+> "brushed off" <+> prosecution claim --> {same as above} JD <+> implied the B-word was never used --> {Is Zambito saying JD lied?}

(10) The Cablevision chairman told Browne Sanders' lawyer it's "not appropriate" for Garden employees to refer to fellow employees as "bitch" or "black bitch."

JD <+> ABS lawyer <+> not appropriate --> {lawyers get JD to admit impropriety}

(11) Then, Dolan added: "It is also not appropriate to murder anyone. I don't know that that has happened, either."

JD <+> not appropriate <+> murder --> {very odd analogy} prev <+> at MSG --> {implies no one called ABS by B-word}

(12) Browne Sanders' legal team wrapped up its case yesterday by calling her sister Ruth Browne, who recalled near-daily conversations with her younger sister about the harassment she endured during a five-year stint at the Garden in which she rose to become one of the NBA's top-ranking female executives.

statements of fact about the witnesses SHIFT OF focus TO RBS RBS <+> witness to ABS's 5 yr suffering --> {5 year harassment = too much} RBS <+> ABS rose to top NBA exec --> {impressive but it's her sister's evaluation}

(13) Dolan could appear in person as soon as today when Garden lawyers begin their attack on Browne Sanders' allegations by calling their first witnesses. Also expected to testify is Garden President and Chief Operating Officer Steve Mills.

statements of fact about defense actions defense <+> attack <+> ABS allegations --> {[attack ABS's claims suggests attacking her credibility]}

(14) Dolan was asked during the deposition if he understood what the term "retaliation" meant.

JD asked <+> what retaliation meant --> {ABS lawyers setting the stage}

(15) "I think I understand the concept," he said, sounding annoyed.

JD <+> annoyed --> {didn't like the question}

(16) "Essentially, it is an action taken against a person in response to their making an allegation, a formal allegation," he said.

JD <+> quote --> {"formal" suggests filing the complaint}

(16b) "Do you believe that Ms. Browne Sanders made a formal allegation?" her lawyer Anne Vladeck asked.

quote <+> formal --> {lawyer getting JD to acknowledge prosecution charge}

(17) "Yes, I think she did," Dolan said.

prev <+> yes --> {JD acknowledges it}

(18) Earlier, former Knicks assistant coach Jeff Nix took the witness stand and backed up many of Browne Sanders' claims involving Thomas.

Nix <+> witness <+> backed ABS's complaints --> {contradicts JD's deposition}

(19) Nix, who worked for the team for 15 years until he was fired last month, testified Browne Sanders told him Thomas called her a "bitch" and a "ho."

Nix <+> fired last month --> {implies retaliation against Nix}

Nix <+> witnesses abusive language from IT --> {Nix = eyewitness}

(20) He said Browne Sanders told him about a 2004 meeting in which she quoted Thomas telling her: "Don't forget, you f---ing bitch, I'm the president of this f---ing team."

Nix <+> from ABS <+> past abusive language --> {contradicts JD's deposition statements (09)}

(21) Nix, who served under eight Knicks coaches including Thomas, said he witnessed an incident that same year in which Thomas allegedly hugged Browne Sanders and professed his love for her.

Nix <+> served under 8 Knicks' coaches --> {why was he fired last month? (19)} Nix <+> saw IT hug ABS --> eyewitness

(22) He said Browne Sanders pulled away from Thomas at "the end of a hug" that occurred in a hall off the Garden floor.

ABS <+> pulled away after hug --> {ABS did not want to be hugged}

(23) "I saw Anucha pushing away from Isiah," Nix testified.

Nix <+> quote --> reinforces (22)

(24) He said he caught up to her a few minutes later, when he says Browne Sanders told him: "You're not going to believe what [Thomas] just said. ... He said, 'I'm in love with you. It's like "Love and Basketball."'"

Nix <+> caught up to <+> ABS --> {Nix concerned about what he saw}; ABS <+> IT said I'm in love --> {[suspicious given NBA climate]} ABS <+> love & basketball --> {[reference to NBA players' sexual escapades?]}

(25) Nix testified he was drawn into the feud at one point.

Nix <+> drawn into feud --> {ABS vs IT had "feud" [WordNet: a bitter quarrel between two parties]}

(26) In November 2005, he said he learned that Mills had allegedly told Browne Sanders that Thomas would float rumors that she and Nix were having an affair if she pursued sexual-harassment charges against the Garden.

Nix <+> Mills told ABS IT would float rumors re: affair between ABS & Nix --> {Mills in on retaliation against ABS prev <+> if ABS pursued charges {supports ABS's claim of retaliation}}

(27) "I was angry," Nix told jurors. "I said Steve Mills is a f---ing liar."

Nix <+> angry with Mills --> {a likely reaction to Mills threat} Nix <+> Mills = liar --> {likely true}

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 8 Analyzing Conceptual Change in Research Publications

ABSTRACT:

This chapter describes a prototype of a “computer assisted” LDA of conceptual change in an article by Robert Entman—“Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm,” *Journal of Communication*, 43, 51-58, 1993.

[Note: This is intended as an indication of the potential of LDA as a computational process of analysis.]

CONTENT:

8.0 Logistical Discourse Analysis and the Study of Conceptual Change

8.1 Identifying paragraphs including the noun, frame, or the verb, framing.

8.2 Breaking paragraphs into sentence & identifying anaphoric devices.

8.3 Identifying clauses.

8.4 Repeated Theorems.

8.5 Comparing theorems.

8.6 LDA as a tool for describing and comparing conceptions

8.0 Logistical Discourse Analysis and the Study of Conceptual Change

The articles or chapters in which research is published are usually regarded as discourses. Logistical discourse analysis (LDA) is an analytic tool designed to track the sequence of statements about a specific concept and to describe the theorems involved. It also can be used to track conceptual changes that

occur in sequences of discourses. The adjective “logistics”⁵⁶ refers to tracking the “*path(s)*” of conceptions (discursive conceptualizations)⁵⁷ as they are used in research publications. Grounded in functional linguistics,⁵⁸ LDA tracks conceptions as components of a **system** of communication. In what follows I describe the “desktop” computer assisted analysis I developed to make the tracking of conceptualization manageable. As I indicate in the conclusion to this monograph, persons more familiar with programming than I, in all likelihood, could improve considerably upon what I offer here which I will refer to as CD-LDA.

LDA involves a series of operations in which the results of a computer application are edited to prepare the data for the next program in the series. Each stage of the operation has two phases: the application of a program and editing its results. Given the limitations of using widely available software (Word macros, for instance) computer-assisted analysis instead of programs developed by computational linguists, each macro application needs to be “proofed.”

CD-LDA takes the entire text of the research publication and by a series of analytical maneuvers reduces the original text to the statements in which the concept being analyzed is the topic. The discourse analyst is thereby presented with all of the conceptions of the concept that constitute a theoretical model used by the researcher(s). Taking the list of theorems, the analyst can revise them into readable paragraphs eliminating the repetitious passages. These can be edited into a list of concepts “embedded” in the conception.

The procedure begins with the text of the research publication (not including endnotes and citations though they are available to be consulted in the “proofing phase.” [Note: images of the results of the initial computer applications are shown rather than the entire text owing to space constraints. The final applications which produce the list of theorems in the theory and edit it is given as a text.]

The article used in this example of LDA is Robert Entman’s “Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43: 51-58, (1993). As I describe the various steps in the analysis keep in mind the differences noted in chapter 1 between concepts and conceptions:

LDA goes beyond the clause. It concerns the analysis of discourse structures, in particular a TOPIC + **sequences** of COMMENTS about it. There is no standard terminology that refers to this commonplace discursive structure. In LDA, concept refers to a TOPIC & a COMMENT about it. By contrast, in LDA a conception refers to a TOPIC + **sequences** of COMMENTS about it.

⁵⁶ The term logistics, which is typically used in military or business contexts involving the transportation of materials, is metaphorically applied here to the ways conceptions “travel” through discourses.

⁵⁷Conceptions (combinations of concepts in statements) are the expression of the cognitive activity of conceptualizing, hence “discursive.”

⁵⁸ For an account of “functional linguistics” see (Halliday, 1977, 2009; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Webster, 2009). For a more general account, see Van Valin, J., Robert D (2003) “Functional Linguistics,” *The Handbook of Linguistics*. M. Aronoff and J. Rees-Miller. London, Blackwell Publishing. For the relation between functional and cognitive linguistics see Jan Nuyts (2007), “Cognitive Linguistics and Functional Linguistics,” *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford, Oxford UP, 54-565.

Although there is no standard term for the "a TOPIC + *sequences* of COMMENTS about it" structure, it is discussed indirectly as a process in the 2004 edition of *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. In their chapter on "Around the Clause: Cohesion and Discourse", Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen discuss logogenesis—the unfolding of meaning in a text (2004, p. 530).

A conception consists of a focal concept as a TOPIC and sequences of ancillary concepts as comments on it.

Step 1: Identifying paragraphs including the noun, “frame,” or the verb, “framing” in a digital copy of the text.



Figure 1: First page of “Framing”

Entman’s conception of framing is the target of the analysis. Since he often uses the noun, frame, or the verb form, “to frame,” it is necessary to analyze statements about the verb as well as the noun.

1. The first program identifies all the paragraphs containing the terms frame or framing and creates a file in which they are placed in the order in which they occurred separated by a blank line.
 - a. CD-LDA
 - i. removes periods from numbers and abbreviations to prepare for step 2 in which the paragraphs are broken into sentences by searching for periods;
 - ii. identifies paragraphs with the terms frame or framing. [Note: the program identifies paragraphs rather than sentences because in some of the sentences

the terms are linked to subsequent sentences by pronoun references or other anaphoric devices.]

- b. Editing: none at this stage.

8.2 Breaking paragraphs into sentences & identifying anaphoric devices.

- 2. The second program breaks the paragraphs into sentences and marks all anaphoric devices by adding frame or framing to them in brackets.
 - a. CD-LDA identifies the sentences that do not include the concept and highlights them in gray.
 - b. Editing:
 - i. Because scanned texts sometimes omit periods, the sentences need to be checked.
 - ii. The anaphoric devices that are marked also need to be checked and the irrelevant sentences deleted.




figure 2: This image of the results shows the sentences with yellow highlighting of "frame" and "framing" and green highlighting of the anaphoric "this."

8.3 Identifying clauses.

- 3. The third program highlights words that are used as conjunctions in complex sentences.
 - a. CD-LDA separates topics and comments in which frame or framing occur (the words, "and" & "or" are heighted for review because they more often conjoin nouns, adjectives, and phrases as well as clauses);
 - b. Editing: The complex sentences are broken into their constituent clauses. Then the clauses in which frame/framing are included in the comment section are revised to make frame/framing the topic *where possible*. The clauses containing frame/framing in the comment section that cannot justifiably be revised so as to make frame/framing the

topic are set aside. Clauses about other researcher's views of framing are gathered in a separate file to allow an "influence" component to be added to the analysis.

Theorems on framing edited as statements

framing offers a case study of just the kind of scattered conceptualization I have identified.

Framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text.

Frames illuminate the precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location—such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel—to that consciousness.

Framing is often defined casually, with much left to an assumed tacit understanding of reader and researcher.

Framing essentially involves selection and salience.

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality

framing make some aspects of a perceived reality more salient in a communicating text,

framing promotes a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

Frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe,

frames define problems—determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values;

frames diagnose causes—identify the forces creating the problem;

frames make moral judgments—evaluate causal agents and their effects;

frames suggest remedies

frames justify treatments for the problems

frames predict their likely effects.

Frames have at least four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.

Framing is a judgment made consciously or unconsciously by Communicators in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata)

frames organize communicatees' belief systems.

Frames, are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences

frames provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.

Frames guide the receiver's thinking and conclusion may or may not reflect the frames in the text and

framing intentions belong to communicators.

Commonly invoked frames = culture as the stock of

the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping define culture

framing in all four locations includes similar functions: selection and highlighting, and use of the highlighted elements to construct an argument about problems and their causation, evaluation, and/or solution.

Frames highlight some bits of information

frames thereby elevating info in salience.

Frames do not guarantee their influence in audience thinking

frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience.

Frames exert their power through the selective description and omission of the features of a situation.

Framing evokes the social world by altering observations about it.

Frames affect Receivers' responses if they perceive and process information about one interpretation and possess little or incommensurable data about alternatives.

Frames exclude of interpretations which is as significant to outcomes as including them.

Framing primes values differentially, establishing the salience of the one or the other.

Framing an issue [in a survey question] to accentuate certain issues makes those issues more or less to affect communicatees positively or negatively.

Framing has important implications for political communication.

Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions.

Framing plays a major role in the exertion of political power,

framing directs our attention to the details of just how a communicated text exerts its power.

Figure 3: Theorems about frame or framing

8.4 Repeated Theorems.

4. The fourth program marks repeated theorems (propositions about framing) by identifying repeated concepts. These are stored as a potential list of embedded concepts in a separate file—"possible embedded concepts."
 - a. CD-LDA joins together the theorems that contain the same concepts in a reorganization of the list of theorems.
 - b. Editing: The coder is asked to edit the similar theorems into one theorem.

Theorems on framing (REPEATED)

FRAMING is

- selecting some aspects of a perceived reality
- selecting elements
- involving selection and salience.

- establishing the salience of the one or the other.
- making info more salient in a communicating text,

- constructing an argument about problems and their causation, evaluation, and/or solution.
- promoting a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.
- FRAMES become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe define problems, determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes--identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments, evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects
- determines whether most people notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate and choose to act upon it.
- include and omit potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience.

- influencing thinking
- guide the receiver's thinking and conclusion
- influencing [communicatees] responses to communications,

- highlighting, elements
- highlighting some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience

-
- COMMONLY INVOKED FRAMES = culture as the stock of
 - the empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping define culture

-
- offering a way to describe the power of a communicating text
 - an intention of the communicator
 - priming values differentially,
 - Calling attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions.
 - plays a major role in the exertion of political power.
 - directing our attention to the details of just how a communicated text exerts its power
 - providing dominant meaning

-
- FRAMING JUDGMENTS are made consciously or unconsciously by communicators in deciding what to say

-
- [FRAMES] have at least four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture

-
- [FRAMES] organize [communicatees'] belief systems.

-
- has a common effect on large portions of the receiving audience, though it is not likely to have a universal effect on all.

NOTE: Theorems in green indicate the revisions made to the original text.

Figure 4: Theorems

8.5 Comparing theorems.

[Note: I did not repeat the steps involved in the analysis of Entman's 2003 "Cascading Activation" article because showing them for his 1993 "Framing" article sufficiently shows how the data for comparison is gathered. In addition, because of the length of the detailed comparison, this section includes only the text of Entman's definitions of framing and not the full text of his conception.]

Robert Entman has numerous articles on framing. In this section I will compare his 1993 definition of framing from the essay just analyzed with a subsequent definition of framing in his definition in “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame After 9/11,” *Political Communication*, 20, 415-432 (2003).

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (From “Framing,” 1993, 52.)

Framing entails *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.* (From Cascading Activation, 2003, 417.)

At the surface, there does not seem to be much difference between the two definitions. However, LDA shows that there are considerable differences.

Table 1 compares the two definitions word by word (the texts of the definitions would be included in a computer assisted LDA as described above).

	1993	2003	analysis
1	To frame	Framing	This is an instance of what Halliday calls “grammatical metaphor” which characterizes scientific language. It re-construes experiences by changing an action into a thing that can be available for analysis—reification. Entman converts the experience of a cognitive process into a fixed conceptual model of it.
2	is »	entails »	The implication of the change is that “if framing, then selecting, etc.” The change attempts to restrict the meaning of the term but that is not possible from a linguistic point of view though conceivably possible in a closed terminological set.
3	to select »	selecting »	
4		& highlighting »	
5	some aspects of	some facets of	Aspects and facets are synonyms in the sense of “a distinct feature or element in a problem.” Aspects is the broader term, facets focuses on the sense above.
6	a perceived reality	events or	Very similar kind of change to the changes that move his terminology toward scientific “reifications.” The

			experience of happenings is changed → “something that happens)
7		issues	Adding “issues” may be a restating of “promoting problem definitions” in the 93 definition.
8		making connections among them »	Adding making connections suggests creating a particular configuration of events that raises issues. This change matches the cascading activations model whereas “a perceived reality” involves specific agency.
10	and		
11	make them more salient »		“highlighting” (#4) may be a restatement of “make salient”
12	in a communication text		redundant since already implied
13	<i>...in such a way as to</i>	<i>so as to</i>	possibly regarded “in such a way” as verbose
14	promote »	promote »	“make publicity for; try to sell (a product)” [WordNet] > selling an idea, getting people to believe
15	a particular	a particular	“separate and distinct from others of the same group or category” [WordNet]
16	problem definition		omitted because “issues” is included, so it would be redundant and also implies agency.
17	causal interpretation	interpretation	too specific — might not always be an interpretation of what caused the problem.
18	moral evaluation	evaluation	too specific — might not always be a moral judgment which also involves agency.
19	and/or »	and/or »	“or” is an odd expression—suggests that a “solution” is not required and can be left out in favor of an interpretation or evaluation.
20	treatment recommendation	solution	solution is “stronger” than recommendation in that it suggests that the advisable course of action WILL solve the problem.
21	for the item described		redundant since already implied

Table 1: Comparison of Entman’s 1993 & 2003 definitions

The most significant change, from a rhetorical point of view, is the shift from the verb “to frame.” to the gerund, “framing.” This is an instance of what Halliday calls “grammatical metaphor” which characterizes scientific language. It re-construes experiences by changing an action into a thing (reification) that can be available for analysis. Entman converts the experience of a cognitive process into a fixed conceptual model of it—cascading activation.⁵⁹ It is, in effect, a shift from a human agent who makes “some aspects of a perceived reality ... more salient” to a socio-cultural mechanism. This shift is also reflected in the change of “a perceived reality” to an impersonal process (cultural resonance) that makes connections among events and issues capable of eliciting strong emotions. As Entman describes it:

Those frames that employ more culturally resonant terms have the greatest potential for influence. They use words and images highly salient in the culture, which is to say *noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged*. Magnitude taps the *prominence* and *repetition* of the framing words and images. The more resonance and magnitude, the more likely the framing is to evoke similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the audience. (2003, p. 417)

The contrast is between frames that “pull” associations together and frames that “push” interpretations, etc. upon their audience. Entman argues that whereas motivations and cultural congruence, work internally to “pull” mental associations into individuals’ thinking, power and strategy, on the other hand, operate from the outside to “push” consideration of frames. (2003, p. 422)

What emerges from the differing contexts of the two essays is that the changes Entman made to his conception of frame/framing are motivated by the differences in the problems he addressed. His 1993 essay addresses the problem of defining framing in a consistent manner in the context of work done during the cold war. His 2003 essay is an analysis of resistance to George Bush’s administration’s framing of the events of 9/11 which, he argues, cannot be addressed by concepts used in the context of the cold war.

8.6 LDA as a tool for describing and comparing conceptions

CA-LDA makes it possible to compare the research conceptions used by the same researcher(s) in different publications or the same conceptions used by different researchers in their publications. It provides a rough draft of a description of a research conception (the list of theorems in the 4th step). However, though identifying the changes in the texts being compared can easily be computerized, human editors are needed to compare the theorems (research conceptions) in several articles (5th step).

A significant dimension of this type of analysis is that the descriptions produced by LDA *retain the language of the article being analyzed*.

⁵⁹ In the 2003 essay, Entman uses the concept of “cascading activation” drawn from the work of Hallin (1986), Bennett (1989, 1990), and Mermin (1999). His article introduces the cascading activation model to understand how frames spread through “networks of association: among ideas, among people, and among the communicating symbols (words and images)” (419) .

The main objective of CA-LDA or LDA in general is to identify changes in conceptions as they are used in research situations. This brief (& truncated) sample study shows several changes in Entman's conception of framing, all of which concern changes in methodology.

First and foremost, the concept of framing is re-construed as an object rather than as an experience in order to render it available for scientific analysis. This gives frame analysis the status of a social science methodology. His earlier conception construes framing as an activity of an author ("select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text"). His later conception construes framing as an "event" ("Framing entails *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them*"). The object of frame analysis is no longer some person's perception of the world. It is the examination of the components of an event as they are connected in a text in culturally resonant ways. This change might be described as a move from interpreting framing in a text to analyzing the way aspects of the text are combined to describe an event. The difference parallels the difference between a literary interpretation of a text and a discourse analysis of a text.

The second difference an LDA shows is one of perspective. The earlier conception takes the perspective of the framer—"To frame is to select ..." The later conception takes the analysts perspective—"Framing entails selecting ..." The first tells us how someone might frame the reality she perceives. The second tells us about the object being analyzed.

Thirdly, the agents of the framing differ. It is difficult to see this difference in the absence of what is being framed. Borrowing from Entman's "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents (1991)," we can take as an example of an event that was framed by the media to be an attack on the airliner that entered the air space of another country. A frame analysis following the earlier conception would show how *news reporters* defined the problem, identified its causes, evaluated the situation, and recommended a way of treating it which is way Entman treated the two incidents.

He characterizes the U.S. coverage of the KAL incident in which a Soviet fighter plane shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing its 269 passengers and crew as framed to emphasize "the moral bankruptcy and guilt of the perpetrating nation" (1991, p. 6). By contrast, he characterizes coverage of a similar incident in which a U.S. Navy ship, the *Vincennes*, shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing its 290 passengers and crew as one that "de-emphasized guilt and focused on the complex problems of operating military high technology" (1991, p. 6). In this frame analysis, "Comparing media narratives of events that could have been reported similarly helps to reveal the critical textual choices that framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text" (1991, p. 6). Since the news reporters made the "critical textual choices" they are the agents of the framing, understanding that they are subject to pressure from others.

A frame analysis consistent with the later conception of framing would show that the news reporter's *text* included an interpretation of the event, an evaluation of it, and, if relevant, a proposed solution to the situation. In such an analysis, the text is the agent. The process that produced the text goes beyond the news reporter who wrote the article and is the result of a socio-cultural phenomenon—cascading activation.

These three differences all concern methodological changes. Were I able to show the complete comparisons of the conceptions rather than just a comparison of the definitions, it would reveal that the differences between the two conceptions are far more extensive.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 9

Analyzing Cultural Configurations

ABSTRACT: An analysis of Aesop’s “The Hare & the Tortoise” and an analysis of WWII Combat Films Genre

CONTENT:

9.0 The Study of Configurations

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9.5 Concluding Remarks

Though “tracking” conceptions was the purpose for which LDA was developed, other applications pertain. It can be used, for example, to track a particular type of narrative structure, a configuration. To mark the difference I refer to this application as Configural Logistical Discourse Analysis (C-LDA) which can be used to analyze myths, fairy tales, folk tales, and films or TV shows that repeat narrative

structures. C-LDA is based on the work of many scholars from numerous fields. I mention only those whose concepts have a direct bearing on its conception, namely Vladimir Propp, Gerald Prince, Bruno Bettelheim, George Lakoff, and Clifford Geertz. From each theorist, I draw particular conceptions: from Propp (function, lack, villainy), from Prince (minimal story), from Bettelheim (identificatory transposition), from Lakoff (metaphor systems), and from Geertz (models of, models for, dispositions). First I explain these apparently disparate concepts and then I combine them into a theory of cultural configurations which I apply to Aesop's fable, "The Tortoise and the Hare" as well as the WWII combat film.

9.1 Mythoi: Folktales, Stories, Fairy Tales, Dreams, & Cultural Systems

The term "myth" is usually reserved for stories that belong to ancient cultures. It derives from the Greek word, "mythos" which simply means stories. But there are many different kinds of stories and the term, "mythoi" can be used to refer generically to folktales, fairytales, as well contemporary beliefs associated with narratives. Many of these narratives can be considered configurations which adds the dimension that the story holds for its audiences beliefs incorporated in the narrative that are a part of their cultural belief systems and with which they identify which is why they are repeated numerous times.

9.1.1 Folktales—functions, lacks, & villainies

Vladimir Propp's classic study of Russian folktales, *Morphology of the Folktale* (1971), is an early and influential account of narrative structure. Propp describes his method of analysis in chapter II, "The Method and Material":

The existence of fairytales as a special class is assumed as an essential working hypothesis. ... we shall separate the component parts of fairytales by special methods; and then, we shall make a comparison of tales according to their components. The result will be a morphology (i.e., the description of the tale according to its component parts and the relationship of these components to each other and to the whole).

Noting that the names of characters and their attributes change but that their actions and functions do not, Propp argues that tales contain both constants and variables. In his view, numerous folktales that differ considerably in their content, nonetheless have the same narrative structure. This phenomenon is easily supported by the history of literature in which numerous stories have the same if not an identical narrative structure—for instance, quest stories, femme fatale stories, initiation stories, fatal love stories, though the names and attributes of the characters differ.

Propp argues that the functions of the characters are the basic components of tales. A "function," he notes "*is understood as an act of the character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the action.*" Though he did not use the term "narrative structure," Propp's conception of narrative "functions" concerns the structure of folktales—the constants, the actions and functions. For Propp, these functions pertain to numerous folktales even though their content, names, clothes,

attitudes, social rank, or settings differ. Propp offers the following example taken from “events” in Russian folktales:

1. A tsar gives an eagle to a hero. The Eagle carries the hero away to another kingdom.
2. An old man gives Sůčenko a horse. The horse carries such Sůčenko away to another kingdom.
3. A sorcerer gives Iván a little boat. The boat takes Iván to another kingdom.
4. A princess gives Iván a ring. Young men appearing from out of the ring carry Iván away into another kingdom.

Though the persons giving a means of transportation to persons with different names, the function of “giving a means of transportation” is constant. Propp identifies this function of a character in the folktale—a tsar, an old man, a sorcerer, a princess—as a “donor,” a person giving the hero something to help him.

Propp identifies 31 narrative functions which he regards as common to Russian folktales. In his *Morphology*, he gives each function a name “in the form of a noun expressing action (donor, interdiction, interrogation, flight, etc.)” It is difficult to envision what narrative function is named by abstract terms such as “interdiction” or “mediation.” Propp’s examples of the functions are much more accessible. Even so, the examples Propp provides need to be analyzed before they can be understood as instances of the same function. Moreover, he goes to great lengths to explain apparent anomalies. In the hope of avoiding confusion, I have composed “The Story of a Hero,” a variant of “The Swan-Geese” tale which Propp analyzes in his *Morphology* (96-98), using his functions as a basis for the narrative structure:

1. In a lovely cottage near a forest lived Jack, a handsome, kind, and resourceful young man, his mischievous younger brother, John, and Jill a beautiful young woman together with their parents.
2. Jack, John, & Jill are warned not to leave the house while their parents went shopping in a nearby village.
3. When John challenges Jack to a game & they become preoccupied with playing it, Jill goes out into the forest disregarding her parents’ warning.
4. A villain, Tantalus, sees her; finds her attractive; and so approaches on his horse.
5. Jill asks the Tantalus if he knows where some apple trees grow.
6. Tantalus says he does and will take her there.
7. She agrees and climbs on his horse.
8. Tantalus rides off with Jill to his castle where an apple tree grows in the courtyard. Tantalus offers one to Jill and she falls asleep.
9. Jack realizes that Jill is not in the house. John says that he saw her enter the forest and ride off with a man in armor.
10. Jack decides to follow them.
11. He takes his father’s horse and rides into the forest.
12. Where he is met by Osiris, a giant soldier, who says that Jack cannot go any further unless he defeats him in combat.
13. Using his slingshot, Jack unseats Osiris from his horse by hitting him in the head with a rock.
14. Impressed by Jack who, despite not having a proper weapon, unseated him, Osiris surrenders his magical sword and his suit of armor to Jack.
15. Then Osiris gives him directions to the Tantalus’ castle.

16. Jack enters the castle and confronts Tantalus. They fight fiercely.
17. Tantalus wounds Jack who falls to the ground and cannot get up because of the weight of his armor.
18. But, just as Tantalus is prepared to strike him a deadly blow, Jack wields his magical sword upward and kills the villain. Then, holding onto his horse's tail and braced by his sword, he gets to his feet.
19. Jack finds a beautiful young woman locked in a room in the castle. Jill does not recognize Jack because of his armor until he lifts his visor and speaks & Jack doesn't recognize Jill who is dressed as an adult until she speaks.
20. Reunited Jack and Jill set out for home.
21. As they enter the forest Cyclops, an ugly giant with only one eye in the middle of his forehead, sees them at a distance and pursues them.
22. But, using his slingshot, Jack hits the giant's eye with a rock and blinds him. Then he guides Jill through a secret path known only to him and they manage to elude Cyclops who is left thrashing about in the underbrush.
23. When they finally arrive at home, Jack's parents do not recognize him because he is in armor carrying a sword.
24. John, Jack's younger brother, mistakes him for Tantalus, and tells his parents that the man in the suit of armor was the one who carried Jill off earlier in the day. Jack protests and says, "Don't you recognize your own brother?"
25. John replies, if you are my brother, climb our favorite tree.
26. Jack removes his armor; sheathes his sword; and climbs the tree.
27. His parents recognize Jack as their son.
28. John is admonished for his mistake.
29. Jack, who is dirty and sweaty from his efforts, is told to bathe before they have dinner and when does, he finds on his bed, a new set of clothes that suit the man he has become.
30. His younger brother is given work to do because of his mistake.
31. Realizing that their son has grown into a man, Jack's parents reveal to him that the beautiful woman he rescued is not his sister but an orphan they adopted. With their permission, he marries Jill and they move to Tantalus' castle where Jack is now the King.

Although Propp contended that these functions, Tantalus' *villainy*, Osiris as a *donor*, his sword as a *magical agent*, Jack's *victory* over Tantalus, Jack in armor as *transfiguration*, and so on, appear in the Russian folktales he studied, this questionable claim does not diminish the importance of his concept of functions (narrative structure).

Another contribution of Propp's to narratology is that folktales proceed from types of events: lacks and villainies. Jill's disappearance is a lack that Jack experiences and Tantalus' absconding and imprisoning her is a villainy. The lack is resolved by Jack's defeat of Tantalus and freeing her. Tales can have several of these initial events, each of which constitutes a separate "move." The events that proceed from them are separable—lack "a" can only be fulfilled by unification with "a." Similarly, villainy "b" can only be resolved by the liquidation of "b." This brings us to a more recent view of narrative structures.

9.1.2 Stories—minimal story structures

Gerald Prince's *A Grammar of Stories* (1973) provides a cogent view of story structures. Though Prince later abandoned his Chomskyan framework, his account of the linguistic markers of narratives stands on its own and corresponds to other views of the way English speakers construct action sequences and events.⁶⁰

Prince argues that the "minimal story" consists of three necessary elements which are conjoined with each other: an initial state, a transformative event, followed by the final state.

... three events conjoined in such a way that (a) the first event precedes the second in time and the second precedes the third, and (b) the second event causes the third, constitute a minimal story. (27)

He offers the following example: "John was rich, then he lost a lot of money, then, as a result, he was poor. If we apply Prince's formulation to "The Story of a Hero" based on Propp's functions, we get the following results:

- The main story is: Jack missed Jill, then he followed her to Tantalus' castle, and as a result he was united with her again. In Propp's terms the event of Jack "lacking" (desiring to be with) Jill initiates the main "move." Jack misses Jill because: Jill disregards the warning, then goes into the forest, and as a result is abducted by the villain, Tantalus. The story "move" sets up Jack's missing (desiring to be with) Jill.
- The lack that initiates the main story is conjoined with a related story of Tantalus' villainy which is resolved by his struggle with and subsequent victory over him
- Jack's story of desiring to be with Jill is the "framing story" in which the other story moves (minimal stories) are embedded.
- As a result of moves embedded in the main story—his encounter with Osiris, who becomes a donor, and his victory over Tantalus—Jack is reunited with Jill.
- The return home of Jack and Jill is a separate story, the first sequence is a departure story, and the second, a return story (a common pattern).⁶¹

In Prince's formulation, Propp's functions constitute stories in themselves. Propp acknowledges this in his consideration of the ways in which stories are combined (see his concept of a "move," Propp, 1971, p. 92)

9.1.3 Fairy Tales—identificatory transpositions

Folktales and fairy tales are closely related. Bruno Bettelheim's *The Uses of Enchantment* is an influential analysis of "the meaning and importance of fairy tales" (1976). Leaving aside his Freudian

⁶⁰ See, for example, Anthony Kenny's conceptions of action and event (2003). Kenny, as a philosopher of language in the tradition of Wittgenstein, describes how English speakers talk about events and actions in a way that is consistent with Prince's account of stories. Prince's conception of stories is also consistent with David Herman's account of "action sequences" in his *Story Logic* which is a compendium of contemporary narrative theory (2002, p. 73 ff.).

⁶¹ See Joseph Campbell's *A Hero with a Thousand Faces* (2004).

readings of fairy tales, Bettelheim's attentiveness to the needs of children gives us insight into the impact these tales have on them.

For a story truly to hold the child's attention, it must entertain him and arouse his curiosity. But to enrich his life it must stimulate his imagination; help him to develop his intellect and to clarify his emotions; be attuned to his anxieties and aspirations; give full recognition to his difficulties, while at the same time suggesting solutions to the problems which perturb him. (5)

Bettelheim emphasizes the correspondence between the psychological problems of growing up—disappointments, dilemmas, and rivalries, dependencies, gaining a feeling of self-worth, and curbing self-interest — with the scenarios fairy tales present. For Bettelheim,

It is characteristic of fairy tales to state an existential dilemma briefly and pointedly. This permits the child to come to grips with the problem in its most essential form where a more complex plot would confuse matters for him. (1976, p. 8)

Such stories are, in Kenneth Burke's terms, "representative anecdotes" (1969, ©1945, pp. 59-61) that present "equipment for living" (1957, pp. 253-262) which in Bettelheim's terms are "parables that sum up how to behave."

Bettelheim understands fairy tales as "daydreams" in the sense of being the product of "unconscious ideation." It is not through rational understanding that children gain the ability to cope but "by becoming familiar with it through spinning out daydreams ruminating rearranging and fantasizing about suitable story elements in response to unconscious pressures." He points to the form and structure of fairy tales, which he argues "suggest images to the child in which he can structure is daydreams and let them get better direction to his life."

Bettelheim makes a crucial point about children and fairy tales:

It is not the fact that virtue wins out at the end which promotes morality, but that the hero is most attractive to the child, who identifies with the hero in all his struggles. Because of this identification the child imagines that he suffers with the hero's trials and tribulations and, and triumphs with him as virtue is victorious. The child makes such identifications all on his own, and the inner and outer struggles of the hero imprint morality on him. (1976, p. 9)

And thereby the child learns how to behave as a member of his culture.⁶²

As Bettelheim points out we tend to identify with heroes and heroines and, a coda to his argument is that we dissociate ourselves from villains and villainesses. While we can identify narrative structures that establish their identificatory transpositions⁶³ by the constant repetition of them—the stories we want to hear over and over, the genres that provide narrative structures we want to watch, even though it is difficult to articulate what they mean to us.

⁶² The phrase, "cultural configurations," refers to various kinds of narratives that include figures with whom members of a culture identify.

⁶³ Identificatory transposition refers to a readers or viewers' identification with a figure in a story to the point where they transpose themselves into that figure. In Bettelheim's terms when they "suffer with the hero's trials and tribulations and, and triumphs with him" thus experiencing the emotions portrayed.

9.1.4 Dreams—metaphor systems

For George Lakoff, popular myths, legends, linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom and dreams can be interpreted as extended metaphors. In “Metaphor: The Language of the Unconscious The Theory of Conceptual Metaphor Applied to Dream Analysis” (1992) Lakoff writes:

... there is a sense in which dreaming is like speaking. We have fixed rules of grammar and phonology that constrain what sentences we can construct and what they can mean. ... Similarly, our metaphor system might be seen as part of a “grammar of the unconscious” — a set of fixed, general principles that permit an open-ended range of possible dreams that are constructed dynamically in accordance with fixed principles. To understand the system of metaphor is to understand those principles.

Although Lakoff quotes *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he does not conceive the unconscious as Freud did (as repressed thoughts) but as cognitive scientists do (as unconscious thinking). For Lakoff, “dreaming is a form of thought.” He argues that dreaming can be understood by treating it as an extended metaphor in which the dream is the “source” and the dreamer’s experience is the “target.” In order to track the correspondences between the dream and experience, a conceptual domain common to both must be identified. He notes that:

There is a certain well-demarcated range of typical emotional concerns in this culture: love, work, death, family, etc. It is a good bet that powerful dreams will be about one of those domains. That puts a constraint on what the target domains of metaphors are likely to be. Suppose each interpretation of a dream is about one of those domains. (12)

His primary example is the metaphor “LOVE IS A JOURNEY.

... suppose the dream is about love. One of the metaphors for love will be used in the dream. If it is LOVE IS A JOURNEY, then the dream imagery will be about a particular kind of journey, say a car trip. Then the dream images might include a car, roads, bridges, bad weather, etc. (10)

In “Contemporary Theory of Metaphor” Lakoff shows how a metaphor system can be used to understand proverbs, fables, allegories, and so on, (1993, pp. 235-236) drawing on a metaphor pattern—GENERIC IS SPECIFIC—which he and Mark Turner describe in *More Than Cool Reason* (1989, pp. 162-166).⁶⁴

The example they give involves applying a proverb to an actual event. The proverb is:

Blind
blames the ditch

Lakoff and Turner describe the *generic-level schema* that structures our understanding of the proverb⁶⁵ and how it is used in analogical thinking to comprehend the proverb.

⁶⁴ Turner developed the idea further in his *Reading Minds: the study of English in the age of cognitive science*. (1991)

⁶⁵ Lakoff and Turner’s conception of a “generic-level schema” closely resembles Schank and Abelson’s conception of a “script” (*Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*, 1997)

- There is a person with an incapacity.
- He encounters a situation in which his incapacity results in a negative consequence.
- He blames the situation rather than his own incapacity.
- He should have held himself responsible, not the situation.

This is a very general schema characterizing an open-ended category of situations. We can think of it as a variable template that can be filled in in many ways.⁶⁶ As it happened, Turner and I were studying this at the time of the Gary Hart scandal, when Hart, a presidential candidate, committed certain sexual improprieties during a campaign, had his candidacy dashed, and then blamed the press for his downfall. *Blind / blames the ditch* fits this situation. ...

If we view the generic-level schema as mediating between the proverb ‘Blind / blames the ditch’ and the story of the candidate’s impropriety, we get the following correspondence:

- The blind person corresponds to the presidential candidate.
- His blindness corresponds to his inability to understand the consequences of his personal improprieties.
- Falling into the ditch corresponds to his committing the impropriety and having it reported.
- Being in the ditch corresponds to being out of the running as a candidate.
- Blaming the ditch corresponds to blaming the press coverage.
- Judging the blind man as foolish for blaming the ditch corresponds to judging the candidate as foolish for blaming the press coverage. (1993, pp. 233-234)

Since experiences are usually expressed as actions and events, the “category” or semantic frame can be articulated as a narrative structure and then mapped onto a current experience to make sense of it. In other words, a novel experience is understood in terms of its narrative structure through which it can be understood as analogous to the initial experience.

To apply Lakoff and Turner’s GENERIC IS SPECIFIC instance of “metaphoric” thinking to “The Story of a Hero,” we need to identify the conceptual domain (THE GENERIC LEVEL) common to both the story structure and an actual experience (SPECIFIC LEVEL). We can, for example, construe “The Story of a Hero” as a QUEST and the experience as GROWING UP—the combination gives us the metaphor, GROWING UP IS A QUEST FOR IDENTITY. Then we need to identify the correspondences between the specific features of the source, in this case, “The Story of a Hero’s Quest,” which in this example stands for a dream, and the fictional experience of Jack and Jill given below.

	Story structure of “The Story of a Hero’S Quest”	Jack & Jill: GROWING UP
01	Young boy (YB) as potential hero living at home.	Jack as a young boy living in a rural town
	Young girl (YG) as potential heroine living at home.	Jill as a young girl living in a rural town

⁶⁶ This has a striking resemblance to Marvin Minsky’s conception of a frame (“A framework for Representing Knowledge,” 1974).

02	They are warned not to leave home	Parents provide a protective environment for Jack and Jill.
03	YG leaves home & enters the forest	Jill leaves home & goes to Chicago
04	Tantalus as a Villain (villain of the story=V)	Various young men want to seduce Jill.
05-08	V abducts YG (YG—>YW) & take her to his castle	One young man, Tank, regards Jill as if she was his possession.
09-11	YB leaves home & enters the forest	Missing Jill, Jack leaves home & goes to Chicago.
12-13	Osiris challenges the YM but YM wins. (i.e. YB —> YM)	A young man in Chicago, Ozzie, constantly challenges Jack but he meets the challenges & becomes Ozzie's equal. (Jack is becoming a man.)
14	Osiris befriends Jack	Ozzie and Jack become friends
15	Osiris directs Jack to Tantalus' castle	Ozzie tells Jack that the young girl he knew back home is in a dangerous relationship.
15	YB—>YM encounters Tantalus	Jack encounters Tank
17-18	YB—>YM fights Tantalus & wins, YM	Jack gets into a fight with Tank & wins
19	YM finds YW	Jack frees Jill of the possessive Tank but can hardly recognize the woman Jill has become.
19	YW doesn't recognize YM	Jill doesn't recognize the boy she knew back home because he has become a man
19	Jack doesn't recognize Jill	YM doesn't recognize the girl he knew back home because she has become a woman.
20	YM & YW set out to return home.	Jack & Jill set out on a journey to return to home so that they can be recognized as grown up & independent.
21	As they enter the forest Cyclops, an ugly giant with only one eye in the middle of his forehead, sees them at a distance and pursues them.	Jack & Jill encounter an obstacle in their journey in the person of Cy who had dated Jill and wants her to stay in Chicago.

22	But, using his slingshot, YM hits the giant's eye with a rock and blinds him.	Jack confronts his rival who is blind to Jill's feelings about him.
22	Then YM guides YW through a secret path known only to him and they manage to elude Cyclops who is left thrashing about in the brushes.	Then Jack makes his feelings about Jill clear and leaves his rival behind in dismay.
23	YM & YW's parents do not recognize them.	Having become a man & a woman, the parents do not recognize the children they raised.
24	YM's younger brother claims Jack is Tantalus	John is jealous and accuses him of not acting like his brother
25-	Younger brother challenges older brother to perform a familiar ritual-to climb a particular tree	Jack invites him to play one of their favorite games growing up.
26	YM removes his armor & climbs the tree	John acknowledges Jack as his brother
27	His Parents now recognize YM	Jack's parents accept the fact that their boy has grown up into a man who is an accomplished person.
28 & 30	They reprimand his younger brother	Parents make it clear that the younger brother is still a boy in contrast to the YM and must obey them.
29-31	Parents reveal that YW is not YM's sister.	Parents acknowledge that they can no longer treat Jack as a boy and accept his companionship with Jill.
31	YM & YW marry	Jack & Jill marry
31	They move to Tantalus's castle	They move to Chicago and
31	And are King & Queen of their kingdom	Purchase their own home.

Lakoff's understanding of dream systems corresponds to the symbolism characteristic of unconscious ideation, hence the circumstance that metaphorical thought has such a wide scope.

We can also note the presence of various motifs and symbols in "The Story of a Hero": the allusions to the Grail Quest and to Campbell's hero of a thousand faces. The symbolism of forests, swords, blindness, etc. And the references to Tantalus (underworld), Osiris (rebirth), and Cyclops (a lawless beast-man, without culture, who ate humans).

Myths, such as the Grail Quest often incorporate religious symbolism, e.g., the holy grail, the chalice Christ used at the last supper and many of the stories in scriptures can be considered configurations. This brings us to Clifford Geertz' account of religion as a cultural system in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*.

9.1.5 Religious symbols and rituals—models of, models for, dispositions

In "Religion as a Cultural System," chapter 4 of *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973, pp. 87-125), Clifford Geertz writes:

... sacred symbols function to synthesize a people's ethos—the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their world view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order. (89)

He then argues that symbols, such as religious symbols, are not to be understood individually but as belonging to complexes of symbols that form a cultural system. Moreover, that they "shape behavior."

Cultural patterns are "models," that they are sets of symbols whose relations to one another "model" relations among entities, processes or what-have-you in physical, organic, social, or psychological systems by "paralleling," "imitating," or "simulating" them. (93)

He then distinguishes between models *of* and models *for*. A model of is a representation of "reality." For example, my local library recently had a logo exhibit in which a *model of* the Sears building in Chicago (made out of logo parts) was featured. In contrast, blueprints of the Sears building were *models for* building it.

Geertz uses this distinction to show how religious systems work. For example, the life of Christ as it is represented in New Testament narratives is understood by Christians to be a representation of ("model of") Christ's life. It is a model on which Christians should base their own lives. In other words, the model of Christ's life is a model for becoming Christ-like, that is, becoming a Christian. This system depends upon the "intertransposability" of models of and models for.

The perception of the structural congruence between one set of processes, activities, relations, entities, and so on, and an-other set for which it acts as a program, so that the program can be taken as a representation, or conception—a symbol—of the programmed, is the essence of human thought. The intertransposability of models *for* and models *of* which symbolic formulation makes possible is the distinctive characteristic of our mentality. (94)

This intertransposability is reflected in the comparison of the structure of "The Story of a Hero" and "Jack and Jill: Growing Up." Lakoff's system of interpreting dreams as extended metaphors is based on his and Mark Turner's "GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor schema" which "allows for an open-ended range of metaphorical correspondences across domains" (1989). The perception of correspondences between a generic narrative structure and a specific experience (their "structural congruence") allows persons to use the generic scheme as the source and the specific experience as the target to construe the meaning of a tale or story. Usually, the generic narrative is made available culturally in repeated stories and persons find correspondences between it and their own experiences.

For example, several years ago the TV show, *Monk*, gained considerable popularity. Monk was a detective with an obsessive-compulsive personality. For him, everything had to be in perfect order. The show opens with Monk leaving his apartment. As he comes to the door, the viewers see four umbrellas hanging from four hooks. Three had their handles turned away from the door and one had its handle turned toward the door. Monk steps out of his apartment and the door closes. A second later the door opens and Monk turns the handle of the offending umbrella away from the door to match the other three umbrellas. The producers of the show soon discovered that many viewers identified with Monk's obsessive-compulsive behavior and added to the promotions of the program: "are you feeling Monk-like today?"

This type of identification, in Geertz' view, shapes in its audiences, whether secular or religious, "a certain distinctive set of dispositions (tendencies, capacities, propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, pronenesses) which shape their behavior" (95).

9.2 A Theory of Cultural Configurations

The theorists mentioned above use various terms to refer to narrative structures, for Propp they are sequences of narrative functions, for Prince they are relations between states and actions, for Bettelheim they are identificatory transpositions, for Burke they are representative anecdotes, for Lakoff they are extended metaphors, and for Geertz they are transposable models of and models for that produce dispositions, for many others, they are mythoi. In every case, the terms are selected to identify aspects of research agendas. Yet, these narrative structures as described by the persons I mentioned have many elements in common. We can derive from them a composite—a narrative structure which is repeated frequently featuring characters with whom readers or audiences can identify and which concern the problems persons typically face living in a specific culture providing for them a way of coping.

To avoid the babel multifarious terminologies can create, I refer to the act of turning a text into a discourse by building a virtual world for readers to inhabit imaginatively and identify with its characters as "configuring" and the result as a "configuration." A configuration is a narrative structure (a "minimal story") in which the figures interact with each other in dramatic ways signaled by desires and conflicts—(in Propp's terms, "lacks" and "villainies"). The drama is constructed to invite readers or viewers to identify with the "heroes" of the drama and to disassociate themselves from the "villains" (to occasion identificatory transpositions). A cultural configuration is one that has attained the status of a "model for" behaving in a culture marked by its constant repetition. It is a "representative anecdote" that presents a common experience in the culture in a dreamlike way (as a "source") but, as a template of behavior it is readably applicable to the readers' or viewers' experiences ("targets" that need illumination).

Configurations dramatize experiences that are characteristic of or representative of a particular culture. For example, whereas the story of Adam and Eve is representative of the beliefs indigenous to western Christian culture, the story of Enkidu and the courtesan sent by Gilgamesh was indigenous to Babylonian and Assyrian culture; whereas the resurrection of Christ is indigenous to Christian culture, the resurrection of Osiris was indigenous to ancient Egyptian culture. The story of Adam and Eve as recounted in Genesis, represents original sin, the discovery of the fallibility of human nature and

mortality. The story of Christ's death and resurrection represents an assurance that Christians can have forgiveness from their sins and that physical death is not the termination of human existence. Enkidu's discovery of his nakedness does not represent his fall into sin nor does Gilgamesh's search for the herb of immortality represent the redemption of mankind.

The stories of Adam and Eve and Christ's resurrection represent beliefs that characterize Christians. As stories, they have the elements that Burke ascribes to representative anecdotes: they are "supple and complex enough to be representative of the subject matter," (the beliefs) they are designed to express and yet they "possess simplicity" (1969, p. 60) which makes them accessible to Christians. In Burke's terms, they are "synecdochic rather than metonymic" (1969, p. 326).

9.2.1 Configural Discourse Analysis

As children we learn that narratives convey messages from our earliest reading experiences—fairy tales. Though these narratives may not verbalize their messages, many stories visualize them. For example, "Little Red Riding Hood" is a narrative that visualizes what happens to children who listen to strangers (in the early versions of the story Little Red Riding Hood is eaten by the wolf, a stranger who disguises himself as a friendly companion). Probably the clearest instance of narratives with messages are Aesop's fables which come with "morals."

Such narratives configure cultural experiences, that is, they portray situations common to a culture. The story of Adam and Eve configures the experience of sinning. Quest stories configure growing up as the Bildungsroman genre in a later period does. As its moral states, "The Tortoise and the Hare" configures the experience of working steadily and persistently: "Slow and steady wins the race" and inculcates the disposition in the members of Western European and American culture.

Tracking cultural narratives is comparable to tracking conceptions since they configure the meaning of typical experiences for a group of persons who share similar belief systems. Like conceptions, they are frameworks to which other frames attach themselves. Just as conceptions refer to the discursive process of conceptualization, configurations refer to the discursive process of configuring.

Cultural configurations are grounded in textual instructures (instructions about how to construct the text) for readers or, in the case of films, for viewers that invite them to identify with the central figure in the narrative. In so doing, readers or viewers experience the story world as if they were that figure and, to greater or lesser extents, are affected emotionally. When these stories are told and retold in verbally and/or visually they become what folklorists designate as legends, that is, narratives that encapsulate cultural values. The hallmark of cultural configurations is that they are repeated with different content (clothes, settings, dialogues) but retain the same functions of the characters and the same narrative structure. The structures of cultural narratives follow specific patterns of events from the initial state, through the turning point, to the resolution.⁶⁷ The content of the narratives changes from re-telling to

⁶⁷ I follow Gerald Prince's conception of a minimal story from his *Grammar of Stories* (1973). Although Prince later abandoned his Chomskyan "grammar," his delineation of a story structure remains viable. It also is confirmed by accounts of the ways in which we describe events and action (See Anthony Kenny's *Action, Emotion and Will* ("States, Performances, Activities," 2003, pp. 120-130).

re-telling but the story is recognizable as the examples below show. Configural Discourse Analysis (C-LDA) tracks the narrative structures of cultural narratives.

9.3 Aesop’s “The Tortoise and the Hare”

Scholars regard the attribution of many of our most familiar fables to a man named Aesop to be historically unlikely. Aesop names a collection of tales that go well back into our oral culture and may have their origins in Ethiopia and Greece. The first known collection dates back to 300 B.C. The first surviving collection was assembled during the first century by Phaedrus. D. L. Ashliman writes that "covering more than 2,000 years of time and extending across the length and breadth of Europe, and beyond, illustrates the timeless appeal of the Aesopic tradition" (Ashliman, 2003). It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Aesop's fables are important stories in our cultural heritage.

As Ashliman notes, although the fables are regularly associated with specific moral applications, they do not comprise a coherent moral philosophy. In fact, the fables often contradict one another (Ashliman, 2003, xv). The circumstance that the fables appear from a logical point of view to be a contradictory system is an important aspect of their cultural significance. As Ashliman notes "In keeping with their folklore heritage, Aesopic fables reflect the lifestyle, the values, and the frustrations of ordinary people," and offer "practical everyday advice." Their moral applications are ad hoc and contingent rather than systematic and logically consistent.

C-LDA is suited to the description of cultural configurations—the mythoi that enable our cultures--legends, folk tales, fairy tales, and myths (including contemporary stories that are repeated so often in a culture that to recognize them is to identify yourself with that culture).⁶⁸ Cultural configurations delineate the patterns of behavior that members of the culture believe provide them with "equipment for living," as Kenneth Burke puts it—in other words, as *instructions* about how to behave. "The Hare and the Tortoise" is one of the cultural configurations that advises us to be persistent in our endeavors. .

There are many versions of Aesop’s fable, “The Hare and the Tortoise.” To illustrate their configural impact, I will start with two early versions, Jacobs' and Jones':

The Hare and the Tortoise (A. a protolog)		The Hare and the Tortoise (B. an analog)
The Hare was once boasting of his speed before the other animals. "I have never yet been beaten," said he, "when I put forth my full speed. I challenge any one here to race with me." The Tortoise said quietly, "I accept your		A HARE one day ridiculed the short feet and slow pace of the Tortoise, who replied, laughing: "Though you be swift as the wind, I will beat you in a race." The Hare, believing her assertion to be simply

⁶⁸ The original analysis involved tracking indices of “transpositions,” that is, of markers in the text that invite the reader to identify with a particular figure in the story. Since Aesop’s fables are a classic instance of a fable with a specific moral, I include part of the analysis here because the relationship between the narrative structure and the “moral” is a critical aspect of my analysis of the WWII Combat film genre.

<p>challenge." "That is a good joke," said the Hare; "I could dance round you all the way." "Keep your boasting till you've beaten," answered the Tortoise. "Shall we race?" So a course was fixed and a start was made. The Hare darted almost out of sight at once, but soon stopped and, to show his contempt for the Tortoise, lay down to have a nap. The Tortoise plodded on and plodded on, and when the Hare awoke from his nap, he saw the Tortoise just near the winning-post and could not run up in time to save the race. Then said the Tortoise:</p> <p>[MORAL:] "Plodding wins the race."</p> <p>FROM: Æsop. (Sixth century B.C.) Fables. The Harvard Classics. 1909–14. Ed. Joseph Jacobs</p>		<p>impossible, assented to the proposal; and they agreed that the Fox should choose the course and fix the goal. On the day appointed for the race the two started together. The Tortoise never for a moment stopped, but went on with a slow but steady pace straight to the end of the course. The Hare, lying down by the wayside, fell fast asleep. At last waking up, and moving as fast as he could, he saw the Tortoise had reached the goal, and was comfortably dozing after her fatigue.</p> <p>[MORAL:] Slow but steady wins the race.</p> <p>Translated by Vernon Jones for the Heimann edition of Aesop's Fables.</p>
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Despite the differences between Jacob's & Jones' "The Hare and the Tortoise," the narrative structure of the two tales is the same. As a story structure, "The Hare and the Tortoise" fable has a cultural meaning fixed in the "moral" assigned to it. Contextualized in the varied experiences of an audience, it can be configured in numerous ways. The "stability" (shared cultural usage) of a configuration comes not from its meaning which varies with each member of its audience but from its story script, that is, the structure of interaction or its "mythos."⁶⁹ In the case of the Hare and the Tortoise, the underlying script is rather simple.

- A. Initial State: two figures conflict
- B. Event: they compete
- C. Final State: one wins

Cognitive Linguists argue that we organize our activities in terms of "basic domains" of action or "basic categories" of action (George Lakoff, 1992; Langacker, 2002; Ungerer & Schmid, 1996). For example, a basic activity is walking. It is associated with subordinate terms (more specific forms of the activity), e.g., stride, strut, amble, stroll, and so on. This phenomenon allows us to generate a "basic story" form from various specific instances of telling it. The mythos (story structure), which I will draw from Joseph Jacobs highly regarded retelling, is slightly more complex:

- A. A figure claims to be faster than anyone. Another figure, though slow, responds. They agree to race.
- B. The two figures compete.
- C. The faster figure, who is far ahead, stops to sleep during the race. The slower figure

⁶⁹ In analyzing configuration, I distinguish between the meanings of a text and its cultural significance which is derived from the typical situation it depicts.

continues racing without stopping.
D. The slower figure wins the competition
MORAL: persistence (moving slowly but steadily) wins

At a lower levels of generality, the mythos could include motivation either by stipulating that the conflict was occasioned by the hare insulting the tortoise as in the Joseph Jacobs version; or by the tortoise challenging the hare to a race after hearing his claim to be faster than anyone, as in Vernon Jones version. The conflict is resolved by a competition. The event that produces the outcome is persistence. The narrative structure of the Jacobs and Jones' fable is quite similar. Most of the children's books that retell the story retain the same narrative structure but add different content, especially in describing where the hare went while he was waiting for the tortoise to catch up. In contrast, consider the following version of the story:

A hare was boasting of his speed before a group of animals. "I have never yet been beaten," he said. I challenge any one here to race with me." A tortoise spoke up, "I accept your challenge. So a course was agreed upon and a starting point was marked. The hare darted almost out of sight at once, but soon stopped for a rest and fell asleep. The tortoise plodded on and plodded on, and when he reached the spot where the hare was sleeping, he laughed out loud. This woke the hare up and he raced to the finish line leaving the tortoise far behind.

This version of the fable does not have the same structure as Jacobs and Jones' narratives because the conclusion is radically different in that the hare wins the race. Obviously the moral, "persistence wins out over talent" is not applicable in this case. This tale requires a different moral—perhaps, "Don't laugh at your rivals until you've beaten them."

In *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Importance of Fairy Tales*, Bruno Bettelheim makes the same point about *Little Red Riding Hood* (1976). Bettelheim criticizes Perrault's changing the story's narrative structure, a change that is tantamount to having the hare win the race.

As he tells the story, nobody warned Little Red Riding Hood not to dally on the way to Grandmother's house, or not to stray off the proper road. Also, in Perrault's version it does not make sense that the grandmother, who has done nothing wrong at all, should end up destroyed. (168)

As a consequence, the "moral" of the story is turned into a punitive indictment of the child: "nice girls ought not to listen to all sorts of people. If they do, it is not surprising that the wolf will get them and eat them up" (168). Were a child to identify with the Little Red Riding Hood of Perrault's version, she would have to understand herself as someone who was so bad that she had to be put to death. It is difficult in this context to imagine children wanting to have the story repeated.

"The threat of being devoured is the central theme of "Little Red Riding Hood" (169), Bettelheim acknowledges. The "moral" of the tale is "listen to your parents" because they know about the dangers that you will encounter in life (6-7). "Little Red Riding Hood" is a tale about a little girl who didn't listen to her mother. As a result she is swallowed by the wolf. But an adult, the woodsman, rescues her. This event reinforces the "helping" relationship between children and adults. In the Perrault version, Little Red Riding Hood goes off the path to pick some flowers and as a result is devoured by the wolf. There is

no motherly advice, no woodsman to help the little girl. And so a child cannot experience being protected by adults in this version. As a consequence the lesson of the tale is muted because identifying with Little Red Riding Hood would be frightening. As Oatley notes in the section below, when readers identify with characters who undergo emotional experiences, the reader experiences those emotions.

9.3.1 Identificatory transpositions

In “Emotions and the Story Worlds of Fiction,” Keith Oatley writes: “Fiction transports the reader to the story world. No longer in this place and time, in his body, or even (sometimes) in this universe, we travel to the place of elsewhere, where strange and exciting things occur” (*Narrative Impact*, 2002, p. 41). Later in the same chapter, he writes:

When a reader or audience member becomes one with the character in a story or play we talk of identification ... The emotions of identification derive directly from the theory of simulation ... The part of the mind on which the reader (or audience) runs the simulation of novel, play, or film, is the planning processor. Ordinarily, we use it in conjunction with our mental models of the world to assemble actions into plans to attain goals, as when planning a journey. In an identificatory reading, a plot may take over (substitute a character’s goals into) the planning processor, and the reader then adopts the protagonist’s plans. Emotions occur when events become vicissitudes, as actions and their outcomes in the plot are evaluated in relation to the protagonist’s goals. Although the goals and plans are simulated, the emotions are not: They are the reader’s own. (*Narrative Impact*, 2002, p. 61)

In their chapter of *Narrative Impact*, “In the Mind’s Eye,” Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock offer a “Transportation-Imagery Model of Narrative Persuasion.” Their model emerged from experiments they conducted which showed that “individuals who were more highly transported into a narrative showed greater belief change” (2002, p. 319). A key condition of a narrative impact on beliefs is the central role that imagery plays.

Bruno Bettelheim makes the same point about *Little Red Riding Hood* in *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976):

A charming “innocent” young girl swallowed by a wolf is an image which impresses itself indelibly on the mind. ... in “Little Red Riding Hood” both grandmother and child are actually swallowed up by the wolf. (166)

Together with the emotional impact of a configuration’s imagery, there are also instructions in the text that invite identificatory transpositions (experiencing a character’s actions as if one was the character), the principal one being perspective.

The markers of identificatory transpositions are related to various aspects of the tale's instructure: (1) perspective, (2) valued behaviors—accepted and rejected actions, (3) and elaboration of motives. Each of these linguistically marked features reflects an identification with a figure in the tale.

The basic form of transposition occurs when readers or viewers experience the tale from the point of view of one of the figures in it. To do so requires that they assume the perspective of the character which is a marker of transposition (Ungerer & Schmid, 1996, 108). For example, in the protolog of "The Tortoise and the Hare" the setting for the race is described quite abstractly ("so a course was fixed"), but in Pinkney's retelling (2000) the course is seen from the Hare's perspective when he agrees to race "to an oak tree around the bend in the road." In McAllister's retelling (2002), the race course is given from both the hare's and the tortoise's perspective. The hare says "I'll race to the hedge and back." But the Tortoise replies "That's not far enough. We'll race down the lane, past the mill and across the meadow to the bridge." Both Pinkney and McAllister sketch the scene of the race from the participants' perspective. Readers are instructed to imagine the hare looking out over the course of a "road" to an oak tree or, alternatively, over the course of a lane, past a mill and across a meadow to a bridge.

In one of Granowsky's versions of the fable (1996), the narrator is the hare and the story is seen entirely from his perspective. It is also the hare who learns the lesson: "I learned a lesson that I'd like to pass on to you. I used to think that I had to win all the time to have friends. To have friends, I have to care about others. But you already knew that, didn't you?"

A very common but "muted" version of this type of transposition can be noted in various markers of point of view. For example, the remark that the hare saw the tortoise near the finish line can only be made from the hare's point of view. The same situation seen from the Tortoise's point of view would have to be rendered along the following lines: When the tortoise looked back over the course he had just traveled, he saw the hare in the distance. Even in third person narratives, the points of view of the characters can be marked. Various spatial indicators construct the perspective from which we see the events. To retell the tale incorporating such points of view requires readers to imagine the scene from that point of view.

In his *Introduction to Cognitive Grammar*, David Lee offers more subtle markers of perspective that are noticeable when the perspective is reversed but usually go unnoticed:

... consider the contrast between (5) and (6).

- (5) *John bought the car from Mary.*
- (6) *Mary sold the car to John.*

Here ... we have a pair of sentences which refer to 'the same event' but they could hardly be said to express the same meaning. Again the contrast has to do with perspective... Sentence (5) construes the situation from John's point of view, whereas (6) is an expression of Mary's viewpoint. As a small piece of evidence that this is so, consider:

- (7) *John bought the car from Mary for a good price.*
- (8) *Mary sold the car to John for a good price.*

In (7) we infer that the price was relatively low, whereas (8) suggests that it was high. This must mean that (5) and (7) are oriented to the buyer's point of view, whereas (6) and (8) are oriented to that of the seller. (Lee, 2004, 3.)

The reader understands these situations from different perspectives. But the reader has to assume those perspectives (put herself in Mary's or John's shoes, so to speak—to see the analogy to her own experiences of buying and selling) in order to construe the situations positively (good for Mary) or negatively (bad for John) or vice versa.

Identificatory transpositions set the stage for the acquisition of a specific disposition, for a way of behaving in circumstances similar to those of a character in a story. Following Geertz' distinction between a "model of" and a "model for," we can say that the fable, "The Tortoise and the Hare," is a model of a common competitive situation in which a person of superior talent loses out to a person with a better work ethic. As a "model of" such situations, each retelling construes it discursively as a "model for" the attitudes, emotions, and plans for behaving in such situations aimed at readers or viewers. As Geertz contends, the intertransposability of models of and for in the context of religious systems is a specific disposition to act in a certain way. The same can be said of fairytales, folktales, and other mythoi. In this light, we note that the outcome of a Configural-LDA is a description of the production of a disposition.

As Bettelheim notes, tales do not communicate propositions but identificatory transpositions, by means of which children (or even adults) relate to the hero or protagonist as a *self-figure*. Configurations are extended metaphors for communicating dispositions. In Aesop's fables morals are assigned to them as in "The Tortoise and the Hare" but what is communicated is a disposition to persist in a difficult endeavor. Its cultural significance is "proverbial"—mere references to "the Tortoise and the Hare" can be applied to numerous situations as interpretations of them.

From cultural configurations we acquire dispositions to behave in culturally acceptable ways. But, they are effective only when identificatory transpositions occur, only when configurations are the result of configuring.

9.4 The World War II Combat Film.

So far we have been dealing with stories mostly written for children. Cultural configurations influence adults to behave in specific ways as well. Religious rituals and parables, for example, are directed at adults to cultivate in them dispositions compatible with the religious practices characteristic of specific religions.

Perhaps the largest number of cultural configurations are provided by novels, stories, films, TV shows, and other media productions. Keep in mind that a cultural configuration is a story that invites readers or viewers to identify with figures in the narrative. In so doing, they experience the story world as if they were those figures and, to greater or lesser extents, are affected emotionally. When these stories are told and retold in verbally and/or visually they become configurations, that is, narratives that encapsulate cultural values. The hallmark of cultural configurations is that they are repeated with different content (clothes, settings, dialogues) but retain the same functions of the characters and the same narrative structure.

In this section I focus on a group of films that had an enormous impact on American involvement in the Second World War. The cinema between WWI and WWII was antiwar, which changed when the Hollywood Studio system was enlisted in the war effort. There is little doubt that the Office of War Information and similar government agencies believed that films could enflame their audiences with patriotism as well as hatred of the enemy. These agencies even used the cartoons (Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck and others) that preceded feature films in movie theaters to instill in audiences patriotic dispositions.

Being supervised by the Office of War Information, it is not surprising that many of the WWII combat films have similar narrative structures. These narrative structures and conventions persisted long after the war was over. Evidently, audiences enjoyed the narratives of WWII Combat films presumably because they produced feelings and emotions which were gratifying.

How do these films have such powerful effects on their audiences? I believe the explanation is identificatory transpositions.

9.4.1 The Narrative Structures of the WWII combat films

In *The World War II Combat Film: The Anatomy of a Genre*, Jeanine Bassinger argues that the film, *Bataan*, is the prototype of a series of films constituting a genre. *Bataan* is the prototype of the WWII Combat Film:

Bataan is the story of a group of hastily assembled volunteers who, through their bravery and tenacity, hold off an overwhelmingly large group of the enemy long enough to buy important time for the American forces.

This narrative structure is the framing story—the narrative within which the other stories are contained. Its minimal storyline is:

Initial situation (IS): a small group of soldiers fight a large group of enemy soldiers to keep them from advancing while compatriots flee.

Pivotal action (PA): one by one the soldiers are killed off by the enemy over a period of time.

Final situation (FS): the small group of soldiers are defeated and the enemy advances but too late.

Within this narrative frame, several other stories are contained. Unlike the short tales we considered in the first part of this chapter which have few, if any, sub-plots, longer narratives have multiple structures. There is a FRAMING structure which includes various sub-structures or “moves,” as Propp termed them. I will use Gerald Prince’s minimal story formula to identify moves: “X” is the initial situation, then the action “Y” changes it: then as a result, “Z” is the resulting situation.

In *Bataan*, there are 18 notable moves, not counting the “prologue move”: civilians *are* trying to flee the advancing Japanese; *then* they cross the bridge; and *as a result* successfully flee.


1. The FRAMING STORY describes a small group of soldiers led by Sergeant Bill **Dane** holding off an overwhelmingly large group of the enemy long enough to buy important time for the American forces as they are killed off one by one until only Dane is left facing certain death. This story

structure is known as the Alamo Plot. Within the Alamo frame of Bataan, 14 additional moves are embedded, each involving one member of the group.

2. Sgt. Dane and Private **Feingold** are ordered to report to Captain **Lassier**
3. **Lassier** is the commander of the squad, but he is soon *killed* by a sniper, *as a result*, Dane becomes the commander. Lassier's death also ends another move: a pretty American nurse *looks back* at Captain Lassier as she flees (retrospective inference: she hopes to be reunited with him); later Lassier *reveals* he recently married the nurse; but *as a result* of his death they cannot be reunited.
4. As they near their encampment, Lt. Bentley, a pilot, introduces himself and indicates that he has camouflaged his plane, so that he can fly it as soon as it is repaired.
5. When Sgt Dane reviews the squad, he suspects that Private **Todd** is an alias for the man ruined his career; then his suspicion is intensified by the discovery that Todd is left handed; and finally Todd admits that he was the culprit. [The major subplot.]
6. Dane *orders* **Matowski** to climb a tree and report on enemy movement; but Matowski carelessly *shows himself*; *as result* he is shot by a sniper.
7. *The next day*, Dane and Todd *go out* alone; and *hurl grenades* at the bridge, *as a result* of which the bridge is blown up a second time. (During this episode, Dane learns that **Todd** is left handed)
8. The group's Pilipino guide, **Salazar**, *tries* to break through the Japanese lines to get to Bataan for help; but is *captured*; *as a result* he is tortured and strung up for the Americans to see.
9. Private **Ramirez** is one of the group, then he *catches Malaria*, *as a result* he dies.
10. Private **Molloy** is one of the group, a Japanese plane *strafes* the camp, *as a result* he dies.
11. Army Air Corps Lt. **Bentley** is one of the group and a pilot; the Japanese set up a machine gun and fire at the plane just as he is about to take off with Private Hardy, and he is wounded, *as a result*, he changes plans and *takes off* with explosives by himself, *flies* into the bridge; and *as a result* blows up the bridge and dies.
12. Private **Hardy**, a conscientious objector in the Medical Corps, is also wounded and becomes unhinged and charges the Japanese, *as a result*, he is shot and dies.
13. Private **Epps** is a black demolitions expert and accepted as one of the group; the Japanese stage a massive frontal assault and Epps *fights them hand to hand* with his bayonet, *as a result* he is killed.

14. Corporal Jake **Feingold** is Dane's confidant; during the Japanese assault, he *fights them hand to hand*; *as a result*, he is killed.
15. Seaman **Purckett**, the only Navy soldier in the group, is wounded in the assault and subsequently, angered by a Japanese broadcast to surrender, he stands up to shout at the enemy; *as a result* he is shot by a sniper.
16. Corporal **Todd** while fighting the Japanese, *he does not realize* that one soldier is feigning to be dead; *as a result* he is stabbed in the back. (Before he dies, Todd admits to Dane that he is Burns which brings the major subplot to a conclusion.)
17. Dane is the commander of the group and the only one left alive; he *digs* his own marked grave beside those of his fallen comrades and *waits* in it until the Japanese attack and then *fires* at them; then *as a result* he dies. (The film ends with Dane shouting at the Japanese, "We're still here ..." and firing at them.) Dane's death ends the framing story.

Propp argues that moves begin with lacks and/or villainies and end with the lack being filled or the villain defeated. The events that proceed from them are separable—lack "a" can only be fulfilled by a union with "a," villainy "b" can only be resolved by the liquidation of "b." Each move, which features a different member of the squad, is a separate narrative structure. Their arrangement can involve numerous combinations of moves, often interweaving with others. [Note: In the following diagram the importance of the moves is indicated by the size of the font size of the names that mark them.]



FRAMING MOVE: (#1) Sgt. Dane is assigned to blow up the bridge & hold off the advancing Japanese, (## 7, 9-17). The members of his squad are killed off one by one which is the pivotal action in the framing story. (#18) Finally, he is the only one left facing certain death.

MAJOR SUB-MOVE: This subplot concerns the clash between Sgt. Dane and Corporeal Todd. (#5 Dane suspects Todd is the person who ruined his career and is now using an alias. (#8) Dane's suspicion is intensified when he learns Todd is left-handed. (#17) As he is dying, Todd admits that he is the person Dane suspected.

(#4 - #12) Bentley and Feingold (#2 - #15) are important sub-moves but not as extended as in Todd's case. The Lassier move (#3 - #6) is significant because Lassier's death results in making Sgt. Dane is squad commander. Purchett stands out from other members of the squad because he is the only Navy member. However, although he is given more film time than the other members, his move does not differ in terms of the narrative structure, his characterization is much more developed than theirs.

Each move provides a potential configuration which is constructed by the author or director to elicit a particular emotion via identificatory transposition that reinforces a disposition.⁷⁰ *Bataan*, given its framing structure, induces in audiences the disposition: "Be willing to die for your country"—a disposition crucial to the war effort.⁷¹

9.4.1 The Cultural Significance of the Narrative Structures of WWII combat films

When you consider that a narrative is the representation of a sequence of *actions*, it is not surprising that they provide virtual models of behavior which, owing to the intertransposability with models for behavior, induce dispositions to *act* in specific ways.

As we have seen, the "quintessential generic features of the American combat film during World War II," which Basinger identifies as a "story pattern" (Eberwein, 2010, p. 43) have the potential to induce a disposition to be willing to die fighting for your country:

At the end of *Bataan*, Dana, having dug a grave for each of his men, now digs his own. Until he dies, his grave serves as his foxhole. As the enemy approaches, the camera tracks in for a close-up of the muzzle of his machine gun; a superimposed title rolls up the screen, justifying the death it refuses to show; 'So fought the heroes of Bataan. Their sacrifice made possible our victories in the Coral Sea, at Midway, on New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Their spirit will lead us back to Bataan.' (Dick, 1985, pp. 133-134)

As Robert Fyne remarks, "When the War ended, Hollywood could easily pat itself on its large back for a job well done"... filling "an important void, reassuring audiences about the righteousness of the American cause, while reaffirming the vileness of the Axis camp" (1994, p. 11). There is little doubt that the audiences who viewed these films were disposed to help in the war effort in various ways, including

⁷⁰ Dispositions can be put into words but they should not be confused with the meaning of a story. For example, the moral message of "The Tortoise and the Hare" is usually considered to be "slow and steady wins the race." However, the disposition the tale inculcates in readers or listeners is closer to "be patient and thorough" implying the counter-disposition "avoid overconfidence and don't count on talent alone." The meaning is articulated as a proposition whereas the dispositions are articulated as imperatives.

⁷¹ See *The Hollywood propaganda of World War II* (Fyne, 1994, pp. 9-13, 31-72)

joining the armed forces. Stories like *Bataan* that are configurations, that embody identificatory transpositions, persuade people to act in specific ways.

However, we need to recall Bettelheim's observation that "It is not the fact that virtue wins out at the end which promotes morality, but that the hero is most attractive to the child, who identifies with the hero in all his struggles" (1976, p. 9). It is not the meaning of the stories that share the same narrative structure that induce identificatory transpositions, it is the bonding with the hero as a self-figure that does.

Generally, as Lakoff notes, "There is a certain well-demarcated range of typical emotional concerns in this culture: love, work, death, family, etc." and the source narrative, the configuration, is applied to individual targets on the basis of a domain of experience which they have in common (1992, p. 12). This range is demarcated by the ways in which we speak about our experiences.

All linguistic units are context-dependent to some degree. A context for the characterization of a semantic unit is referred to as a domain. Domains are necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, representational spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes. (Langacker, 2002, p. 147)

The context for characterizing "The Tortoise and the Hare" is the domain, a race. The semantic domain of the WWII combat film is war. This domain-frame⁷² evokes a situation in which two parties are engaged in a deadly conflict. In the case of the WWII combat film the war is between the Allies and the Invaders. (An audience of Americans would be included among the Allies since one of them was the United States.) The WWII combat film accordingly portrayed situations in which American and Allied soldiers fought against German or Japanese soldiers. The framing story is:

A conflict between two groups of soldiers—defenders and invaders—ensues, then a battle is waged, as a consequence of which one group wins and the other loses. In the WWII combat films two variants of this framing story were made:

1. A small group of defending soldiers encounter a large group of invading soldiers, then they battle, as a result the invaders win albeit temporarily (e.g. *The Lost Patrol*, *Bataan*, *Wake Island*).
2. A small group of defending soldiers encounter a large group of invading soldiers, then they battle, as a result the defenders win (e.g. *Back to Bataan*, *Sahara*, *Battleground*).

In the first group, either all of the defenders die or only one is left before being rescued. We have already discussed *Bataan* where the hero is defiant until he is killed. *Wake Island* has a similar structure. In *The Lost Patrol*, on which *Bataan* was based, all the soldiers are killed leaving only a defiant hero confronting the enemy. Unlike *Bataan*, the hero of *The Lost Patrol* is rescued. These films and others with the same structure inculcate the disposition: Be willing to die for your country.

In the second group some soldiers are killed, but the hero and many of his comrades survive after defeating the enemy. Since the defenders win in the end against a much larger enemy force, the identificatory transposition with the surviving heroes is more likely to inculcate a disposition to—Fight heroically against all odds and you can win.

Treating these framing structures as extended metaphors, the "source" = narrative structure of war and the target = reader or viewer. The source of an identificatory transposition on the part of the audience

⁷² In this expression I am combining the concept of a conceptual domain with Charles Fillmore's conception of a frame which includes the concept of a typical interactive situation.

would likely be the hero of the story and the outcome would be that reader or viewer imagines him or herself as the hero or heroine.

Tim O'Brien, a Vietnam War veteran, recalls:

"I've come out of the theater having seen some of these old films. Movies like *Pork Chop Hill* and *To Hell and Back* with Audie Murphy, *Sands of Iwo Jima* with John Wayne. I'd come out of these movies having ... feeling a peculiar thing. I want to play war and I remember looking at my little buddies on a Saturday afternoon and we'd go out onto the golf course and pretend we were John Wayne."⁷³

O'Brien was not the only boy who identified with the heroes of these films as the OWI censorship of them aimed at exactly this reaction in audiences.

9.5 Concluding Remarks:

C-LDA provides a way of analyzing oft repeated narratives in our culture, including current ones. Of course not all TV shows and films are worth analyzing in any detail. But many are, especially TV shows that have survived the Nielson ratings for long periods of time. Perry Mason is a particularly interesting example.⁷⁴ The principle narrative structure of Perry Mason is centered in the main character played for years by Raymond Burr: A suspect in a murder case hires Mason to defend him or her claiming to be innocent despite overwhelming evidence against him or her. Then Perry, with the help of his assistants Della Street and Paul Drake investigate, as a result of the investigation Perry is able to prove the accused is innocent by discovering the guilty party. In considering the Perry Mason TV drama a cultural configuration, two factors are paramount: First, although the narrative structure was repeated over and over, it maintained its viewer rating; was reprised numerous times in TV films, was re-broadcast for years after Burr died; and is still shown regularly at the time of writing. Second, the narrative structure is highly unrealistic—Perry wins all of his cases and *never* loses.

⁷³ *Pork Chop Hill*, an antiwar film directed by Louis Milestone—whose *All Quiet on the Western Front* remains one of the most powerful antiwar films ever made—had the opposite effect on O'Brien. Once again, we can note that the configuration only surfaces when activated by configuring it. It is not uncommon that films engender opposite effects on their audiences depending on how they configure them. A young boy configures the scenes of bravery. An adult configures the scenes of unnecessary death—"While diplomats argue pointlessly over the shape of the negotiation tables at Panmunjom, United Nations troops bleed and die. Lieutenant Gregory Peck leads a 135-man unit on the attack of the Chinese-held Pork Chop Hill. When reinforcements finally arrive, only 25 of Peck's men survive." Janice Radway's research on romance readers establishes that viewers of these novels selectively configure (identify with) narrative moves that are not necessarily the framing moves. Similarly, women who watched the film Noir genre in the 1940s selectively found the femme fatales portrayed in the films to have admirable qualities.

⁷⁴ "Perry Mason is a fictional character, a criminal defense lawyer who was the main character in works of detective fiction written by Erle Stanley Gardner. Perry Mason was featured in more than 80 novels and short stories, most of which had a plot involving his client's murder trial. Typically, Mason was able to establish his client's innocence by implicating another character, who then confessed. The character of Perry Mason was portrayed each weekday on a long-running radio series, followed by well-known depictions on film and television, including "television's most successful and longest-running lawyer series" Perry Mason from 1957 to 1966 starring Raymond Burr; another series, The New Perry Mason starring Monte Markham, from 1973 to 1974; and 26 made-for-TV movies starring Burr filmed from 1985 to Burr's death in 1993." (Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perry_Mason, 11/28/2014)

In every episode for years an innocent person is accused of murder and seemingly incontrovertible evidence is presented. Yet, Perry manages to show that the incontrovertible evidence the prosecuting attorney—usually Hamilton Burger—offered could be refuted. Following Lakoff and Turner’s argument for understanding folktales, proverbs, dreams, and poems as extended metaphors, the metaphoric source (the narrative structure of Perry Mason dramas) has as its target the individual viewers of the show. The semantic domain of this metaphor, it can be argued, is “law,” or more specifically, the legal system. Given this domain, the disposition inculcated in viewers of Perry Mason would be to: believe in the legal system implying that the innocent will prevail and the guilty will be uncovered. This has been an important belief in main-stream American culture which, at least since the O. J. Simpson trial (1994), has been in decline.

As Marcia K. Johnson notes in her Foreword,

Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations highlights the key role that stories play in shaping our memories, knowledge and beliefs. ... At the heart of the endeavor is the idea that stories are a particularly compelling source of information and that public narratives (e.g. books, movies, news stories, TV programs) have the potential to have a profound and far-reaching influence on what we remember, know and believe. It is not hard to imagine a future where the influence of public narratives is even greater as the world increasingly is connected via television, movies, and the Internet. The focused and systemic study of the impact of narratives contributes to our understanding of cognition, emotion, and social processes in a number of ways. (Green, et al., 2002, p. ix)

Fairy tales and the WWII combat films are excellent examples of the role that stories play in the production of culture. And, as Marcia K. Johnson suggests, there is much to be learned from “the focused and systematic study of the impact of narratives,” in particular of cultural configurations.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 10 Evaluating Texts

ABSTRACT:

Logistical Discourse Analysis is comparative. It can be used to evaluate discourses by comparing them to other discourses. In addition, it can compare specific discourses to a template. In this chapter, I compare a series of Introductions to Communication Study to a template of recommendations about learning developed by cognitive scientists who argue that significant learning occurs when students experience conceptual discoveries. Frederick Reif's model of learning as a belief transformation that fosters Learners' ability to use new concepts to accomplish tasks which they were not able to perform beforehand is a key point of comparison.

[Note: Much of the text of the chapter is drawn from Chapter Two of "Introduction" to *An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication: A Critical Study*, the entire text of which is available on academia.edu and ResearchGate.]

CONTENT:

10.0 Evaluating Texts

10.1 *An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication: A Critical Study* (ITFC)

10.2 Chapter Two of ITFC (Reif's model of significant learning as a template for evaluating the textbook, *Human Communication*)

10.0 Evaluating Texts

Evaluation is a systematic determination of a subject's merit, worth and significance, using criteria governed by a set of standards. It can assist an organization, program, project or any other intervention or initiative to assess any aim, realizable concept/proposal, or any alternative, to help in decision-making; or to ascertain the degree of achievement or value in regard to the aim and objectives and results of any such action that has been completed. The primary purpose of evaluation, in addition to gaining insight into prior or existing initiatives, is to enable reflection and assist in the identification of future change.
(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evaluation>, bold italics mine.)

This definition of evaluation articulates the motives for using LDA as a tool to evaluate discourses, in this case, a series of textbooks.⁷⁵

10.1 An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication: A Critical Study

An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication: A Critical Study (ITFC) is, in many respects, a “pilot” study that calls for research into communication textbooks in general. Just as the members of tenure and promotion committees are not inclined to regard textbooks as significant publications, the editors of journals and scholarly presses that publish communication research are not likely to look favorably on publishing research on textbooks. I regard the lack of interest in the instruments of

⁷⁵ There are five inter-related cognitive models of learning used in this analysis drawn from the recent researches of cognitive scientists and learning theorists. Paul Thagard's *Conceptual Revolutions* provides a model of conceptual change in scientific inquiry (1992). In "Concepts and Conceptual Systems" he outlines what would be required for a full representation of a concept (28). In *The Cognitive Science of Science* (2012), he describes scientific creativity as a process of convolution. In *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (2002), Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner outline the process of conceptual blending (which Thagard relates to convolution) as a model of the way we think. Fauconnier's early work on "mental spaces" (1994, 1999) is strongly linked to Ronald Langacker's model of conceptualization in his *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (2002b), *Grammar and Conceptualization* (2000), and *Concept, Image, and Symbol: the Cognitive Basis of Grammar* (2002a), which delineate the relationship of this cognitive activity and its expression in language. Frederic Reif's *Applying cognitive science to education: thinking and learning in scientific and other complex domains* (2008) provides models of the learning process as an intellectual performance involving declarative and procedural knowledge. He also offers accounts of "Producing Instruction to Foster Learning" (377-399) and "Implementing Practical Instruction." Gunther Kress in *Multimodality: A social semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication, Multimodal Teaching and Learning* (with Carey Jewitt, Jon Ogborn, and Charalampos Tsatsarelis) (2001), *Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary Communication* (2001) provides a model of multimodal learning through discourse. L. Dee Fink's *Creating Significant Learning Experiences* (2003) provides a correlative model of designing a course as a significant learning environment, that is, as an environment that fosters the cognitive abilities required in learning. Ambrose, et. al.'s *How Learning Works: 7 Research-Based Principles for Smart Teaching* (2010)) synthesizes contemporary learning theory.

training communication scholars and scientists to be a serious flaw in academic cultures. If it is a serious matter to evaluate candidates for membership in a profession, it is a logically prior matter to evaluate the instruments of instruction that prepare them for membership. It is the equivalent of discounting the impact training has on athletic performances.

10.2 Reif's model of significant learning as a template for evaluating the 2012 edition of the textbook, Human Communication

[Note: the entire text of ITFC is available at <http://www.sclcr.com/documents/introtextbook.pdf>]

An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication: A Critical Study

Chapter Two

What Should Introductions to Communication Studies Introduce?

A central premise in this study is that learning is a belief transformation—a transformative process in which a mental state is changed from believing “B1” to believing “B2” (Fink, 2003, pp. 6-7; Reif, 2008, pp. 4-5).




Figure 1 ⁷⁶

In the context of an Introduction to Communication Studies, a person who believes (B₁) e.g. — that meaning of a concept is fixed, then, presented with an alternative, changes to believing (B₂) e.g. — that meaning is not fixed because it is dependent on a person's experience, undergoes a cognitive transformation. The successful processing of such belief transformations depends upon two correlations: one is semantic and the other concerns the cognitive abilities involved. If both conditions are met, then a basis for a belief transformation is provided.

The analysis reported in this chapter focuses on the appropriateness of applying procedural knowledge linked to declarative knowledge in the situations described in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* to provide a basis for learning understood as a belief transformation.⁷⁷

Because of the complexity of the analysis in this chapter, keep in mind that two different sets of data are both analyzed with respect to two different criteria. The data consists of pairings of declarative knowledge/theory and procedural knowledge/skills. These are presented in the chapter by textboxes. However, there are two different kinds of textbox formats: generic and specific. Both of these types of pairings are analyzed with respect to two criteria: the extent to which the pairings are semantically correlative and the extent to which the pairings of cognitive abilities are correlative.

Conceptually, the chapter is organized by the following structures:

⁷⁶ This diagram is adapted from Reif's "Learning and Teaching" diagram (Reif, 2008, p. 4).

⁷⁷ Reif's terms declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge do not correspond to the declarative memory and the procedural memory. Since in both expressions Reif uses declarative and procedural as modifiers of "knowledge," both kinds of knowledge correspond to the declarative memory also known as the "explicit" memory because one can "declare" what is known. In contrast, the procedural memory is a distinct memory system and is known as the "implicit" memory because it refers to remembering procedures that have been repeated so often persons are no longer aware of them. The declarative memory is subdivided into the episodic and semantic memories. The episodic memory stores experiences which can be recalled (made explicit) and corresponds to Reif's conception of procedural knowledge. (Wheeler, 2000, pp. 597-598)

Pairing of dec. & proc. knowledge

Criteria

GENERIC pairing	SEMANTIC correlation
	COGNITIVE correlation

SPECIFIC pairing	SEMANTIC correlation
	COGNITIVE correlation

1. CONTEXT OF THE TITLE QUESTION

As I established in the first chapter, DeVito articulates two general purposes of *Human Communication: The Basic Course* : providing a foundation for understanding Communication Studies and providing a skill set for becoming an effective communicator. The content (knowledge domains) *Human Communication: The Basic Course* introduces is governed by these two purposes.

In the context of learning "the fundamentals of human communication" — "classic approaches," "new developments" and "research and theory," one would expect students to change their (B1) everyday beliefs about communication to (B2) technical beliefs about communication. From the perspective of learning theory, one would expect the second goal to enable students to change (B3) everyday habits of communicating to (B4) more effective communicating practices governed by the conceptions about communication presented in the textbooks. The first learning experience involves a change from naïve conceptions of communication to technical conceptions of communication. The second learning experience involves a change from habitual communicating practices that are uncritical to practices that are "competent."⁷⁸

This chapter analyzes the belief transformations which are characteristic of the learning process. In *Applying Cognitive Science to Education: Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains*, Frederick Reif argues that belief transformations depend upon correlating declarative and procedural knowledge.

⁷⁸ DeVito defines competent communication in the following way (2012, p. 22): "Communication competence refers to both your knowledge and understanding of how communication works and to your ability to use communication effectively (Spitzberg & Cupach, 1989)." In Spitzberg and Cupach's account of communication competence, the knowledge involved is knowing what to do in a specific situation that will have the most effective results. It is procedural knowledge about communicating rather than about conducting research.

Declarative knowledge specifies factual knowledge about a situation by describing the relevant entities in the situation and the relations among them. Such declarative knowledge can be specified by one or more verbal statements or by alternative forms of description (for example, by diagrams or mathematical formulas).

Procedural knowledge specifies methods or procedures (that is, sequences of actions describing *how* to perform particular tasks). (Reif, 2008, p. 32).

In his view, a belief transformation occurs when a person applies a new belief to a situation with the result that he or she is then able to understand or do things not possible with his or her prior beliefs. Imagine a person who is not an experienced computer user and who believes that Word documents are incompatible with PDF documents because the programs that produce them are different. Let's say that a friend shows him that he can save a Word document in a pdf format and he proceeds to click on "save as" on the file menu, then on "save as Adobe pdf" which saves the Word document in the pdf format. Subsequently, the friend calls up Adobe Reader and loads the file from the folder in which it was saved into the program and, in seconds, it appears on his screen. The procedure of saving the document in the pdf format and loading it into Adobe Reader would confirm the new knowledge his friend provided. The process would also effectively cancel his belief that the two programs are incompatible and result in his being able not only to understand something he did not understand before but also to do something he was not able to do before by following the procedure his friend showed him.

Learning experiences are *discoveries* that engender a change of belief. According to Reif, for this outcome to be achieved, two major conditions have to be met. First, the two types of knowledge must be semantically and cognitively correlative. Second, the belief transformation must occur as the result of using a procedure that is correlative to new declarative knowledge, for example, applying a technical conception to a communicative situation with the result that a previous conception of the situation now seems naïve and commonsensical. With respect to Reif's first condition, the learning transformation is judged valid or invalid. With respect to the second, the outcome of the learning transformation is judged to result in a competent researcher or a competent communicator. I use Reif's conditions as a coding template in my analysis of the pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge that are the potential basis of a learning transformation. [Note: In what follows, I refer to these belief transformation in terms of their learning outcomes—learning to be a "competent researcher" or a "competent communicator."]

A central feature of DeVito's *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012 textbook is matching statements about *what* communication is to statements that show *how* to apply them to specific situations. Each chapter begins with a text box that matches particular "theories" with their coordinate "skills" (2012).⁷⁹ In addition, numerous textboxes also contains pairings of theories and skills in the context of specific scenarios.

⁷⁹ In this study, Fink's conception of "foundational knowledge," Reif's conception of "declarative knowledge," and DeVito's conception of "theory" are regarded as correlative, in the sense of references to the accumulated body of knowledge about communication. In addition, DeVito's conception of "skills" is *provisionally* regarded as "procedural knowledge" in Reif's sense.

Models of and models for

In my view, a central issue in the analysis of *Human Communication: The Basic Course* is whether Introductions to Communication Studies should present students with declarative knowledge about communication that can be used (a) to become a competent researcher OR (b) to become a competent communicator? The difference in the two kinds of procedural knowledge will be expressed as a difference in (a) employing communication theory as a model of a communication situation in the conduct of research, or (b) deploying communication theory as a model for communicating.⁸⁰ I borrow this distinction from Clifford Geertz: "The term 'model' has, however, two senses—an 'of' sense and a 'for' sense—and though these are but aspects of the same basic concept they are very much worth distinguishing for analytic purposes" (1973, p. 93). Whereas a model-of reality is a representation of something that parallels its structure, a model-for reality is a representation of how to behave. It is not accidental that Geertz makes this distinction in a discussion of "Religion as a Cultural System." A ritual performance enacts a belief. With respect to learning, the belief transformation is from (a) understanding dogma to (b) acting in a way that reflects it—a move from understanding an idea to making it a part of one's life: for example, believing in Christ requires Christ-like behavior. In the context of the learning outcomes in *Human Communication: The Basic Course*, the difference is between learning to analyze communicative situations and learning ways, as a researcher, to help others deal with them and/or improve one's communication skills with respect to them.

I add Geertz's distinction to DeVito's theory/skill and Reif's declarative/procedural knowledge because it adds the dimension of "transposability" (see below).

2. METHOD OF ANSWERING THE TITLE QUESTION

The semantic correlation

DeVito's argues throughout the editions of his textbook that these two knowledge domains, theories and communication skills, are coordinate. "Theories are extremely practical and skills-like examples and applications clarify the theories. The two work together, each informing and enlarging upon the other" (1994, p. xvii).⁸¹ Although unspecified, given the distinction made between "applications" and "skills-like examples," I construe the difference in the sense that: theoretical conceptions can, on the one hand, (a) be applied to situations as a model of them or, on the other hand, (b) used as a model for behaving in them.

Given Geertz's distinction, the pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge in *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012 would be of two kinds: understanding a theoretical conception

⁸⁰ I am using the expression, model-of, as a synonym for declarative or foundational knowledge or theory; and I am using the expression, model-for, as a synonym for performance, skill, or procedural knowledge.

⁸¹ In my view skills-like examples of theoretical conceptions and applications of theoretical conceptions are two different procedures. The phrase "skills-like examples," as I understand it, suggests that a theoretical conception can be exemplified by an ability acquired by training. From the list of skills identified in *Human Communication: The Basic Course*, the ability involved is acting as a competent communicator.

(model of) a communication situation that enables one to analyze it and understanding a theoretical conception of a communication situation that enables using it as a guide (model for) communicating. In the first case, persons believe that a conception accurately reflects the communicative situation because they are able to apply the model effectively to it. In the second case, persons believe that a conception can show them how to behave in a situation.

The data I examined are the pairing of declarative and procedural knowledge given in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*. In this textbook two different types of textboxes deal with the relations between theories and skills. One begins each chapter and is generic. Another type occurs within the chapters and is more specific. For example, the first generic correlation DeVito offers in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is: "the major elements in the *Human Communication: The Basic Course*" is matched with the request to "use the essential principles of human communication to increase your own effectiveness in interpersonal, small group, and public speaking" (2012, p. 3). Later in the chapter, there are two "Building Communication Skills" textboxes that show how knowing about one of the major elements of communication—the concept of a "message"—can be applied to specific situations.

I use Reif's account of the conditions upon which theories (declarative knowledge) can be applied to situations (procedural knowledge) as a template for analyzing DeVito's conception of the coordinate functioning of these conceptual domains (2008, pp. 32-41). From the point of view of learning, Reif argues that procedural knowledge (without accompanying declarative knowledge) has numerous disadvantages—it is inflexible, can't be checked for correctness, and is cognitively uneconomical (2008, p. 34). Correlatively, declarative knowledge "is meaningless if there is no possible way of determining its validity (that is, if one does not have procedural knowledge specifying what one would actually have to do to determine whether it is true or not)" (2008, p. 33). The two knowledge domains, declarative and procedural, according to Reif are "complementary" (2008, p. 35). "Each alone is inadequate without use of the other, and both are usually needed for good performance" (2008, p. 36). Reif's view matches DeVito's stated view about the relation between theories and skills.⁸²

Understanding the relations between a theory and its correlative skills is a semantic issue upon which the performance depends. Understanding a correlative relation between a particular declarative knowledge domain and a specific procedural knowledge domain depends upon their belonging to the same *conceptual* domain. Whether or not it is understood depends upon knowledge base of the persons of whom the performance is requested. This is, of course, a relative matter—the more comprehensive the person's knowledge base, the more likely the connection will be made. This means that there is a range of possibility of comprehension depending on the scope of the person's cognitive frameworks.

My analysis of the semantic correlation of declarative and procedural knowledge in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is based on Charles Fillmore's frame semantics (2006). In the context of a conceptual framework such as a theory, a concept is related to the other concepts in it,

⁸² Whether DeVito's conception of a skill is an "application" of theoretical conceptions remains an open issue. His conception of a skill is provisionally construed as "procedural knowledge" in Reif's sense, in order to determine the type of belief transformations. The analyses of DeVito's pairings of theory and skill in this chapter show that his conception of a skill is not procedural knowledge in Reif's sense of learning in scientific and complex domains. It differs in that in DeVito's view skills are related to communicative competence rather than communication research.

forming a semantic network.⁸³ The link between the description of a theory and instructions about its application in a discourse such as *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is semantic—the link has to be understood before any activity can take place. For example, if someone said “turn off the water in the bathtub,” this could not be accomplished by persons who did not understand the relations between faucets, bathtubs, and water. This is, of course, a familiar situation and everyday concepts are involved. If, on the other hand, the instruction was to “write a Do While loop to count the words in a text,” this instruction would only be intelligible to someone who understood the relations between a Do While loop, counting, and texts. For everyone else, the relations would have to be made explicit; and, as the next section points out, the procedure of writing a Do While loop would have to be specified in sufficient detail for a novice programmer to be able to write the script.

Because no connection is a necessary one and the determining factor is the ability of students to make the connection, with respect to semantics, I consider the strongest connection in the matches to be “probable.” If the connection has to be inferred from the discourse, its “strength” is weaker than one that can be directly related to experience and therefore needs to be considered “possible” but not probable. The weakest connection in this rating scheme is “questionable,” which indicates that there are reasons to doubt that the connection can be made. The strength of the cognitive correlation between theories and skills can also be scaled from (a) probable to (b) possible to (c) questionable depending on the specification of the cognitive operations that would enable its use.⁸⁴

The correlation of cognitive abilities

The first step in being able to apply a theory to a situation is understanding the concepts involved. The next step is to translate the knowledge into a usable procedure. The second step involves specific

⁸³ As expressed in a discourse, a knowledge domain is a conceptual domain which is a synonym in cognitive linguistics for a frame. Thus, Concepts constituting theories are conceptual frames that function within theoretical frameworks. As Croft and Cruse explain in “Frames, domains, spaces: the organization of conceptual structure” (*Cognitive Linguistics*, 2004, p. 14), Charles Fillmore’s use of the term “frame” (2006) parallels Ronald Langacker’s use of the term “domain” (2002b). Domains are networks of concepts:

... concepts do not simply float around randomly in the mind. First, there are the relations between words and their corresponding concepts described by structural semantics. But there has been a strong feeling that concepts are organized in another way as well. Certain concepts ‘belong together’ because they are associated in experience. To use a classic example (Schank and Abelson 1977), a RESTAURANT is not merely a service institution; it has associated with it a number of concepts such as CUSTOMER, WAITER, ORDERING, EATING, BILL. These concepts are not related to RESTAURANT by hyponymy, meronymy, antonymy or other structural semantic relations; they are related to RESTAURANT by ordinary human experience. The concept of RESTAURANT is closely tied to the other concepts, and cannot be isolated from the other concepts. (*Cognitive Linguistics*, 2004, pp. 7-8)

⁸⁴ See Langacker’s account of “usage events.” (*Cognitive Grammar* 2008, pp. 457-459). The “strength” of a correlation between conceptual domains in this chapter is “measured” in terms of the *usage* of concepts. Fortunately, there are linguistic tools available for the task. WordNet a lexical database at Princeton University founded by George A. Miller provides a list of “coordinate terms” for every sense of a concept in the database (WordNet, Princeton, 2010).

cognitive abilities and its success depends upon whether they are not only correlative but also sufficiently specified for students to carry them out.

For Reif, adequate specification is a crucial requirement for being able to apply concepts to situations. He points out that for students to understand performance requests requires explicit specification (2008, pp. 12-13). Applied to understanding the relations between theories and correlative skills in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, we can say that, unless the relationship is adequately specified, making a connection between them is unlikely, especially for undergraduates.

Reif's learning objective in *Applying Cognitive Science to Education* is to transform students who use common sense into students who can think like scientists, who can draw inferences from data and form hypotheses to solve problems using the conceptions they have acquired in their courses.

As Reif notes in the subtitle of his book, "Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains," the process of scientific inquiry is complex. Scientific theories (or models-of) are complex conceptual systems. All forms of thinking involve conceptualization and science is no different. However, unlike the concepts used in everyday life, scientific concepts are systematically related to each other in the form of theories or models-of. Jaccard and Jacoby in their *Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists* note that this requires that scientists "focus on strategies for specifying and refining conceptual definitions for those concepts that [a social scientist] decides to include in the theoretical system" (75). This echoes Reif's remark that:

Concepts are the basic components of knowledge, the basic building blocks used to express statements or ideas. All such concepts need to have well-specified meanings so that we know what we are talking about and can communicate with other people. It is particularly important that the concepts used in scientific fields are unambiguously specified and can be properly interpreted in any specific instance. Otherwise, they could not be used to attain the central scientific goal of making definite predictions. (43)

Using a concept in the conduct of a research investigation involves conceptualizing which can entail any number of specific cognitive abilities. Being able to use these abilities effectively is the basis for acquiring the procedural knowledge needed to function as a communication researcher. And being able to use them depends on the degree to which their specific cognitive operations are operational in individuals. Reif's conception of procedural knowledge is knowing the "sequences of actions describing *how* to perform particular tasks" which need to be specified in *Introductions to Communication Studies* in considerable detail. (2008, p. 32)

Basically the same requirements—specifying the procedures linked to theoretical conceptions—pertain to being able to function as a competent communicator.

In this study both the generic and specific transformative pairings are examined with respect to their semantic correlation and their cognitive correlation—between the concepts presented and the cognitive abilities required in the performances requested.

3. FINDINGS

In the Introduction to *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, DeVito emphasizes the balance of theory/research and skills—"The twelfth edition continues the pattern of the previous editions in giving emphasis to research and theory, on the one hand, and practical communication skills, on the other" (2012, p. xv). Throughout the textbook, theories are matched up with skills. Each chapter begins with a

text box with two columns: the first column has the header, "In this chapter you'll learn about," which is paired with the header in the second column, "And, you'll learn to." The first column lists the theoretical concepts discussed in the chapter and the second column lists correlative skills. I refer to these pairings as "generic." In addition, various textboxes pair theory and skills in the context of scenarios in which the theories can be applied. I refer to this type of pairing as "specific" because it includes specific details belonging to the situations described.

In my analysis, I focused on this pattern of "pairing" theories with skills which I construed as a pairing of declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge that can potentially provide the basis for a belief transformation.

The semantic correlation of the generic pairings

There are 18 textboxes of generic pairings in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* that include 49 pairs of theories and corresponding skills. I analyzed each one from the perspective of matching the theoretical conception with the conception of the skill.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Because the correlations between the two knowledge types in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* were not specified in the text, it is necessary to describe how they were determined. The *Human Communication: The Basic Course* series generally assumes that "The two work together, each informing and enlarging upon the other" (1994, p. xvii). Aside from this very broad claim for a connection between "theories" and "skills-like examples [or] applications," the individual connections are unspecified. The linguistic devices known as "connectives" are the only indication in the discourse of the type of relationship that is intended between theories and skills

Chapter 1 of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, for instance, begins with the following pairing of declarative and procedural knowledge: "**In this chapter you'll learn about:** the major elements in the human communication process. **And, you'll learn to:** communicate with a clear understanding of the essential elements and how they relate to one another." The formulation "you'll learn about: [x]. And, you'll learn to [y]" is the header given to each chapter-opening textbox ("x" represents the declarative knowledge in the chapter and "y" represents its coordinate procedural knowledge). In this formulation it is not clear what the relationship is between the two knowledge domains. Using "and" as a coordinate conjunction leaves the connection unspecified. In all of the chapter-opening textboxes the conjunctions in the statements only suggest that these are two different knowledge domains.

However, as Halliday and Hasan indicate in *Cohesion in English*, "and" is an "additive" type of conjunction" ... "in the form of coordination" (244). Although "and" is sometimes ambivalent, at the same time Halliday and Hasan note that it may serve to convey the speaker's intention that they should be regarded as connected in some way.⁸⁵ I take this to be the case with *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, namely that the statements about skills (procedural knowledge) "should be regarded as connected in some way" to those about theories (declarative knowledge).

In the absence of the specification of the kind of connection that links the two knowledge domains to each other in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, the comprehensibility of the connection depends on whether the conceptual domains are related semantically. In other words when "x1" is learned, outcome "y1" is **to be expected** because they are associated by concepts that refer to the same situation (symbolized by the number "1"). Thus, when "the major elements in the human communication process" are learned, the outcome—being able to "communicate with a clear understanding of the[se] essential elements" can be

Understanding the connection between the theory (declarative knowledge) and skills (procedural knowledge) to be "semantic" in the sense described in the previous section, I analyzed 49 pairings which are summarized in the following chart:

[Key: text in red = potential semantic connection']

CHAPTER 1:	
Preliminaries to Human Communication	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the major elements in the human communication process.	communicate with a clear understanding of the essential elements and how they relate to one another.
the essential principles that explain how communication works.	use the essential principles of human communication to increase your own effectiveness in interpersonal, small group, and public speaking.
the characteristics of the competent communicator .	begin to internalize the characteristics of communication competence
Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:	
DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME

expected because the communication process is in the same semantic network as communication; both concepts refer to the same type of situation.

This type of semantic connection is not always straightforward. Consider the pairing in Chapter 9 “that learning the ways in which culture and technology impact on relationships of all types” will have the outcome that you can expect “to take greater control of what influences your relationship life” (DeVito, 2012, p. 187). This is a questionable connection. The impact of culture & technology would not enable persons *to take greater control of* what influences their relationship lives. There are at least three conceptual domains that are related to each other in this statement. Two declarative domains (culture and technology) are both linked to one procedural domain (controlling what influences your relationship life). But, knowing what the impact of culture or technology is does not enable persons to control their influence on them. Unlike Fillmore’s prototype of verbs belonging to the same frame—buying and selling, knowing a concept and controlling its influence are not part of the semantic frame used to describe the activities to which these verbs refer.

Granting that it is possible to relate the frame, “culture,” to the frame, “control-of-relationship-life,” it would require an extensive explanation of how these domains are related. There are several discussions of the relationship between culture and technology in Chapter 9: “Friendships, Culture, Gender, and Technology” (2012, pp. 190-192), “Love, Culture, Gender, and Technology” (2012, pp. 196-199), “Families, Culture, Gender, and Technology” (2012, pp. 202-203); but, they do not include discussions of the relationship between knowing about culture or technology and controlling the impact and influence of culture or technology on relationships. In other words, the relation between the pairing of knowing and controlling is not specified in a way that shows how they might be understood as part of the same semantic frame.

It would be possible to argue that this connection could be inferred from these passages, but it is questionable that students would be able to make such inferences. The criteria of judging the strength of the connection is the *experiential* correlation of the cognitive abilities involved which is ordinarily expressed by identifying the relevant experiential framework. Undergraduates would lack the knowledge base to draw such inferences from their experiences. The likelihood of students making these connections is very weak.

1.1. that learning the major elements of the communication process	will have the outcome that students can expect to have a clear understanding of how they function in communicating.
1.2. that learning how communication works	will have the outcome that effectiveness in communicating will increase
1.3. that learning the characteristics of competent communicators	will have the outcome that you begin to internalize them.

1.1: questionable connection — communicating is not systematic and technical. Abstract terms such as sender, noise, code do not correspond to the largely habitual performance of communicating and past experiences would not very likely be the categories in which past experiences in communicating are stored in the episodic memory.

1.2: a probable connection — although the principles are not elaborated here, that communication is multi-purposeful, requires adjustment, etc. can be applied to students' communicating practices.

1.3: a possible connection (assuming that some students begin internalizing, it depends upon repeated practice (an obstacle). How many repetitions are required for the acquisition of these skills is not known.)

CHAPTER 2:

Culture and Communication	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the ways cultures differ from one another.	send and receive messages with a recognition of cultural influences and differences.
the forms and principles of inter-cultural situations.	communicate more successfully in inter-cultural situations.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
2.1. that learning the ways cultures differ from one another	will have the outcome that students can expect to send and receive messages with a recognition of cultural influences and differences
2.2. that learning the forms and principles of inter-cultural situations.	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate more successfully in inter-cultural situations.

2.1: possible connection — since the statement does not indicate learning about influences, it is an obstacle to recognizing them.

2.2: probable connection — knowing the protocols (forms & principles) of intercultural communication, would lead to more success in communicating.

CHAPTER 3

: The Self and Perception	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
self-concept, self-awareness, and self-esteem.	communicate with a better understanding of who you are.

the process of self-disclosure.	regulate your self-disclosures and respond appropriately to the disclosures of others.
the nature and workings of perception.	increase your own accuracy in perceiving other people and their messages.
the way impressions are formed and managed.	manage the impressions you communicate to others.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
3.1. that learning about self-concept, self-awareness, and self-esteem	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate with a better understanding of who you are.
3.2. that learning about the process of self-disclosure	will have the outcome that students can expect to regulate your self-disclosures and respond appropriately to the disclosures of others
3.3. that learning about the nature and workings of perception	will have the outcome that students can expect to increase your own accuracy in perceiving other people and their messages
3.4: that learning the way impressions are formed and managed	will have the outcome that students can expect to manage the impressions you communicate to others

3.1: possible connection — knowing about an abstract concept does not guarantee that students will apply it to themselves which requires additional self-reflection (obstacle)

3.2: possible connection — knowing about an abstract concept referring to a process does not guarantee that students will apply it to themselves which requires additional self-reflection (obstacle)

3.3: possible connection — knowing about an abstract concept does not guarantee that students will apply it to themselves which requires additional self-reflection (obstacle)

3.4: possible connection — knowing about an abstract concept does not guarantee that students will apply it to themselves which requires additional self-reflection (obstacle)

CHAPTER 4:

Listening in Human Communication	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
how listening works.	avoid the barriers to effective listening.
the styles of listening you can use.	adjust your listening so that it's most effective for the specific situation.
how listening varies with gender and culture.	listen with sensitivity to cultural and gender variations.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
4.1. that learning how listening works	will have the outcome that students can expect to avoid the barriers to effective listening.
4.2. that learning about styles of listening that can be used	will have the outcome that students can expect to adjust to specific situations

4.3. that learning how listening varies with gender and culture	will have the outcome that students can expect to listen with sensitivity to cultural and gender variations
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4.1: possible connection: know how something works (e.g., an automobile) does not enable you to avoid barriers to driving it that are not related to its working.)

4.2: possible connection: *knowing about* styles of listening does not imply that you *know how to* use them.

4.3: probable connection: the difference between 4.2 & 4.3, is that the latter is about *knowing how*.

CHAPTER 5

: Verbal Messages	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
how language works.	use language to best achieve your purposes .
the nature of disconfirmation and confirmation	express confirmation when appropriate .
the principles of message effectiveness	use verbal messages more effectively

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
5.1. that learning how language works.	will have the outcome that students can expect to use language to best achieve your purposes
5.2. that learning	will have the outcome that students can expect
5.3. that learning	will have the outcome that students can expect

5.1: possible connection: deciding how best to achieve your purposes is an additional cognitive requirement to learning how language works

5.2: possible connection: knowing about an abstract concept does not guarantee that students will apply it *appropriately* (obstacle)

5.3: possible connection: knowing abstract principles does not guarantee that students will use them *effectively* (obstacle)

CHAPTER 6:

Nonverbal Messages	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the functions nonverbal communication serves.	communicate more effectively with nonverbal messages.
how nonverbal communication interacts with your verbal messages.	respond appropriately to the nonverbal messages of others.
the channels of nonverbal communication.	encode and decode nonverbal messages more effectively.

the role of culture and gender in nonverbal communication.	communicate with an awareness of cultural and gender influences and differences in nonverbal communication.
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Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
6.1. that learning the functions nonverbal communication serves	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate more effectively with nonverbal messages.
6.2. that learning how nonverbal communication interacts with your verbal messages	will have the outcome that students can expect to respond appropriately to the nonverbal messages of others.
6.3. that learning the channels of nonverbal communication.	will have the outcome that students can expect to encode and decode nonverbal messages more effectively.
6.4. that learning the role of culture and gender in nonverbal communication.	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate with an awareness of cultural and gender influences and differences in nonverbal communication.

6.1: possible connection: knowing functions does not guarantee that students will communicate *effectively* non-verbally (obstacle)

6.2: questionable connection: know about the interaction of verbal and non-verbal messages is not related to responding appropriately.

6.3: questionable connection: knowing about email, for example, does not make encoding or decoding messages more effective.

6.4: possible connection: knowing the roles of culture or gender in nonverbal communication does not entail awareness of influences (obstacle).

CHAPTER 7:

Interpersonal Communication – Conversation	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
how the process of conversation works.	apply the skills of interpersonal communication to a wide variety of situations.
how you can become a more satisfying and more effective conversationalist.	engage in conversation that is satisfying and mutually productive.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
7.1. that learning how the process of conversation works.	will have the outcome that students can expect to apply the skills of interpersonal communication to a wide variety of situations.
7.2. that learning how you can become a more satisfying and more effective conversationalist.	will have the outcome that students can expect to engage in conversation that is satisfying and mutually productive.

- 7.1: questionable connection: knowing about a process does not make one skilled at it.
 7.2: probable connection: learning how to do something will likely result in being able to do it.

CHAPTER 8:

Interpersonal Relationship - Stages and Theories	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the ways in which relationships develop and the stages they go through.	communicate in ways appropriate to your relationship stage.
the theories that attempt to account for our relationship decisions and choices.	assess your own relationship behavior and make adjustments as needed.
the "dark side" of relationships.	deal with relationship jealousy and violence in productive ways.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
8.1. that learning the ways in which relationships develop and the stages they go through.	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate in ways appropriate to your relationship stage.
8.2. that learning the theories that attempt to account for our relationship decisions and choices.	will have the outcome that students can expect to assess your own relationship behavior and make adjustments as needed.
8.3. that learning about the "dark side" of relationships.	will have the outcome that students can expect to deal with relationship jealousy and violence in productive ways.

- 8.1: possible connection: judging what is appropriate is an additional cognitive ability (obstacle)
 8.2: possible connection: knowing abstract theories does not entail using them to assess (obstacle)
 8.3: questionable connection: knowing about jealousy and violence does not entail dealing with them productively.

CHAPTER 9:

Friends, Lovers, and Families	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the types and functions of friendship, love, and family relationships.	interact in interpersonal relationships in ways that are appropriate to the type of relationship.
the ways in which culture and technology impact on relationships of all types.	take greater control of what influences your relationship life.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME

9.1. that learning about the types and functions of friendship, love, and family relationships	will have the outcome that students can expect to interact in interpersonal relationships in ways that are appropriate to the type of relationship.
9.2. that learning the ways in which culture and technology impact on relationships of all types.	will have the outcome that students can expect to take greater control of what influences your relationship life.

9.1: possible connection: judging what is appropriate is an additional cognitive ability (obstacle)
 9.2: questionable connection: the impact of culture & technology (two separate areas) could not enable one to take greater control of what influences your relationships. Suggests that one can control the impact of either culture or technology on one's life.

CHAPTER 10:

Small Group Communication	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the stages and formats of small groups.	use small groups to achieve a variety of personal, social, and professional goals.
the structure and functions of idea-generation, personal growth, information sharing, and problem solving groups.	participate effectively in a variety of small groups.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
10.1. that learning about stages and formats	will have the outcome that students can expect to achieve a variety of personal, social, and professional goals.
10.2. that learning about the structure and functions of idea-generation, personal growth, information sharing, and problem solving groups.	will have the outcome that students can expect to participate effectively in a variety of small groups

10.1: questionable connection: being able to manipulate a group requires more than knowing about its stages and formats.
 10.2: probable connection: on the other hand, knowing about the structure and functions of groups can enable you to participate effectively.

CHAPTER 11:

Members and Leaders	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the kinds of roles members play in groups.	participate more effectively as a group member.
the types of and styles of leadership.	lead a wide variety of groups effectively and efficiently
the role of culture in membership and leadership.	NO COORDINATE PERFORMANCE

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
11.1. that learning the kinds of roles members play in groups.	will have the outcome that students can expect to participate more effectively as a group member.
1.2. that learning the types of and styles of leadership.	will have the outcome that students can expect to lead a wide variety of groups effectively and efficiently

11.1: possible connection: participating effectively requires a judgment about the situation (obstacle)
 11.2: questionable connection: leading a group effectively and efficiently requires more than knowing about the types and styles of leadership.
 11.3: n/a

CHAPTER 12:

Human Communication in the Workplace - Organizational Communication	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the nature and types of organizations; the characteristics of organizations.	communicate more effectively in the organizational context.
the types of organizational messages and relationships.	advance your own status and personal satisfaction within the organization.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
12.1. that learning the nature and types of organizations; the characteristics of organizations.	will have the outcome that students can expect to communicate more effectively in the organizational context.
12.2. that learning the types of organizational messages and relationships.	will have the outcome that students can expect to advance your own status and personal satisfaction within the organization.

12.1: possible connection: knowing the nature & types of organizations, etc. does not entail communicating in them more effectively which requires other skills (obstacle)
 12.2: questionable connection: advances in status, not to mention personal satisfaction, are not the consequence of knowing types of messages or relationships.

CHAPTER 13:

Interpersonal, Group, and Workplace Conflict	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the nature of conflict; the principles of conflict.	approach conflict positively and realistically.

the strategies that people use to manage conflict.	engage in interpersonal and group conflict using productive conflict management strategies.
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Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
13.1. that learning the nature of conflict; the principles of conflict.	will have the outcome that students can expect to approach conflict positively and realistically.
13.2. that learning the strategies that people use to manage conflict.	will have the outcome that students can expect to engage in interpersonal and group conflict using productive conflict management strategies.

13.1: questionable connection: not only does abstract knowledge not lead to performance skills without additional cognitive activity, but in this case the ability to approach conflict positively depends upon the emotional makeup of the student and approaching conflict realistically is an ability that depends on practice.

13.2: probable connection: in contrast knowing strategies, assuming they are sound, enables using them.

CHAPTER 14:

Public Speaking Topics, Audiences, and Research	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the very normal nervousness that most people feel .	manage your own anxiety and not let it prevent you from developing and presenting effective speeches.
the first three steps for preparing a public speech.	select an appropriate speech topic, purpose, and thesis.
	analyze and adapt to your audiences.
	research your topic.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
14.1. that learning about the very normal nervousness that most people feel.	will have the outcome that students can expect to manage your own anxiety and not let it prevent you from developing and presenting effective speeches.
14.2. that learning first three steps for preparing a public speech	will have the outcome that students can expect to take them

14.1: questionable connection: knowing that nervousness is normal does not necessarily result in managing it

14.2: possible connection: this connection depends on the students believing that they are viable (obstacle)

CHAPTER 15:

Supporting and Organizing Your Speech
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In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the nature of supporting materials.	support your ideas with interesting and persuasive materials (examples, testimony, statistics).
the main points of your speech.	generate your main points from your thesis statement.
the organizational patterns, introductions, and conclusions for speeches of all types.	organize your thoughts so that your speech is easy to follow and maintains your audience's interest and attention.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
15.1. that learning the nature of supporting materials.	will have the outcome that students can expect to support your ideas with interesting and persuasive materials (examples, testimony, statistics).
15.2. that learning what the main points of your speech are	will have the outcome that students can expect to generate your main points from your thesis statement.
15.3. that learning the organizational patterns, introductions, and conclusions for speeches of all types.	will have the outcome that students can expect to organize your thoughts so that your speech is easy to follow and maintains your audience's interest and attention.

15.1: questionable connection: know about data is not related to articulating it in interesting or persuasive ways.

15.2: questionable connection: "generating" ideas from a statement requires the ability to synthesize them into an expression so that it implies all three ideas which is not related to knowing the main points.

15.3: questionable connection: the effect of a coherent & interesting speech is not a necessary result of knowing how speeches can be organized.

CHAPTER 16:

Style and Delivery in Public Speaking	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
language and how it influences us.	use language to best achieve your purposes.
ways that speakers use to rehearse their speeches.	rehearse your speech efficiently.
the various methods of presentation and how to use your voice and bodily actions to the greatest advantage.	deliver your speech with maximum impact
the role of criticism in public speaking	criticize speeches constructively.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
16.1. that learning about language and how it influences us	will have the outcome that students can expect to use language to best achieve your purposes.

1.2. that learning the ways that speakers use to rehearse their speeches.	will have the outcome that students can expect to rehearse your speech efficiently
16.3. that learning the various methods of presentation and how to use your voice and bodily actions to the greatest advantage.	will have the outcome that students can expect to deliver their speech with maximum impact
16.4 that learning the role of criticism in public speaking	will have the outcome that students can expect to criticize speeches constructively

16.1: questionable connection: knowing about language and how language influences us is very vague, whereas purposes are quite specific. Need to specify a particular influence and its relation to a specific purpose. (I understand that his a generalization that is made more specific in the chapter. However, it should be rephrased. As it stands, the connection is not made.)

16.2: possible connection: know ways to rehearse is likely to enable students to rehearse but doing it "efficiently" requires another cognitive component (obstacle)

16.3: possible connection: "maximum impact" is unknowable until after the fact (obstacle) but knowing methods, voice control, and gestures would enable delivering a speech

16.4: possible connection: "constructively" adds another cognitive component (obstacle)

CHAPTER 17:

The Informative Speech	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:
the goals and principles for communicating information.	use the principles for communicating information more effectively and efficiently.
the types of informative speeches.	prepare a variety of informative speeches —speeches of description, definition, and demonstration.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
17.1. that learning the goals and principles for communicating information.	will have the outcome that students can expect to use the principles for communicating information more effectively and efficiently.
17.2. that learning the types of informative speeches.	will have the outcome that students can expect to prepare a variety of informative speeches—speeches of description, definition, and demonstration.

17.1: possible connection: "more effectively and efficiently" adds two other cognitive components (obstacles)

17.2: probable connection: knowing types of speeches enables preparing them according to type.

CHAPTER 18:

The Persuasive Speech	
In this chapter you'll learn about:	And, you'll learn to:

the nature and goals of persuasion and how attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors are influenced .	use the strategies of persuasion in a variety of communication contexts.
the major types of persuasive speeches.	prepare a variety of effective persuasive speeches on questions of fact, value, and policy
	prevent yourself from being unfairly or unethically persuaded.

Assumptions about the outcomes of declarative knowledge in the chapter:

DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE	PROCEDURAL OUTCOME
8.1. that learning the nature and goals of persuasion and how attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors are influenced.	will have the outcome that students can expect to use the strategies of persuasion in a variety of communication contexts.
8.2. that learning the major types of persuasive speeches.	will have the outcome that students can expect to prepare a variety of effective persuasive speeches on questions of fact, value, and policy
8.3.	will have the outcome that students can expect to prevent yourself from being unfairly or unethically persuaded.

18.1: probable connection: knowing about and how persuasion works is likely to enable using strategies of persuasion

18.2: possible connection: "effective" adds another cognitively ability (obstacle)

18.3: the declarative knowledge component is not provided, if it is intended to be "learning the major types of persuasive speeches" the connection would be questionable because knowing types of speeches is not related to being "unfairly" or "unethically" influenced in that this effect would have more to do with the discursive structure of the speech than with its genre.

Table 1

With respect to the generic matches of declarative and procedural knowledge in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, of the 49 pairings: 8 = probable, 24 = possible, 16 = questionable, and 1 = undeterminable.

[Note: These findings need to be joined with the analysis of the correlation between the cognitive abilities involved which would confirm or invalidate the semantic connection. The next section analyzes the match of cognitive abilities in the pairing of the two types of knowledge.]

The correlation of the cognitive abilities in the generic pairings

The analysis of the generic correlations that follows hinges on Reif's premise that declarative knowledge does not *entail* procedural knowledge (2008, pp. 16-17). Without specification about applying the theoretical conceptions, "the student's knowledge is purely nominal rather than effectively usable" (2008, p. 17). Take the first pairing as an example: Understanding the major elements in the human communication process, will enable you to communicate with a clear understanding of the essential elements and how they relate to one another. If we replace the phrase "elements in the human

communication process" with the particular elements to which it refers, the expectation is that understanding the meaning of sender/receiver, message, context, noise, effect (and how they relate to one another in a communication) will enable readers to communicate with a clear understanding of these interrelations. This pairing is un-contextualized and since the condition-dependent procedural knowledge is not specified, how to apply this conception to a given situation is not disclosed. In Reif's terms, the performance is nominal, meaning that students using the textbook, like Feynman's Physics students, understand the semantic connection but do not know how to use the knowledge involved.

Note: Richard P. Feynman was a very bright and colorful physicist who ... was a Nobel-Prize winner and also identified the cause of the *Challenger* spacecraft disaster.) In one of his books [Feynman] describes vividly his experiences as a visitor in Brazil. When he asked doctoral students there questions about polarized light, he promptly received correct verbal answers. But when he then asked the students to look out the window to observe the phenomenon that they had described, they were unable to connect their words to the observable phenomena. Feynman (1985, 211) summarizes his experiences in the following words:

After a lot of investigation, I finally figured out that the students had memorized everything, but they didn't know what anything meant. When they heard "light is reflected from a medium with an index," they didn't know that it meant a material such as water. They didn't know that the "direction of the light" is the direction in which you see something when you're looking at it. Everything was entirely memorized, yet nothing had been translated into meaningful words.

Indeed, the Brazilian educational system merely seemed to emphasize *nominal* knowledge that teachers taught, students memorized, and examinations assessed. But none of this knowledge was usable. Nobody seemed to know how to use this physics knowledge to predict or explain observable phenomena. (Reif, 2008, p. 17)

As can be seen in the following chart, all 49 pairings of cognitive abilities have to be considered to result in nominal understanding of Communication Studies.

[The expression "you'll learn about" is construed as involving the cognitive ability of "understanding." The text in **turquoise** indicates the cognitive abilities called for in relation to the declarative knowledge in the preceding column. **?** = questionable connection given the lack of specification of the conditions required for the procedure.]

	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
1.	? the major elements in the human communication process.	communicate with a clear understanding of the essential elements and how they relate to	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
2.	? the essential principles that explain how communication	use the essential principles of human communication to increase	-no necessary connection between understanding a principle and using it to
3.	? the characteristics of the competent communicator	begin to internalize the characteristics of communication	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and internalizing it

CHAPTER 2: Culture and Communication			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
4.	the ways cultures differ from one another.	send and receive messages with a recognition of cultural influences and differences.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and recognizing it.
5.	the forms and principles of inter-cultural situations.	communicate more successfully in inter-cultural situations.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
CHAPTER 3: The Self and Perception			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
6.	self-concept, self-awareness, and self-esteem.	communicate with a better understanding of who you are.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
7.	the process of self-disclosure.	regulate your self-disclosures and respond appropriately to the disclosures of others.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and regulating your behavior.
8.	the nature and workings of perception.	increase your own accuracy in perceiving other people and their messages.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and increasing accuracy in perceiving
9.	the way impressions are formed and managed.	manage the impressions you communicate to others.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it
CHAPTER 4: Listening in Human Communication			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
10.	how listening works.	avoid the barriers to effective listening.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and controlling your behavior
11.	the styles of listening you can use.	adjust your listening so that it's most effective for the specific situation.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
12.	how listening varies with gender and culture.	listen with sensitivity to cultural and gender variations.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of listening and listening with sensitivity.
CHAPTER 5: Verbal Messages			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
13.	how language works.	use language to best achieve your purposes.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it as a means to achieve your puposes.
14.	the nature of disconfirmation and confirmation	express confirmation when appropriate.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
15.	the principles of message effectiveness	use verbal messages more effectively	-no necessary connection between understanding principles and applying them more effectively.
CHAPTER 6: Nonverbal Messages			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:

16.	?	the functions nonverbal communication serves.	communicate more effectively with nonverbal messages.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of the nonverbal functions of communication and being able to communicate <i>effectively</i> non-verbally.
17.	?	how nonverbal communication interacts with your verbal messages.	respond appropriately to the nonverbal messages of others.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of nonverbal communication and responding to it.
18.	?	the channels of nonverbal communication.	encode and decode nonverbal messages more effectively.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of a channel and the activity of encoding and decoding.
19.	?	the role of culture and gender in nonverbal communication.	communicate with an awareness of cultural and gender influences and differences in nonverbal communication.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concepts and using them in nonverbal communications.

CHAPTER 7: Interpersonal Communication - Conversation

	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:	
20.	?	how the process of conversation works.	apply the skills of interpersonal communication to a wide variety of situations.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
21.	?	how you can become a more satisfying and more effective conversationalist.	engage in conversation that is satisfying and mutually productive.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.

CHAPTER 8: Interpersonal Relationship - Stages and Theories

	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:	
22.	?	the ways in which relationships develop and the stages they go through	communicate in ways appropriate to your relationship stage.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
23.	?	the theories that attempt to account for our relationship decisions and choices.	assess your own relationship behavior and make adjustments as needed.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
24.	?	the "dark side" of relationships.	deal with relationship jealousy and violence in productive ways.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and dealing with the situation to which it refers.

CHAPTER 9: Friends, Lovers, and Families

	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:	
25.	?	the types and functions of friendship, love, and family relationships.	interact in interpersonal relationships in ways that are appropriate to the type of relationship.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.
26.	?	the ways in which culture and technology impact on relationships of all types.	take greater control of what influences your relationship life.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.

CHAPTER 10: Small Group Communication			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
27.	the stages and formats of small groups.	use small groups to achieve a variety of personal, social, and professional goals.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.
28.	the structure and functions of idea-generation, personal growth, information sharing, and problem solving groups.	participate effectively in a variety of small groups.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
CHAPTER 11: Members and Leaders			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
29.	the kinds of roles members play in groups.	participate more effectively as a group member.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.
30.	the types of and styles of leadership.	lead a wide variety of groups effectively and efficiently	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.
31.	- the role of culture in membership and leadership.	NO COORDINATE PERFORMANCE	
CHAPTER 12: Human Communication in the Workplace - Organizational Communication			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
32.	the nature and types of organizations; the characteristics of organizations.	communicate more effectively in the organizational context.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.
33.	the types of organizational messages and relationships.	advance your own status and personal satisfaction within the organization.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of organizational messages and personal satisfaction although there is a connection with advancing status.
CHAPTER 13: Interpersonal, Group, and Workplace Conflict			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
34.	the nature of conflict; the principles of conflict.	approach conflict positively and realistically.	-no necessary connection between understanding the concept of conflict and behaving in a conflict situation positively and realistically. .
35.	the strategies that people use to manage conflict.	engage in interpersonal and group conflict using productive conflict management strategies.	-no necessary connection between understanding a strategy and using it productively.
CHAPTER 14: Public Speaking Topics, Audiences, and Research			
	Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
36.	the very normal nervousness that most people feel.	manage your own anxiety and not let it prevent you from developing and presenting effective speeches.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and using it as a guideline for behavior.

37.	?	the first three steps for preparing a public speech .	select an appropriate speech topic, purpose, and thesis. analyze and adapt to your audiences. research your topic.	Presumably, the first three steps are: select, analyze, and research. However, understanding what the three cognitive processes mean does not entail being to conduct them properly.
CHAPTER 15: Supporting and Organizing Your Speech				
		Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
38.	?	the nature of supporting materials.	support your ideas with interesting and persuasive materials (examples, testimony, statistics).	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
39.	?	the main points of your speech.	generate your main points from your thesis statement.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
40.	?	the organizational patterns, introductions, and conclusions for speeches of all types.	organize your thoughts so that your speech is easy to follow and maintains your audience's interest and attention.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
CHAPTER 16: Style and Delivery in Public Speaking				
		Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
41.	?	language and how it influences us.	use language to best achieve your purposes.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
42.	?	ways that speakers use to rehearse their speeches.	rehearse your speech efficiently.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
43.	?	the various methods of presentation and how to use your voice and bodily actions to the greatest advantage.	deliver your speech with maximum impact	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
44.	?	the role of criticism in public speaking	criticize speeches constructively.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
CHAPTER 17: The Informative Speech				
		Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
45.	?	the goals and principles for communicating information.	use the principles for communicating information more effectively and efficiently.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
46.	?	the types of informative speeches.	prepare a variety of informative speeches—speeches of description, definition, and demonstration.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.
CHAPTER 18: The Persuasive Speech				
		Understand	And, you'll be able to:	Comment:
47.	?	the nature and goals of persuasion and how attitudes, beliefs, values,	use the strategies of persuasion in a variety of communication contexts.	-no necessary connection between understanding a concept and applying it.

		and behaviors are influenced.	
48.	?	the major types of persuasive speeches.	prepare a variety of effective persuasive speeches on questions of fact, value, and policy
49.	?		prevent yourself from being unfairly or unethically persuaded.

Table 2

Taken together, the two charts show that the generic pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge do not provide the basis for belief transformations.

Generally speaking, the generic declarative and procedural pairings in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* are at best nominal and at worst invalid (16 pairings—those marked by “?”—were judged questionable). In as much as the pairing of declarative and procedural knowledge corresponds to the model of learning as a transformative process of belief resulting in the ability to do something that persons could not do beforehand, it is a significant finding that, for the most part, the learning in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is likely to be nominal, that is, equivalent to what Feynman’s students learned.

The semantic correlations of the Specific pairings

The analysis of specific pairings in the textboxes in Chapter 1 or *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* focuses on the sources of the theories contained in them, the expectations associated with the scenarios presented as well as the semantic connections.

Chapter 1 of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, “Preliminaries to Human Communication” contains the following 7 textboxes which contain pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge constituting potential belief transformations situated in specific communicative experiences:⁸⁶

1. TEST YOURSELF: What Do you believe about communication
2. Communication Tips
3. BUILDING COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Distinguishing Content from Relationship Messages
4. BUILDING COMMUNICATION SKILLS: Resolving Ambiguity
5. COMMUNICATION CHOICE POINT: Irreversibility
6. COMMUNICATION CHOICE POINT: Silence
7. COMMUNICATION CHOICE POINT: Content and Relationship Messages

⁸⁶ I omitted textboxes that explained what the function of this type of textbox. I also omitted the two UNDERSTANDING THEORY AND RESEARCH textboxes which described the declarative knowledge in the chapter, namely "theory" and "research" but which was not paired with procedural knowledge.

My analysis of these textboxes and the related discussions in the chapter led to the conclusion that none of the seven specific pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge was viable in the context of Reif's learning theory model of belief transformation. There were three kinds of "dis-connects" between the two types of knowledge:

1. the accounts of the theoretical conceptions in the chapter were inaccurate representations of the sources cited [#3] invalidating the pairing;
2. the procedure recommended could not be considered an application of the declarative knowledge identified in the textbox [#4, #5, #6, #7]; and
3. the declarative knowledge to be paired with the procedures called for in the textboxes was difficult, if not impossible, to specify [#1, #2].

The three disconnects invalidate the pairings in the textboxes as educational belief transformations for different reasons summarized in the following paragraphs:

1. Inadequate representation of the sources cited:

The account of the context and relationship dimension of communication in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is based on two sources: Deborah Tannen's *You're Wearing That?: Understanding Mothers and Daughters in Conversation* (2006) and Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson's *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (1967). However, DeVito's account of this theoretical conception, mindfulness, does not match his sources on two important counts:

1. Whereas Watzlawick, et. Al., following Ruesch and Bateson's account in their *Communication; the social matrix of psychiatry* (1968) understand content and relationship to be two dimensions of every communication, DeVito understands them as separate messages.
2. Whereas Tannen and Watzlawick, et. al. understand the relationship dimension to be communicated as meta-messages typically non-verbal and based on past experiences with the interlocutor involved, DeVito understands the relationship message as a "signal" or an expected aspect of the context—e.g., an employer speaking to an employee (2012, p. 15).

In addition, DeVito's account of "mindfulness" does not match his sources. In *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, the account of mindfulness is based on two sources: Ellen Langer's *Mindfulness* and Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron's "Mindfulness and Interpersonal Communication" (2000).⁸⁷ DeVito's account does not match his sources on two significant counts:

1. Whereas Langer does **not** understand mindfulness as a logical cognitive operation and Burgoon, Berge, & Waldron insist that "it would be a misconstrual of the concept to equate mindfulness with conscious, planful, or strategic communication," DeVito understands it as "a state of awareness in which you're conscious of your reasons for thinking or behaving."
2. Langer identifies four ways of increasing mindfulness. While "create new categories" and "be open to information and points of view" are drawn from Langer, "Beware of relying too heavily on first impressions" and "Think before you act" are not. DeVito adds two practices of

⁸⁷ DeVito also cites Elmes, M. B., & Gemmill, G. (1990). "The psychodynamics of mindlessness and dissent in small groups." *Small Group Research*, 21, 28-44. However, this is an article about "group mindlessness."

mindfulness to Langer's list and subtracts "Control over context" and "process before outcome" without indicating the changes.

The misleading citations invalidate any belief transformation.

[NOTE: In this section of the chapter in which specific pairings are analyzed, I have placed the detailed arguments in a "DATA APPENDIX" and include in the main text only a summary of the conclusions reached. Accordingly I have supplied links to the data such as the following:] [GO TO DATA](#)

2. The procedure recommended could not be considered an application of the declarative knowledge identified in the textbox.

In the textbox "Resolving Ambiguity" it would seem that the declarative knowledge involved is ambiguity and the procedure involved is disambiguating. If this is the case, it would be difficult to claim that the procedure of disambiguating an utterance is based on the knowing what ambiguity is. In *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012, ambiguity is described as a message with more than one potential meaning, an example of which is the sentence "what has the cat in his paws?" which can mean either that another animal has the cat in his paws or that the cat has in his paws something that is hard to identify.

The ambiguity in the textbox on "Resolving Ambiguity" concerns a request. The textbox offers a scenario in which Pat, whom I take to be a woman, invites her boyfriend to have dinner with her parents, presumably in a sentence such as: "Would you like to have dinner with me and my parents this Sunday?" Unlike the sentence offered as an instance of ambiguity quoted in the preceding paragraph, this question is not ambiguous. Pat's boyfriend finds the question ambiguous with respect to what he construes as its implications, not with respect to its wording. These are two different senses of concept, ambiguity.

The procedure recommended is to "disambiguate" the message in the following way: "instead of assuming one interpretation is right and another wrong, it may be useful to try to disambiguate the message and find out more clearly what the speaker means" (2012, p. 17). In this case, the message cannot be disambiguated because it is not ambiguous in the first place. Pat's boyfriend's interpretation is also not ambiguous but simply a "guess" at Pat's intentions involving two un-ambiguous alternatives which are unknown because her intentions are private and inaccessible to her boyfriend.

For these reasons, the recommended procedure of disambiguating cannot be considered correlative to the concept of ambiguity. For a detailed discussion of "disambiguating," see the data-appendix.

As in the first group of disconnects, this instance cannot be considered to include valid belief transformations.

[GO TO DATA](#)

3. The declarative knowledge to be paired with the procedures called for in the textboxes was difficult, if not impossible, to specify.

There are two textboxes at the beginning of the chapter located in the section on "Elements of Communication" that seem to be instances of them, namely of source/receiver, message, channels, noise, context, and effect. One is a test about "What Do you believe about communication?" and the other is a set of "communication tips" for communicating with a visually impaired person. In both cases, the declarative knowledge featured in them is difficult to match with the procedural specifications.

1. In the case of the test, the concepts source/receiver, message, channels, noise, context, and effect are not mentioned. The beliefs about communication have mostly to do with communicating. At the same time, the textbox indicates that the "theories and research discussed in this chapter will help you reconsider your own beliefs." The only procedures mentioned are to "re-examine your beliefs" and "consider how new beliefs would influence the way you communicate" (2012, p. 8). Relating these procedures to the elements of communication while considering your old and new beliefs about communicating is not likely to provide a basis for learning the elements.
2. In the case of the tips textbox, the elements of communication are either mentioned or implied. However, the procedures described in the textbox have more to do with mindful communication which is discussed later in the chapter but not mentioned in the "Tips" textbox.

In both these textboxes, it is difficult to identify what knowledge domain is paired with the procedural knowledge described; thus any connection between them is questionable.

A detailed analysis of these textboxes is presented in the data appendix.

[GO TO DATA](#)

The correlation of the cognitive abilities in the specific pairings:

The "dating Pat" scenario is given twice with different advice about disambiguating Pat's remark. The scenarios are presented from Pat's and her boy/girl-friend's⁸⁸ point of view—the first in a Building Communication Skills textbox and the second in a Communication Choice Points textbox, both on page 17:

(1) You've been dating Pat on and off for the past six months. Today, Pat asks you to come to dinner and meet the parents. You're not sure if this means that Pat wants to get more serious (which you do not want) or if it's a simple dinner invitation with no additional motives.

textbox 1

⁸⁸ I perceive the example as a strategy to make the textbook consistent with LGBT guidelines. That is, I think that the gender of "Pat" is deliberately left unidentified to show that DeVito thinks that it's Ok for men to date men or women to date women.

(2) You've [Pat] been dating someone on and off for a year or so and you'd like to invite your date to meet your parents (you're anxious to see what they think about your partner) but aren't sure how your date will perceive this invitation.

textbox 2

In the two textboxes that include this scenario four questions are asked:

1. How might you disambiguate this dinner invitation message?
2. What are some of the things you might say to reduce the ambiguity?
3. What do you say?
4. In what context?

The only cognitive abilities explicitly mentioned are disambiguating and speaking. Of course, the textbox choice points is about choices and decision making is implied as is contextualizing in question #4. Nonetheless, any specification of making a decision about what to say in this scenario is missing. Students would have to extrapolate a disambiguating procedure from the "Pat/boyfriend" scenarios for choosing what to say to reduce the ambiguity. Given question #4, students presumably would use the procedure of contextualizing to analyze the situation. The results would be something along the following lines: the social-psychological context is that Pat is anxious about asking the question; the temporal context would be the interval between "now" and their next conversation; the cultural dimension would be "meeting the parents." The first scenario suggests the implication of increasing seriousness and the second indicates "seeking parental advice." Both imply an increase in the seriousness of the relationship.

The implied cognitive abilities that pertain to disambiguating either scenario are: contextualizing / analyzing the context and thereby deciding what to say. As earlier noted, "There is an important distinction between performance that is *usable* (enabling the performance of significant tasks) and performance that is just *nominal* (enabling merely naming some things or talking about them)" (Reif, 2008, pp. 16-17). The procedures recommended explicitly in the textboxes (disambiguating) or implied in the chapter (contextualizing) have to be judged, in Reif's terms, to be nominal performances because the declarative knowledge in the textboxes, taking their titles as an index, is ambiguity. Disambiguating, as I argued in a previous section, cannot be considered correlative to the concept of ambiguity.

Having noted that, in the case of the "dating Pat" scenario, the performance is nominal, I summarize the analyses of the other specific pairings in the following chart:

	Concepts	Requested performances	Specification of the performance
1	communication	<p>Consider how these beliefs about communication influence the way you communicate.</p> <p>reexamine your beliefs about communication and</p> <p>consider how new beliefs would influence the way you communicate</p>	<p>The theories and research discussed in this text will help you reconsider your own beliefs about communication, and the skill-building activities will help you practice new ways of communicating.</p>

2	Communication Tips	<p>Identify yourself.</p> <p>Face your listener; Speak at your normal volume.</p> <p>encode into speech all the meanings you wish to communicate.</p> <p>Use audible turn-taking cues.</p> <p>Use normal vocabulary</p> <p>Don't avoid terms like "see" or "look" or even "blind."</p>	<p>The "tips" are specific and readily followed but they are all aspects of everyday conversations and do not involve technical understanding. [Encode may be the exception but, if so, its performance is not specifically described, making it nominal.]</p>
3	Distinguishing Content from Relationship Messages	<p>Identify the possible content and relational messages that a receiver might get in being asked the following questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • You're calling me? • Did you say you're applying to medical school? • You're in love? • You paid a hundred dollars for that? • And that's all you did? 	<p>This textbox was analyzed in the previous chapter. The absence of any scenario in which these messages might be sent makes the identification of the content and relationship aspects of them impossible to identify.</p>
4	Resolving Ambiguity	<p>How might you disambiguate this dinner invitation message?</p> <p>How might you disambiguate this job appraisal?</p> <p>How might you disambiguate this invitation to speak?</p>	<p>This textbox was also analyzed in the previous chapter. The specification of a performance of disambiguating was deemed inappropriate in two of the three scenarios.</p>
5	Irreversibility	<p>What are your options for communicating your feelings?</p> <p>What communication channels could you use?</p>	<p>Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. How to perform them is not specified.</p>
6	Silence	<p>What are some of the things you might say?</p> <p>What are some of the things you'd want to be sure not to say?</p> <p>How might you introduce the topic?</p>	<p>Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. . How to perform them is not specified.</p>
7	Content and Relationship Messages	<p>What do you say? Through what channel?</p>	<p>Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. How to perform them is not specified.</p>

Table 3

In the various scenarios described, only the tips (#2) textbox specifies how to perform the tasks. However, since the conceptions to which the performances are allied are not a part of the Communication Studies research lexicon, the pairings are not relevant to learning about communication

research. In the other cases, there are no specifications about how to perform the cognitive tasks involved and the performances, in Reif's terms, are nominal.

[GO TO DATA](#)

4. DISCUSSION

I analyzed two data sets: the generic matches of declarative knowledge (theory) and procedural knowledge (skills) in all twelve chapters of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* and the more specific matches in the text of chapter 1 with respect to two criteria: semantic correlations and cognitive correlations. The analysis of the specific matches between declarative and procedural knowledge in chapter 1, in my view, are representative sample of those in the other 17 chapters.

Generic pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge

As the findings show, the performances requested in Chapter 1 of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* are nominal rather than usable performances according to Reif's distinction (2008, pp. 16-17). Although in many instances semantic connections can be made between theories and the requested performances, the second criteria for using theoretical concepts—specification of the procedures—is not met, rendering them "nominal."

The mantra with which each chapter begins: "In this chapter you'll learn" [concepts about communication] "And, you'll learn to" [communicate more effectively] seems to pertain to the acquisition of communication skills, despite the claim that "Theories are extremely practical and skills-like examples and applications clarify the theories. The two work together, each informing and enlarging upon the other" (1994, p. xvii). It appears that, for the most part, in the *Human Communication: The Basic Course* series theories and skills are paired but not theories and applications to research situations.

Specific pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge

The textboxes that specifically matched declarative knowledge with procedural knowledge in Chapter 1 present considerable obstacles to the understanding of the theories involved. It was impossible to apply Reif's applicability criteria to them because the declarative knowledge presented did not represent the sources cited or because the textbox was not clearly associated with a specific set of conceptions. This makes the recommended procedural knowledge questionable from the point of view of learning Communication Studies.

In the Introduction to *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*, we find that a "major feature" of the textbook is "interactive pedagogy":

This edition continues to emphasize new and useful pedagogical aids, especially those that are interactive, to help you better understand the theory and research and to enable you to effectively build and polish your communication skills. (2012, p. xvii)

This confirms the view that in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*—as well as most of the textbooks in the series—theories are paired with skills. However the "disconnects" in the pairings of declarative and procedural knowledge in the specific scenarios: inaccurate representations of the sources, inappropriate applications of theoretical conceptions, and the difficulty of determining the declarative knowledge to be paired with recommended procedures render these practical exercises “unusable” in the context of Communication Studies.

Skills, as procedures, would have to have the conditions of their performances specified. It is rarely the case that the conditions which enable the performance of skills or procedural knowledge are specified in *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*. Students are, for the most part, are left to imagine what the requested performances entail.

Considering this analysis in the context of the next chapter, it is clear that *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* is oriented toward students who wish to become skillful communicators. If Chapter 1 is any indication, learning, in the sense of a transformation from a common sense state of mind to the mindset of a researcher is clearly not the goal of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012*.

Implications

The lack of match between declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge has a significant impact on students’ ability to fully understand the conceptions being studied. In Reif’s view:

There is an important distinction between performance that is *usable* (enabling the performance of significant tasks) and performance that is just *nominal* (enabling merely naming some things or talking about them).

For example, suppose that a student is asked the question "What is a triangle?" and responds by saying "A triangle is a three-side polygon". On the basis of the student's performance on this question, a naive teacher might well conclude that the student knows what a triangle is.

But suppose that the student is shown a sheet of paper displaying various geometric figures and is asked to point out which of them is a triangle. Or suppose that the student is asked to draw a triangle. If the student can perform neither of these tasks, would the teacher still say that the student has significant knowledge about triangles? In this case, the student's performance consists merely of his ability to *state* a verbal definition of a triangle. But if he cannot *use* this definition to do anything with it (for example, if he can neither recognize nor construct a triangle) then the student's knowledge is purely nominal rather than effectively usable. (2008, pp. 16-17)

Another illustration of the distinction that Reif uses immediately after this example is the one I provided in the Introduction about Feynman’s Brazilian students. In the context of Feynman’s anecdote, the students using chapter 1 would have, at best, acquired nominal knowledge rather than usable knowledge in Reif’s terms. In other words, the applications of the theories students are asked to undertake would not enable them to do communication research.

5. FUTURE RESEARCH

The obvious implication of this analysis for future research is that more research needs to be conducted on the extent to which communication textbooks accurately represent the conceptions researchers use in their projects.

Aside from this obvious implication, more research is needed on the criteria that relates declarative knowledge of communication to the procedural knowledge needed in the field of Communication Studies.

There is also a curricular issue that requires research. Should Introductions to Communication Study be directed at both majors and non-majors? Or should courses in communication for non-majors be separate courses from those directed at majors? An associated question is: do the financial constraints on departments result in developing one course to serve two very different audiences? This question can be asked about courses that offer credit to both undergraduate and graduate students.

In Reif's model, the intellectual performance indicative of understanding a field is, in effect, learning to think like a researcher in that field. Does this imply that non-majors need to be treated in different ways than majors?

Can persons majoring in one science extrapolate what they learn about another science and apply it to the practices involved in their majors? If so, why emphasize personal skills rather than disciplinary skills?

Can a conception be understood sufficiently by omitting its development? For example, can a dialogical model of communication be understood sufficiently to be used as a framework in a research project without knowing about the linear models that preceded it the cognitive science models that follow it?

Is learning one model of communication sufficient to apply to all communication situations?

Can research into communication practices be learned from practicing how to communicate personally?

The next question

The dual purposes and audiences of *Human Communication: The Basic Course* leads to another issue: Should communication textbooks be designed to meet student interests and expectations or to meet the expectations of the researchers in the field whose work has been well regarded?

6. DATA APPENDIX

Analyzing the specific matches between declarative statements and procedural statements in chapter 1 of *Human Communication: The Basic Course 2012* with respect to applicability conditions

1. Inadequate representation of the sources cited

1a. the content and relationship dimension of communication

The "Distinguishing Content from Relationship Messages" textbox:

In *You're Wearing That?*, (2006), Deborah Tannen gives examples of content and relationship communication and the problems that can result from different interpretations. For example, the mother who says, "Are you going to wear those earrings?" may think she's communicating solely a content message. To the daughter, however, the message is largely relational and is a criticism of the way she intends to dress. (Of course, the mother may have intended criticism.) Often, questions that may appear to be objective and focused on content are perceived as attacks, as in the title of Tannen's book. **Identify the possible content and relational** messages that a receiver might get in being asked the following questions:

- You're calling me?
- Did you say you're applying to medical school?
- You're in love?
- You paid a hundred dollars for that?
- And that's all you did?

Content and relationship messages serve *different communication functions*, *Being able to distinguish between these functions is a prerequisite for using and responding to messages effectively.*

Textbox 4

Though the textbox references Deborah Tannen, in the chapter the distinction between "Content and Relationship Dimensions," is also attributed to Watzlawick, et. al. (*Pragmatics of Human Communication* Watzlawick, et al., 1967, pp. 51-54). In their account, all messages in communicating have both a content and a relationship dimension. In *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012, the content dimension is referred to as a content *message* and the relationship dimension as a relationship *message* (2012, p. 15 and 16). By contrast, in the *Pragmatics of Human Communication* the distinction is not about different types of messages but different aspects of *any* message.

The report aspect of a message conveys information and is, therefore, synonymous in human communication with the *content* of the message. It may be about anything that is communicable regardless of whether the particular information is true or false, valid, invalid, or undecidable. The command aspect, on the other hand, refers to what sort of message it is to be taken as, and, therefore, ultimately to the relationship between communicants. (Watzlawick, et al., 1967, pp. 51-52)

Further, in the textbox, Deborah Tannen is cited as someone who gives examples of the distinction between "content and relationship communication." The scenario in it parallels one in a section of *You're Wearing That? Understanding Mothers and Daughters in Conversation*. Tannen offers an example of "one of the conundrums of mother-daughter relationships: the double-meaning of connection and control" (2006, p. 11). In the example, Loraine's mother asks her the question which Loraine interprets as a criticism.

In interpreting her mother's question as a sign of disapproval, Loraine was also drawing on past conversations. She couldn't count the times her mother had commented, on this visit and on all the previous ones, "You're wearing *that?*" And therein lies another reason that anything said between mothers and daughters can either warm our hearts or raise our hackles: Their conversations have a long history, going back literally to the start of the daughter's life. So

anything either one says at a given moment takes meaning not only from the words spoken at that moment but from all the conversations they have had in the past. (Tannen, 2006, p. 14)

Explaining Loraine's interpretation of her mother's question, Tannen, (as do Watzlawick, et al.), notes that "interpretations depend on metamesages-the meaning gleaned from how something is said, or from the fact that it is said at all" (2006, p. 13).⁸⁹ For Tannen, interpreting meta-messages depends on non-verbal clues (how something is said) as well as contextual clues (the fact that it is said in this context). Being able to discern the possible meta-messages that indicate what sort of message it is, as Tannen notes, usually depends on "all of the conversations they have had in the past."

In these examples, the declarative knowledge entailed includes nonverbal meta-communication (2012, pp. 52-53; Watzlawick, et al., 1967) since the key to making the distinction is context and intonation or some other gestural aspect of the conversations (Watzlawick, et al., 1967, p. 53). However, it is questionable whether students can apply the distinction between content and relationship functions to the speech acts listed below without non-verbal and contextual clues which are not given in the textbox scenario.⁹⁰ Moreover, the speech acts at issue are un-contextualized questions about which students are asked to "identify the possible content and relationship messages:

1. You're calling me?
2. Did you say you're applying to medical school?
3. You're in love?
4. You paid a hundred dollars for that?
5. And that's all you did?

Consider identifying the relationship function of the first question, "You're calling me?" Without a context, it is impossible to understand the question. The second question is similarly difficult to interpret without a context. Questions 3-5 are familiar to some extent and contexts can be inferred from the questions. The question "You're in love?" could be contextualized as a close friend asking his or her companion the question in a tone of surprise based on familiarity with the past relationships or dispositions of his or her companion. Similarly, the question, "You paid a hundred dollars for that?" could be contextualized as a friend expressing surprise at the discrepancy in the evaluation of the item purchased by his or her friend. And, similarly, the question "And that's all you did?" could be contextualized as a friend expressing surprise at the extent of his or her companion's behavior in a specific situation. In every case students have to invent contexts in which the questions might be asked and then interpret the attitude behind the question as friendly or hostile in the case where the relationship was agonistic.

None of the "possible" scenarios imagined by students could approximate the extensive research behind Tannen's observations of mother-daughter relationships. In the case of Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, their view is taken from Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson's *Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry*:

⁸⁹ Tannen does not draw her distinction between message and meta-message from Watzlawick, et. al.

⁹⁰ Watzlawick, et al. remark "messages can be constructed, especially in written communication, which offer highly ambiguous met communicational clues" (Watzlawick, et al., 1967, p. 53).

Whatever communication we consider, be it the transmission of impulses in a neural system or the transmission of words in a conversation, it is evident that every message in transit has two sorts of "meaning" ... On the one hand, the message is a statement or report about events at a previous moment, and on the other hand it is a command-a cause or stimulus for events at a later moment. ... The same thing is true of all verbal communication, and indeed of all communication whatsoever. When A speaks to B, whatever words he uses will have these two aspects: they will tell B about A, conveying information about some perception or knowledge which A has; and they will be a cause or basis for B's later action. ...

This double aspect of all communication is, of course, a commonplace of the psychiatric interview and is indeed the basis of a large part of all differences between the content of consciousness and the unconscious. The patient is continually aware of only one aspect of what he is saying-whether it be the "report" or the "command"-and the psychiatrist is continually calling his attention to that aspect which he would prefer not to recognize. (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, pp. 179-180)

That *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012 does not cite Ruesch and Bateson's cybernetic account of the two aspects of communication is not the problem I am addressing. The problem is that construing a content message as distinct from a relationship message is not only an inaccurate account of the distinction between content and relationship levels of communication, but that the distinction should be related to the concept of meta-messages, in particular non-verbal ones, in the section on "Elements of Communication," a connection that Tannen, Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson as well as Ruesch and Bateson foreground in their delineations of the distinction.

1b. Mindfulness

There are no specific skills boxes for communication competence. However, in the section on "The Competent Communicator Thinks Critically and Mindfully" four practices of mindful critical thinking are offered (2012, p. 22). The concept of mindfulness as well as some of the practices are drawn from Ellen J. Langer's *Mindfulness* (1989, pp. 61-79). In *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012, mindfulness is regarded as a special kind of "critical thinking":

Mindfulness is a state of awareness in which you're conscious of your reasons for thinking or behaving. In its opposite, mindlessness, you lack conscious awareness of what or how you're thinking (Langer, 1989). To apply interpersonal skills effectively in conversation, you need to be mindful of the unique communication situation you're in, of your available communication options, and of the reasons why one option is likely to be better than the others (Burgoon, Berger, & Waldron, 2000; Elmes & Gemmill, 1990).⁹¹ (2012, pp. 22, , the citations in the quotation are DeVito's)

⁹¹ Elmes, M. B., & Gemmill, G. (1990). The psychodynamics of mindlessness and dissent in small groups. *Small Group Research*, 21, 28-44. This is an article about "group mindlessness."

Langer does not define mindfulness in her 1989 book. She equates it with “the key qualities of a mindful state of being: (1) creation of new categories; (2) openness to new information; and (3) awareness of more than one perspective (1989). In the 2000 article that DeVito cites, the authors note that:

Although mindfulness is often equated with actors producing, comprehending, and interpreting verbal and nonverbal messages in a deliberate, rational fashion that reflects not only forethought but also ongoing monitoring of the discursive stream, it would be a misconstrual of the concept to equate mindfulness with conscious, planful, or strategic communication ... Langer (1989) makes clear that mindfulness refers to active and fluid information processing, sensitivity to context and multiple perspectives and ability to draw novel distinctions. (Burgoon, et al., 2000, p. 106)

Given the remarks by Burgoon, Berger, and Waldron, characterizing Langer’s view of “mindfulness” in *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012 as “a state of awareness in which you are conscious of the logic and rationality of **your** behaviors and of the logical connections among them” is quite misleading.

After defining mindfulness in *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012, DeVito lists four practices.

As you progress through your study of human communication, actively increase your own mindfulness (Langer, 1989):

- **Create and re-create categories.** Group things in different ways; remember that people are constantly changing, so the categories into which you may group them also should change. Learn to see objects, events, and people as belonging to a wide variety of categories. Try to see, for example, your prospective romantic partner in a variety of roles child, parent, employee, neighbor, friend, financial contributor, and so on.
- **Be open to new information and points of view.** This is perhaps especially important when these contradict your most firmly held beliefs. New information forces *you* to reconsider what might be outmoded ways of thinking and can help *you* challenge long-held but now inappropriate beliefs and attitudes.
- **Beware of relying too heavily on first impressions.** Treat first impressions as tentative, as hypotheses that need further investigation. Be prepared to revise, reject, or accept these initial impressions.
- **Think before you act.** Especially in delicate situations such as anger or commitment messages, it's wise to pause and think over the situation mindfully. In this way you'll stand a better chance of acting and reacting appropriately (DeVito, 2012, p. 22)

Given the colon at the end of the first sentence, the practices mentioned seem to be drawn from the declarative and correlative procedural knowledge found in Langer’s 1989 *Mindfulness*.

In his delineation of mindfulness, DeVito offers four ways of increasing mindfulness attributed to Langer. While “create new categories” and “be open to information and points of view” are drawn from Langer, “Beware of relying too heavily on first impressions” and “Think before you act” are not. In her chapter on “The Nature of Mindfulness,” Langer discusses two cognitive dispositions which she includes in her delineation of mindfulness, “Control over context” and “process before outcome.” Neither of these cognitive dispositions correspond to “Beware of relying too heavily on first impressions” and “Think before you act.” DeVito’s account of Langer’s view is misleading.

It is instructive to match Langer’s discourse (1989) with DeVito’s

Langer’s discourse	DeVito’s delineation of Langer’s conception:
... “the key qualities of a mindful state of being:	“Mindfulness is a state of awareness

<p>“(1) creation of new categories; (2) openness to new information; and (3) awareness of more than one perspective.”</p> <p>[For Langer, these dispositions are “qualities” of a mindful state and are present together with each other.]</p>	<p>in which you're conscious of your reasons for thinking or behaving.” [does not correspond to Langer’s text and is presented in the syntax of a definition—“Mindfulness is ...”]</p>
<p>(L1) Creation of new categories: “Categorizing and re-categorizing, labeling and relabeling as one masters the world are processes natural to children. They are adaptive and inevitable part of surviving in the world. Freud recognized the importance of creation and mastery in childhood. [He wrote] Should we not look for the first traces of imaginative activity as early as in childhood? The child’s best-loved and most intense occupation is with his play or games. Might we not say that every child at play behaves like a creative writer, in the he creates a world of his own, or rather, re-arranges the things of his world in a new way which pleases him.”</p>	<p>(D1) “Create and re-create categories. Group things in different ways; remember that people are constantly changing, so the categories into which you may group them also should change. Learn to see objects, events, and people as belonging to a wide variety of categories. Try to see, for example, your prospective romantic partner in a variety of roles child, parent, employee, neighbor, friend, financial contributor, and so on.”</p> <p>[The conception of a category in this paragraph is logical. Langer’s conception of a category is imaginative. It is closer to a prototypical conception than a logical conception. ⁹²]</p>
<p>(L2) Openness to new information: For Langer “mindfully engaged individuals will actively attend to changed signals. Behavior generated from mindful listening or watching, from an expanding, increasingly differentiated information base, is, of course, likely to be more effective.” Openness to new information involves being “open to cues, to another point of view.</p> <p>[Note that DeVito collapses the two characteristics into one, which suggests that awareness of more than one perspective is equivalent to receiving new information.]</p>	<p>(D2) Be open to new information and points of view. This is perhaps especially important when these contradict your most firmly held beliefs. New information forces <i>you</i> to reconsider what might be outmoded ways of thinking and can help <i>you</i> challenge long-held but now inappropriate beliefs and attitudes.</p> <p>[In DeVito’s gloss on “open to new information” the concept of “contradiction” plays a prominent role which is in the semantic network of logic. For Langer, contradiction is not a factor. See (L3)]</p>
<p>(L3) Awareness of more than one perspective:</p> <p>“Once we become mindfully aware of views other than our own, we start to realize that there are as many different views as there are different observers.”</p> <p>[Langer goes on the point out that the same event can be understood from different perspectives even though they might seem to cancel each other out.]</p>	
	<p>(D3) Beware of relying too heavily on first impressions. Treat first impressions as tentative, as hypotheses that need further investigation. Be prepared to revise, reject, or accept these initial impressions.</p>
	<p>(D4) Think before you act. Especially in delicate situations such as anger or commitment messages, it’s wise to pause and think over the situation mindfully. In this way you’ll stand a better chance of acting and reacting appropriately</p>
<p>(L4) Control over Context. [reframing] “Patients are often certain that pain is inevitable in a hospital. Caught in such a mindset, they assume that, without the help of medication, pain cannot be controlled. In our experiment, we tried to learn whether people could control their experience of pain by putting it in a different, more optimistic context. “</p>	

⁹² See George Lakoff’s *Women Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (1987).

(L5) **Process Before Outcome.** "... we can see mindfulness as a process orientation." ... "A true process orientation also means being aware that every outcome is preceded by a process." For instance, "Awareness of the process of making real choices along the way makes it less likely that we will feel guilty in retrospect. After all, mindful choices are perceived to offer some benefit, or why would we intentionally make them? On occasion, after learning the consequences of a choice, we may wish we had chosen differently, but we still tend not to be quite as hard on ourselves when we know why we did what we did."

Table 3

Of course, DeVito is within his rights to adapt Langer to his purposes. However, the slant toward logic, rationality, and information is close to the opposite of what Langer means by "mindfulness."

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2. The procedure recommended could not be considered an application of the declarative knowledge identified in the textbox

Resolving Ambiguity

Here are a few ambiguous situations; for each, indicate what you would say to resolve the ambiguity. If possible, try to share your responses with others in a small group and perhaps combine responses to come up with the ideal way to reduce the ambiguity. Or responses from a larger group can be written on index cards (anonymously), collected, and read aloud for the entire group to evaluate.

1. You've been dating Pat on and off for the past six months. Today, Pat asks you to come to dinner and meet the parents. You're not sure if this means that Pat wants to get more serious (which you do not want) or if it's a simple dinner invitation with no additional motives. How might you **disambiguate** this dinner invitation message?
2. At an appraisal interview, your supervisor says that your work over the last six months has improved considerably-then smiles and says, "But there's always more that I need to do;" and then nonverbally indicates that the interview is over and you can return to work. Since you're considering other job offers, you want to know in more detail how your current employer sees you and your prospects for advancement. How might you **disambiguate** this job appraisal?
3. You receive an e-mail invitation to address the eighth-grade class of your local middle school on careers in communication. The invitation said little more than that a conference on careers is planned and that they'd like to schedule you as one of the speakers. This is too ambiguous for you; you need to know in more detail what will be expected of you. How might you **disambiguate** this invitation to speak?

Messages and *relationships* are often *ambiguous*; instead of *assuming one interpretation is right and another wrong*, it may be useful to try **to disambiguate the message and find out more clearly what the speaker means.**

Textbox 5

That “communication is ambiguous” is the declarative knowledge in this textbox and the correlative procedural knowledge is “reducing ambiguity” by “disambiguating” the message (2012, pp. 17-18). How to disambiguate is specified as “*instead of assuming one interpretation is right and another wrong, it may be useful to try to disambiguate the message and find out more clearly what the speaker means.*”

This is hardly an adequate specification of the relation between ambiguity and the procedure of disambiguating. How could one “find out *more clearly*” what someone else means? If the listener is not “clear” about what a given expression means, whatever ambiguity is involved is related to the listener not the speaker. In my view, there are two ways of reducing ambiguity—(1) one is by examining all of the possible meanings that can be inferred from the utterance and (2) the other is by asking, directly or indirectly, the speaker to clarify what he or she meant. The “Resolving Ambiguity” textbox asks: “How might you disambiguate this ... message?” leaving both approaches open. The three “choice points” textboxes ask “what might you say to reduce the ambiguity?” which suggests only the second approach:

In the first approach clarifying meaning involves considering the meanings that are not covered by the conventional meanings of words. Ordinarily, “in the process of communication, the ‘sender’s’ communicative intention becomes mutual knowledge” (Levinson, 2000, p. 16) because of the conventional nature of language use. On the other hand, the conventional content of what is said “does not include all the inferences that can be made from (a) what is said and (b) all the available facts about the world known to participants” (Levinson, 2000, p. 15) which are the pragmatic dimension of utterances.

Granting that students would be hard pressed to identify “all the inferences that can be made” about the remarks in question, and given the fact that the “Relationship Ambiguity” choice points textbox containing one of the scenarios in the “Resolving Ambiguity textbox” on the same page, students would be likely to construe “disambiguating” as asking, directly or indirectly, the speaker to clarify what he or she meant. Since we do not have access to another person’s thoughts, determining what his or her intentions are depends upon whether he or she discloses them. Thus, the most direct way of finding out what someone else means is to get them to disclose their intentions. This would not be possible unless, in some way, the person was asked what they were.

However, this procedure would not work in the choice points scenarios. In two of the situations described in these textboxes, asking the speaker what he means is more likely to initiate an evasive response than a response that clarifies the meaning of the remark in question.

The three COMMUNICATION CHOICE POINT textboxes: Irreversibility, Silence, and Content and Relationship Messages all propose prompting the speaker to disclose his or her intentions by saying something about them.

CONTENT AND RELATIONSHIP MESSAGES: An older relative frequently belittles you, though always in a playful way. But it’s uncomfortable and probably not very good for your self-esteem. You’re determined to stop the behavior but not lose the relationship. **What do you say? Through what channel?** (2012, p. 24)

Textbox 6

SILENCE: Your partner (who is extremely sensitive to criticism) talks constantly. There is never any silence, which you desperately crave. You're determined to combat this and create periods of occasional silence. Yet, you don't want to start an argument. **What are some of the things you might say? What are some of the things you'd want to be sure not to say? How might you introduce the topic?** (2012, p. 23)

Textbox 7

IRREVERSIBILITY: You post a really negative remark on your friend's Facebook wall. The next day you realize you shouldn't have been so negative. You really want to remain friends. You need to say something. **What are your options for communicating your feelings? What communication channels could you use?** (2012, p. 20)

Textbox 8

In each case, the person in the situation who must be addressed may be offended by the interlocutor's responses. In each case, the goal is to preserve the relationship. All three scenarios call for a rhetorical response to the situation which is not necessarily governed by the concepts identified.

The "older relative" scenario clearly involves socio-cultural conventions associated with the relationship between an older relative and a person who is younger. Recalling the discussion of the concept of the content-relationship dimensions of communication, would a valid performance in this case be to send a meta-message to the older relative? (In Watzlawick and Tannen's views meta-messages are usually the carriers of the relational aspect of a communication.) The secondary question, "through what channel?" would seem to imply that this would be an appropriate response. Whatever response might be chosen, the concept most relevant to the situation is the rhetorical "effect" discussed on in the section on "Elements of Communication" (2012, p. 12). In any case, it would be difficult to answer the questions in the textbox on the basis of the declarative knowledge identified—"content and relationship messages" without offering an example and explaining its rhetorical force, students would be likely to fall back on their past experiences of similar situations rather than "theorize" their response.

The other two scenarios are similar. In the "silence" scenario, the passage in the chapter on "cultural sensitivity" and communication competence are more relevant than the concept of silence, which by the way, is not a "key term" in the chapter and appears only in discussions of cultural differences. In the "irreversibility" scenario, the concept is not central to the verbal performance requested, which has to do with making amends with a friend. Again, a rhetorical matter.

Given these considerations, of the scenarios in which students are asked to disambiguate ambiguity, only 1 paring can be considered probable. The other 2 are "questionable."

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3. The declarative knowledge to be paired with the procedures called for in the textboxes was difficult, if not impossible, to specify

There is another obstacle to making the appropriate connections between declarative and procedural knowledge in *Human Communication: The Basic Course* 2012, namely the location of the textboxes which made it difficult to specify the theory to which the requested performance was to apply.

3a. the "what do you believe about communication" textbox

The main textbox in the section of the chapter "Elements of Communication" is a test: "What Do You Believe about Communication?" The questions are very general true or false questions—e.g., "Good communicators are born, not made," true or false? The statements about communication presented in the textbox are all false generalities. From the perspective of learning theory, they are not conceptually related to any of the elements of communication discussed in this section.

There are three performance requests: (1) "Consider how these beliefs about communication influence the way you communicate, (2) Then, as you read this book and participate in class discussions and activities, reexamine your beliefs about communication and (3) consider how new beliefs would influence the way you communicate" (2012, p. 8). Since none of these performance requests is linked to the declarative knowledge in the section, they cannot be considered a pairing of theory and practical procedure constituting a belief transformation.

3b. the "tips" textbox

The chapter lists six major elements in human communication: (1) context, (2) sources-receivers, (3) messages, (4) channels, (5) noise, and (6) effects. Messages are broken down into (3a) meta-messages, (3b) feedback messages, and (3c) feed-forward messages. (2012, p. 10). Four types of noise are listed (5a) physical, (5b) physiological, (5c) psychological, and (5d) semantic (2012, pp. 11-12). Three effects are identified (6a) intellectual or cognitive, (6b) affective, and (psychomotor) (2012, p. 12). In table 1, the elements are identified by red text in brackets inserted into the text of "Communication Tips."

If you're the sighted person and are talking with a visually impaired person:

- Identify yourself [(2) source]. Don't assume the visually impaired person will recognize your voice.
- Face your listener [(2) receiver]; you'll be easier to hear. Don't shout. Most people who are visually impaired are not hearing impaired. Speak at your normal volume.
- Because your gestures, eye movements, and facial expressions [(4) channel] cannot be seen by the visually impaired listener, encode into speech all the meanings you wish to communicate.
- Use audible turn-taking cues [(3b) feedback messages]. When you pass the role of speaker to a person who is visually impaired, don't rely on nonverbal cues; instead, say something like "Do you agree with that, Joe?"
- Use normal vocabulary and discuss topics [(3) messages] that you would discuss with sighted people. Don't avoid terms like "see" or "look" or even "blind." Don't avoid discussing a television show or the way your new car looks; these are normal topics for all people.

If you are a visually impaired person, interacting with a sighted person:

- Help the sighted person meet your special communication needs. If you want your surroundings described [(1) context], ask. If you want the person to read the road signs.
- Be patient with the sighted person. Many people are nervous talking with people who are visually impaired for fear of offending [(6) effects]. Put them at ease in a way that also makes you more comfortable.

Textbox 9

Despite the references to the elements of communication, the recommended procedures, conceptually, are related to competent communicating, in particular to mindfulness.

In a later section of Chapter 1, five characteristics of the competent communicator are identified: thinks critically and mindfully; is culturally sensitive, ethical, and an effective listener (2012, pp. 22-25). The five tips in table 1 which are procedures — "don't assume," "face your listener," "encode into speech all the meanings you wish to communicate," "Use audible turn-taking cues," and "use normal vocabulary and discuss topics that you would discuss with sighted people" — can be related to mindfulness: "you need to be mindful of the unique communication situation you're in, of your available communication options, and of the reasons why one option is likely to be better than the others" (2013, 22).

Being mindful is not directly connected to the semantic network of the elements of communication. The connections between declarative knowledge of the elements of communication and the advised procedures are weak enough to be considered "questionable." For instance, not assuming a visually impaired person will *recognize your voice* is not in the same conceptual domain as identifying yourself as a *source*. So numerous inferences are required to make the connection.

Consider the tip: "Identify yourself. Don't assume the visually impaired person will recognize your voice" (2012, p. 11). Given the definition of a source/receiver as an encoder/decoder (2012, p. 11), it might be difficult to connect this declarative knowledge with the procedure "identify yourself." However, not assuming that someone will recognize your voice, depending on the circumstances, would be in the same conceptual domain as "mindfulness." Given the location of the textbox in the middle of the section on the elements of communication, it would be difficult for readers to sort out whether these tips are examples of using conceptions of the elements of communication or of the characteristics of competent communicators which are delineated 11 pages later. The connections would have to be inferred. This would be possible if the section on communication competence preceded the major elements section. Since the communication competence section occurs two sections after the textbox, making the connection to mindfulness would be questionable. Thus, to a typical reader, the tips textbox concerns the elements of communication.

As it stands, the procedural knowledge in the "communication tips" textbox is difficult to align with the declarative knowledge in the chapter. That readers would make the appropriate connections is questionable and the possibility of a belief transformation remote.

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4. The "nominal" pairing of declarative procedural knowledge.

The COMMUNICATION CHOICE POINT textboxes

	Concepts	Requested performances	Comments:
5	Irreversibility	What are your options for communicating your feelings? What communication channels could you use?	Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. How to perform them is not specified.
6	Silence	What are some of the things you might say? What are some of the things you'd want to be sure not to say? How might you introduce the topic?	Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. . How to perform them is not specified.
7	Content and Relationship Messages	What do you say? Through what channel?	Generally students are left to depend on their own experience to perform these tasks. How to perform them is not specified.

Textbox 10

In these textboxes, there are no specifications about how to perform the cognitive tasks involved and the performances, in Reif's terms, are nominal.

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Reading and Analyzing Discourses

Chapter 11 Conclusion

ABSTRACT:

In these concluding remarks, I focus on four benefits of Logistical Discourse Analysis (LDA). First, most if not all of the types of LDA can be computerized. Second, it can be used to foster scientific inquiry in students. Third, it can be used to add to the existing data base developed by members of the Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research (SCLCR). And fourth, it can be used to create a simple information system for published research.

CONTENT:

11.0 Conclusion:

11.1 [LDA and Computational Linguistics](#)

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11.3 [LDA and The Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research](#)

11.4 [LDA and Online Research Archives](#)

11.1 LDA and Computational Linguistics

In chapter 8, "Analyzing Conceptual Change in Research Publications" I offered an example of computer assisted LDA. I am not an experienced programmer, but developing computer programs for LDA with Microsoft's Visual Basic tool has persuaded me that far more can be done with computer applications.

In *Computational and Quantitative Studies* (Webster, 2002-2009, pp. 239-267), Michael Halliday traces the development of computational linguistics from the 1955 to 1995. He identifies four turning points, the last of which involves the introduction of "fuzzy logic" by Lotfi Zadeh into discussions of artificial intelligence. This development made it possible to compute with words rather than numbers:

... Computing with words "enhances the ability of machines to mimic the human mind, and points to a flaw in the foundation of science and engineering." He also observed that, while human reasoning is "overwhelmingly expressed through the medium of words," people are only taught to compute with numbers – they are never taught how to compute with words. Commenting on the formulation "computing with words," Zadeh glossed "computing" as "computing and reasoning," and "words" as "strings of words not very small." (2009, p. 233)

For Halliday these developments opened the door to describing texts in the categories of functional linguistics. In the context of LDA, there are developments in computational linguistics that match the units of analysis pertinent to each type of analysis.

Computational discourse analysis has been developed in the areas of text organization, text segmentation, discourse coherence, and anaphora resolution (Mitkov, 2013). All of these issues pertain to the discourse analysis of conceptual change.

In the example of analyzing the news stories about the sexual harassment trial involving the NY Knicks, conceptual blending was the core conception. Several computational discourse analyses of conceptual blending have been undertaken. In chapter 8 of *The Cognitive Science of Science*, "The AHA! Experience: Creativity Through Emergent Binding in Neural Networks," Paul Thagard and Terrence C. Stewart note that "Our account of creativity as based on representation combination is similar to the idea of blending (conceptual integration) developed by Fauconnier and Turner (2002), *which is modeled computationally by Pereira* (2007). (2012, p. 139, italics mine).

In "Blending Basics" Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley, note that:

Veale and O'Donoghue (2000) provide a computational rationale for many of the concepts in blending theory. For example, the integration process completion can be seen to be implemented via the process of spreading activation through a semantic network. A semantic network is a model of conceptual structure in which concepts are represented as hierarchies of interconnected concept nodes. On this sort of a model, the relationships between concepts are represented by the path or paths through which activation would have to spread to get from one concept to another. (2000, p. 181)

A few pages later, they add that:

Veale and O'Donoghue show that the optimality principles can be algorithmically implemented, and demonstrate the computational tractability of conceptual blending theory. Moreover, they argue that the computational perspective offered by their model can contribute new insights to blending theory. (2000, pp. 186-187)

With respect to the analysis of narrative structures, Ralph Grishman who discusses frames and narrative in his chapter on "Discourse Analysis and Information Structuring" in *Computational Linguistics: An Introduction* (1986) more recently in his "Information Extraction" discusses the relations between extraction and event extraction (2013, pp. 517-530) which are centrally pertinent to identifying narrative structures. Relations between characters in a story are the basis of narrative functions. Events are the basis of stories.

In the chapter on evaluating textbooks, I made extensive use of Frederic Reif's learning model of a belief transformation that depends upon being able to use declarative knowledge in a procedure. Jan van Eijck and Christina Unger's *Computation Semantics with Functional Programming concerns*:

Computational semantics [which] is the art and science of computing meaning in natural language. The meaning of a sentence is derived from the meanings of the individual words in it, and this process can be made so precise that it can be implemented on a computer. ... This text shows how to compute meaning using the functional programming language Haskell. It deals with both denotational meaning (where meaning comes from knowing the conditions of truth in situations), and operational meaning (where meaning is an instruction for performing cognitive action). (2010, p. i)

In the context of Reif's model of learning van Eijck and Unger's "denotation" corresponds to "declarative knowledge" and their "operational meaning" corresponds to "procedural knowledge."

These developments suggest that the Logistical discourse analyses I propose, with respect to data collection, can be computerized. This is an important consideration as the analyses are detailed and time-consuming when done manually even with the assistance of computer macros. Also the design of LDA permits huge data sets, for instance, the corpus of a given researcher's publications or a collection of publications on a common method, e.g., frame analysis.

End of 11.1 LDA and Computational Linguistics. 11.2 [LDA and Scientific Inquiry](#) follows.

11.2 LDA and Scientific Inquiry

Becoming a scientist requires learning to think like one. Scientific research moves from the development of a problematic (hypothesis) along a path toward its resolution, however temporary. An integral part of this process is the movement from initial conceptions of the problem to more and more accurate re-conceptions of it. This movement is characteristic of scientific thinking and involves conceptual change. To educate communication scholars as scientists requires teaching them to re-conceptualize. Logistical discourse analysis of scientific publications reveals the way researchers re-conceptualize their problematics and is a tool for learning how to think like a scientist.

Logistical Discourse Analysis was developed in the context of the study of communication. It is a method for systematically tracking conceptual changes in the research discourses published by communication scholars. Re-conceptualization (conceptual change) involving conceptual blending is central to scientific inquiry which depends upon cognitive acts of "discovery" (Thagard & Findlay, 2012, p. 101 ff.).

Persons are not born scientists.⁹³ Becoming a scientist requires educating persons to think like scientists. This applies to researchers who study communication.

A Major Part of Scientific Development is the Introduction of New Conceptions

In *The Cognitive Science of Science* (Thagard & Findlay, 2012), Paul Thagard contends that conceptual change continues to be a critical area of research for several reasons:

"First . . . a major part of scientific development is the introduction of new concepts. . ."

"Second," the ways in which we change our conceptions is a crucial component of our education.

"The third reason why conceptual change is an important topic . . . results from its relevance to science education" (pp. 195-196).⁹⁴

These three reasons for studying conceptual change form a causal chain: understanding how we acquire and change our beliefs is a critical condition for developing "educational techniques that are more effective than the current ones," which, in turn, is vital to the growth of scientific knowledge through new concepts.

⁹³ Note: "Science" and "scientist" are used here in the broad sense of systematic conceptualization and re-conceptualization generally involving problem solving.

⁹⁴ Considerable interest in this topic, Thagard observes, was stimulated by the publication of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* in 1962 when Kuhn argued that textbooks have to be rewritten in whole or in part whenever revolutions in the language, problem-structure, or standards of normal science occur. The idea that scientific theories could be overthrown shocked many of his readers.

LDA Reveals Changes

LDA is designed to describe the development of research conceptions. It is a tool for analyzing:

- discourse(s), specifically research discourses concerning communication;
- the way terms are used, modified, and maintained by researchers; and
- the evolution of the conceptions underlying terms used in different projects over time.

As such, LDA educates persons in the way scientists think by following the unfolding discursive expression of their cognitive activity. Concepts figure prominently in the hypotheses or warranting assumptions that govern research. Though textbooks may present them as stable and unchanging, the discourse analysis of scientific publications reveals the opposite. Research is an elaborate and often lengthy process that takes scientists from initial hypotheses and routes them toward various re-conceptions to tentative conclusions. LDA is an analytical tool that describes these conceptual shifts.

The description of a conceptual change can only be accomplished comparatively—Conception #1 in discourse #1 containing concepts "a," "b," "c," "d," and "e" is the basis of comparison for Conception #1 in discourse #2 containing concepts "a," "c," "d," "e," and "f." The comparison reveals that the change in conception #1 from discourse #1 to discourse #2 is the omission of concept "b" and the addition of concept "f." Such changes are often undetectable when the discourses are separated in time, sometimes by years. The retention of concepts "a," "c," "d" and "e" often creates the impression that conception #1 has not changed. Conceptual changes usually require detailed comparative analyses of the sort provided by LDA. Showing students how the evolution of conceptual changes in conceptions shows them the paths scientific inquiry takes which is available to them.

End of 11.2 LDA and Scientific Inquiry. 11.3 [LDA and The Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research](#) follows.

11.3 LDA and The Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research

Conceptual Logistics is a model of conceptual change as it occurs in scientific discourse (http://c-cs.us/sclcr/CL/conceptual_logistics.html). As earlier chapters of this monograph indicate, it is a response to the difficulty students have in learning how to think like scientists (See *An Introductory Textbook to the Field of Communication Studies: A Critical Study*.) The *SCLCR Toolkit* is a database housing the *SCLCR-Lexicon* as well as various tools for learning how to think like a scientist. Logistical Discourse Analysis was developed to facilitate submitting entries into *the SCLCR-Toolkit*.

The SCLCR-Lexicon

In 2009, the Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research (SCLCR) was founded by James J. Sosnoski, Gordon Carlson, and Jordan Stalker with the aim of compiling an online encyclopedic lexicon of the way conceptions are used, modified, and maintained in communication research (hence logistics). The basic unit in the SCLCR Lexicon (SCLCR-L) is a "conception." Though the compilers of lexicons usually consider their basic units to be words, SCLCR-L is domain specific (conceptions used in communication research). Most lexicons devoted to theoretical concepts (domain specific contexts) usually have titles such as *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, *Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind*, or *Keywords*. However, since the cognitive linguistic approach we take in developing the lexicon is one in which meaning is identified with conceptualization, the basic unit of SCLCR-L is a conception. As one of the founders, I proposed that SCLCR-L be based on Ronald Langacker's view that

... meaning is a cognitive phenomenon and must eventually be analyzed as such. Cognitive grammar therefore equates meaning with conceptualization (explicated as cognitive processing). (Foundations, Langacker, 2002b, p. 5)

As a symbol for the process of conceptualization, the term conception refers to "invention, innovation, excogitation, ... design -- the creation of something in the mind" (Wordnet —Princeton University's Lexical Database for English), adding that conceptions are used in a particular way at a particular time in a particular situation. From this perspective, research, which is a complex cognitive process spanning a period of time, conception seems the most appropriate unit for the SCLCR-L.

In his Preface to the Anniversary edition of *Concept, Image, and Symbol*, Langacker acknowledges that: "a number of important theoretical developments and directions of research have come to the fore only in recent years and thus are not well represented in this volume" (2002a, p. xi). Among the developments to which he refers is "dynamicity, pertaining to the temporal dimension of conceptualization" (xi). He notes that "How conceptions unfold through processing time, on different time scales, is a significant aspect of linguistic meaning" (xi).

Unfortunately, it is only in his later work, and then quite briefly that his analyses go beyond the sentence and concern discourse (Cognitive Grammar, 2008, pp. 457-499). The dynamicity of discursive language-use is central to the SCLCR Lexicon. Conceptual logistics involves the analyses of conceptual, innovation, maintenance, modification, and evolution as they are described in research discourses.

In addition, the circumstance that the meaning of a term used in a research project often changes during the research process is a factor that needs to be taken into account in treating various senses of a term which are acquired as it is used (Section 6, "Meaning Extensions and Change," in "The Lexicon," Cruse, 2003, pp. 257-259). The research process is usually presented to other researchers as a *fait accompli* in publications about it. This tends to glaze over the modifications of a term that are required as difficulties are encountered. (In SCLCR-L, the expression, "conceptual logistics," refers to the extensions and changes in the meaning of a term over time.)

The Structure of the SCLCR-Lexicon

Entries to the SCLCR-Lexicon describe the **use** of a conception

1. First, the name (term) of the conception must be identified.
2. Second, the author of the conception must be identified
3. Third, the context in which the conception was used must be cited.
4. Fourth, its conceptual or semantic network must be described.
5. Fifth, its diachronic relation to other conceptions (before or after) must be identified.

Hence the following fields in the SCLCR database:

- Term
- Author
- Conception / Embedded concepts
- Publication / Notes on the context of use
- Year

The focal concept being described is entered into the field, "term." The person who is using this term in a research publication is entered into the field, "author." His conception of the focal concept is described in the field, "conception." The correlative field, "embedded concepts" in which the "ancillary concepts" are enumerated provides a semantic network for understanding how the author uses the term. The field, "publication," refers to the prototypical background frame—the research project in which the focal term is used. The "Notes on the context of use" field briefly describes the research project, usually with respect to its problematic. The field, "year," provides a frame for relating this particular use of the focal concept to other uses.

Consider the parallel to Charles Fillmore's frame semantics:

The notion can be exemplified with the Commercial Transaction Frame, whose elements include a buyer, a seller, goods, and money. ... Among the large set of semantically related verbs linked to this frame are buy, sell, pay, spend, cost, and charge, each of which indexes or evokes different aspects of the frame. The verb buy focuses on the buyer and the goods, back-grounding the seller and the money; sell focuses on the seller and the goods, back-grounding the buyer and the money; pay focuses on the buyer, the money, and the seller, back-grounding the goods; and so on. The idea is that knowing the meaning of any one of these verbs requires knowing what takes place in a commercial transaction and knowing the meaning of any one verb means, in some sense, knowing the meaning of all of them. The knowledge and experience structured by the Commercial Transaction Frame provide the background and motivation for the categories represented by the words. The words, that is, the linguistic material, evoke the frame (in the mind of a speaker/hearer); the interpreter (of an utterance or a text in which the words occur) invokes the frame. ("Frame Semantics," Petruck, 1996)

Compare the structure of seller sells goods to a buyer for money to Searle's conception of speech acts (1969, pp. 16-17). In both cases, you have an agent (author), an action (conceptualization), (a standard situation) an implied audience and a relation to other authors, publications, and conceptions (a semantic network. The "prototype background frame" in the SCLCR-Lexicon is "communication research." There are five elements in this frame: An Author published a Conception of a Term in a Book/article in a particular Year (A published C of T in B in Y). Given the "prototype background frame" "communication research," users of the SCLCR-L know that this publication is about its author's research.

For Fillmore and colleagues the central unit in the analysis is a "frame." And that frame evokes a typical experience. In SCLCR-L the unit is a "conception" which can be understood as a frame[work] in Fillmore's sense. As I implied in the previous paragraph, the five frame elements in the SCLCR-L matrix refer to a typical communication research project. (From a cognitive standpoint these five frame elements can be increased to nine taking into account the roles of the semantic and episodic memory systems of both the author and the audience. See my discussion of the cognitive-functional model of communicating in 11.4 [LDA and Online Research Archives](#) of this "Conclusion.")

In the SCLCR-L frames are embedded in frames. There are various "layers" that can be made to appear in the concept maps accompanying the conception entry. The framing frame, so to speak, is communication research. Within this frame is the frame, conception, which has to be understood as the action of conceptualizing. Within that frame are the ancillary concepts that make up the description of the conception, each of which is itself a concept frame (implying a conceptualization) as it delineates a "stage" of the implied process.

The lexicon is in the process of being built. We have targeted as our model FrameNet. The digital lexicon we will eventually produce depends on the design of our search engines. Given the circumstance that we are not in the position of searching copyrighted discourses, we have to rely on contributors who describe them in a format we can search in particular ways to create entries based on the work of the contributors. We are not claiming that our project is an instance of frame semantic analysis but that it is based on approximations of it which we hope will become increasingly refined. We do not expect that its initial design will remain fixed and welcome comments on it.

The SCLCR-Lexicon and FrameNet

The SCLCR Lexicon is a project in usage-based computational lexicography, now in its third year." The project's key features are (a) a commitment to usage based evidence for semantic generalizations, and (b) the representation of the semantic networks of its target terms based on frame semantics. The resulting database contains (a) descriptions of the semantic frameworks (conceptions) underlying the meanings of the concept described, and (b) the representation of terms and technical phrases within its semantic network, each accompanied by (c) a collection of annotated context of use attestations within the entry. This overview will present the project's goals, workflow, and information about the "tools" that have been adapted or created in-house for this work.

The SCLCR Lexicon project produces modified frame-semantic descriptions of technical terms in communication research and backs up these descriptions with annotated attestations from relevant research publications. These descriptions are based on hand-tagged semantic annotations of keywords extracted from the descriptions and systematic analysis of the semantic patterns they exemplify. The primary emphasis of the project therefore is the encoding, by humans, of semantic knowledge in machine-readable form. The intuition of the contributors is guided by and constrained by the use of semantically coded entry forms. The conceptual domains to be covered are: terms, authors, conceptions, embedded concepts, citations, dates, context of use, and related visualizations. (See "11.4 LDA and Online Research Archives" in this chapter.)

The results of the ongoing project are (a) a lexical resource, called the SCLCR Toolkit (a database which includes the SCLCR-Lexicon), (b) associated software tools, (c) visualizations of the conceptions, and (d) related documents. The database has three major components (described in more detail below):

- Frame Database containing descriptions of each frame's basic conceptual structure and giving names and descriptions for the elements which participate in such structures. Several related entries in this database are schematized in Fig. 1.
- Lexicon containing entries which are composed of: (a) encyclopedic descriptions of communication research conceptions (b) algorithms which capture the semantic networks from the descriptions of conceptual frameworks; (c) links to research publications that illustrate each of the potential realization patterns identified in the algorithm (these are the sentences in the entry which illustrate the use of the concepts embedded in the focal concept or frame).
- Annotated contexts of use which provide empirical support for the conceptions in the SCLCR frame database.

These three components form a highly relational and tightly integrated whole: elements in each may point to elements in the other two.

Similar Conceptual Models

The SCLCR-Lexicon is in several ways similar to FrameNet which is based on Charles Fillmore's frame semantics (FS). In FS, the conceptual model is an "ACTION," involving the frame elements: agent, act, agency ("means"). In his example of the parent frame "transportation" frame, two other child frames, "driving" and "riding," are regarded as subordinate frames (sub-frames) and each includes frame elements (FE) that parallel the parent frame's FEs:

For example, the transportation frame, within the domain of motion, provides movers, means of transportation, and paths; sub-frames associated with individual words inherit all of these while possibly adding some of their own. Fig. 1 shows some of the sub-frames, as discussed below:

```
frame(transportation)
frame elements(mover(s), means, path)
scene(mover(s) move along path by means)

frame(driving)
inherit(transportation)
frame elements(driver (=mover), vehicle (=means), rider(s) (=mover(s)), cargo (=mover(s)))
scenes(driver starts vehicle, driver con- trols vehicle, driver stops vehicle)

frame(riding 1)
inherit(transportation)
frame elements(rider(s) (=mover(s)), vehicle (=means))
scenes(rider enters vehicle, vehicle carries rider along path, rider leaves vehicle )
```

Figure 1a: A subframe can inherit elements and semantics from its parent

In SCLCR-L the conceptual model is COMMUNICATION (author > discourse > implied audience > situation > conceptualization), a conceptual domain usually considered to be a subdomain of ACTION.

```
frame(DISCOURSE)
frame elements(text — string of sentences, discursive structures, cognitive abilities, implied situations)
scene(author(s) in a situation constructs a text by means of cognitive abilities.)

frame(ARGUMENT)
inherit(discourse)
frame elements(statements (=text), structures (=combinatory constraints — claims, grounds, warrants), inferences(s) (=cognitive abilities(s)), problem (=implied situation(s)))
```

scenes(author starts expressing concepts in logical order, author controls logical structure, abilities, author concludes the meaning construction with an inference about the problem)

Frame (NARRATIVE)

Inherit(discourse)

Frame elements (narrator) (narrative) (narrate)

scenes(author starts expressing concepts in chronological order, author controls narrative structure, abilities, author resolves the problem.)

Figure 1b: A subframe can inherit elements and semantics from its parent.

The argument frame, for example, specifies statements (as sentences in a text), a structure (a particularization of cognitive abilities), and inferences as the principal elements in the structure. In this frame, the argument initiates and controls the structure of the cognitive abilities.

If we were to describe the PUBLICATION frame, it would be a sub-frame of DISCOURSE and ARGUMENT / NARRATIVE sub-frames of PUBLICATION.

frame(PUBLICATION)

inherit(discourse)

frame elements(article(s) (=text(s)), research (=discursive structure) problem(=situation)

inferential sequence (=cognitive ability)

scenes(author publishes an article about his/her research addressing a problem)

Figure 1c

In the publication frame the primary role in the scene is the author of the article, and research is the activity that the author pursues.

As is clear from the above, the SCLCR-Lexicon is structured as a frame semantic network. However, it differs from FrameNet with respect to its methods. Whereas FrameNet seeks to find “concise formula[s] for all semantic and syntactic combinatorial possibilities together with a collection of annotated corpus sentences in which each possibility is exemplified,” the descriptive technique employed in the SCLCR-Lexicon project is more closely related to discourse analysis. As Sanders and Spooren note, “Discourse is often considered a crucial notion for understanding human communication” because language users, most of the time, communicate through discourses rather than sentences (“Discourse and Text Structure,” *Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Sanders & Spooren, 2007, p. 916).

In the SCLCR-Lexicon the primary unit of analysis is a conceptualization expressed as a discursive structure—a conception. From the point of view of expression, a discursive structure has an identifiable beginning, middle, and end—for example, an argument. Many discursive structures, an argument being one of them, comprise a set of concepts that correspond to a cognitive activity as it is expressed in language.

The “scene” of a research discourse is the process of solving a problem. Thus the implicit symbolic action in a research publication is a narrative describing the search for a solution to the problem. This narrative is usually “covert” rather than “overt” in publications about research projects. The story of the research project is condensed into an argument in most publications about it.

Thus to describe a conceptual frame that occurs in a research discourse requires analyzing how it functions within it. To identify a function in a system requires the identification of its structure. If we consider a discourse as a system of conceptualizations expressed in sentences, then the type of discursive structure in which the conception occurs determines its function.

For example, Charles R. Berger's complex argument about the reduction of uncertainty is expressed as a complex discursive structure. If a conception of “uncertainty” occurs in a sentence related to the other sentences in an argument it may function as a claim, warrant, or ground. Consider the following sentence that are included in the SCLCR-Lexicon’s entry on “uncertainty reduction.”

When strangers meet, their primary concern is one of uncertainty reduction or increasing predictability about the behavior of both themselves and others in the interaction. (warrant)

Uncertainty is “an aversive state” generating cognitive stress. (secondary warrant)

As the amount of verbal communication increases, the level of uncertainty decreases. (claim)

People experience uncertainty in interpersonal situations. (followed by cases, grounds)

These sentences have “functions” in Charles R. Berger’s complex argument which are noted in the parentheses. The first two sentences which describe his assumptions and the concept of uncertainty reduction have warranting functions. In the third, uncertainty reduction functions as a claim made about it. The last sentence does not couple uncertainty with reduction and refers to situations where uncertainty is experienced which provide the data in Berger's argument.

Discourse analysis involves relating the units of a discourse to discursive structures and then relating the discursive structures to a purpose. The purpose of research is in one sense or another to solve a problem. In Berger's case, the problem has to do with the alleviation of uncertainty because it is a stressful state. In the SCLCR-Lexicon the context of use and/or context of situation describe the problematic aspects of the situations in which the conception of uncertainty reduction is used.

Although it is not apparent at the surface, the SCLCR Lexicon is built by the use of LDA which underlies the assumptions upon which the entry form is based. Those assumptions parallel many of the assumptions in Frame Semantics. A key difference is that, unlike Frame Semantics, the object of analysis is a conception rather than a frame. As I have argued in the Introduction (see in particular 1.2.3 [“Conceptions and Conceptualization”](#)) conceptions are the linguistic expressions of conceptualizations

and involve numerous clause throughout texts. A “frame” is usually equated to a “concept.”

End of 11.3 LDA and The Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research. 11.4 [LDA and Online Research Archives](#) follows.

11.4 LDA and Online Research Archives

[Constructing a large database of research conceptions in Communications Study made me aware of the need for some sort of information system to facilitate complex searches. As a result, I developed a simple information system for labeling conceptions that can be used in conjunction with LDA which is based on the model of conceptual logistics.

What follows is taken from my original paper, an expanded version of which, “Coding Collected Research to Form a Simple Information System,” was co-authored with Gordon Carlson and published in the *International Journal of Sociotechnology and Knowledge Development* (2013).]

In certain respects, communication theory is an enigma⁹⁵—it is difficult to relate the theories underlying research projects to each other. Consulting bibliographies is often futile. The titles of research publications in Communication Studies are not related semantically. For example, agenda setting theory is not semantically related to framing theory but is often considered a species of framing theory. Students looking only at the titles would not make the connection. On the other hand, speech codes theory would seem to be related to speech act theory because they are semantically related. However relating Philipson’s conception of “codes” to Searle’s conception of “acts” would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Similarly, Kenneth Burke’s concept of symbolic action is semantically related to and considered an instance of symbolic interactionism. However, Burke views communication from the point of view of its author in one-way transactions and Mead/Blumer emphasize the dialogical character of communication. There is no semantic connection between standpoint theory and action assembly theory, yet, conceptually, they are more closely related than speech acts and codes. There are many other instances of the absence of cohesiveness in the discourses of communication researchers that can illustrate the difficulty of finding patterns of interrelations in their conceptions.⁹⁶ Semantic coherence, however, is not the problem. The problem is the lack of a descriptive system capable of marking the similarities and differences among theories more precisely.

Why is this a problem? If it is, how serious a problem is it? Whenever publications reach a certain mass, they go beyond the capability of the humans to remember where they are so that they can be found when needed. Take a simple example: a person begins to purchase books. At first, she has no difficulty in locating a book to which she needs to refer. At some point she will have to put her books in order to form a library. To do so, she must categorize them. Let’s say she organizes her books in the categories:

⁹⁵ According to Josh Jones, what made the German code produce by the enigma machine so difficult to decipher was the machine's "ability to encode messages without ever repeating a letter." In other words, the more pattern-less a communication is, the less decipherable it is. (<http://blogs.benchmarkdaily.com/2013/01/the-enigma-machine-how-alan-turing-helped-break-the-unbreakable-nazi-code.html>)

⁹⁶ I will hazard the generalization that the concepts used in communication research tend to be idiosyncratic. There are several possible reasons for this circumstance. Many concepts are borrowed from other disciplines and are not usually integrated with other concepts used in communication research. Neologisms are often treated as signature concepts whose relations to other concepts of communication are therefore not often disclosed. Numerous concepts are understood to belong to historical traditions or orientations—for example phenomenology or cybernetics—which do not readily fit with the concepts used in current research projects on texting or tweeting.

very interesting, not so interesting, not very interesting, and totally uninteresting. This idiosyncratic system might work well for her in as much as she would be likely to refer more often to the very interesting books than the totally uninteresting books. Consider the following thought experiment: imagine the library of congress organized along similar lines. Then imagine trying to find a book in it. Such idiosyncratic organization would depend upon the individual for whom books are “very interesting” and so on. Categorization is at the heart of data retrieval.

In contrast to Communication Studies, linguistics, whose research lexicon includes as many conflicting conceptions as are found in communication research, nonetheless features naming patterns that suggest interrelations. Lakoff and Chomsky have dramatically conflicting views of semantics but they are both views of semantics. There are numerous grammars but they are all attempts to describe grammar. There are numerous conceptions of discourse but they can all be collected in a Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Generally speaking, it is much easier to find patterns of conceptual interrelations in linguistic research than it is to find similar patterns in communication research. This is due to the circumstance that the different areas in language study are named consistently: phonology, morphology, syntax, grammar, semantics, and so on.

Since it would not be feasible to change the names of communication theories, there is a need for a notational system for describing communication research that would mark similarities and differences. Such a notational system would not be in any way prescriptive. It would be designed to show the inter-relatedness of communication research. A notational system could be based on "the context of use" and the semantic relations of the conceptual models that have been used by researchers. Since communication occurs in some context and requires semantic frameworks, any research into communication events has to take into account the semantic networks and the contexts involved—interpersonal, political, mass media, and so on. It would be quite helpful to have a notational system to describe typical communication events that are studied by researchers in these respects. The task of creating such a notational system may seem as daunting as solving the riddle of the enigma code during WWII, but it is possible.

Ordinarily, models of communication are based on the *sine qua non* components of communicating. They include, at least, five components. I will stipulate that these five components of communicating can be found in most models of communication.

Code		
Sender/receiver	message/channel/noise	Receiver/sender
context		

This “traditional” model modifies the linear model by adding a dialogical aspect (represented by “sender/receiver” component suggesting changes in roles by the persons involved). The traditional model can be considered to have its origins in the linear Shannon/Weaver model (1949) which was modified by Wilbur Schramm (1954).

As conceived by Schramm, the traditional model regard communicating as a system in the sense that each component functions in relation to the other components to produce a communicating event.

From the perspective of Functional Linguistics, the components of the traditional model need to be renamed to reflect their *function* in the system and from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics other components need to be added.

Unlike the traditional model which identifies only the public components of communicating, the cognitive-functional model⁹⁷ I use to describe theorems about communicating adds four “private” functions to account for the cognitive aspects of communicating events. Since persons are involved, one has to acknowledge that cognitive frameworks are involved. Two are especially critical, namely, the functions of semantic and episodic memory systems. Every person involved in a communicating event is influenced by his or her memory systems. The semantic memory stores concepts and the episodic memory stores experiences. Both memory systems are private and not accessible to observers. However, the symbol systems used in communicating *reflect* them. If a communicator uses a particular concept or refers to a particular experience, we do not know precisely how she understands or experiences the events. We only have access to the public symbols produced.

Since communication theory often involves conceptions that attribute meanings to those involved in the event by using terms such as “intends,” “means,” “feels,” and so on, it is necessary to consider the cognitive functions of the private components of communicating. Their functions are to contextualize (to locate an experience in epistemic memory) and to pre-textualize (to locate a concept in semantic memory) textual data. Both concepts and experiences are activated by a text but they activate concepts and experiences that existed in the communicator’s or communicatee’s minds BEFORE the text. Including the private spheres adds four functions to the model:

communicator’s pretext* > COMMUNICATOR > communicator’s context* >	Cultural Codes TEXT Reference to experience (Situation)	< communicatee’s pretext* < COMMUNICATEE < communicatee’s context*
---	--	---

* “Context” abbreviates “contextualize” and “pretext” abbreviates “pre-textualize.”
[The concepts in bold CAPS refer to public aspects of communicating. The concepts in small case are public only to the extent that they are in the text.]⁹⁸

⁹⁷ See Jan Nuyts, “Cognitive Linguistics and Functional Linguistics” (2007), for an account of correspondences between the two.

⁹⁸ In any *moment* of a communicating event the persons who are involved bring to the public event different cognitive frameworks which are private. Those frameworks are expressed as cultural meanings (concepts publicly available) and recognizable experiences. The cognitive frameworks of each person differ from all the other person(s) in the interaction. Thus they need to be considered separate functions in a communicating event—the communicator’s pretext and context are distinct from the communicatee’s pretext and context in the dyadic model I’ve drawn so far.

I use the expression “a *moment* of a communicating *event*” to allow for the circumstance that the persons in the event often change roles in the *process* of communicating. The conception of a text in this functional model approximates the conception of a channel of communication in the traditional model. I borrow this view from

The core functions are constants but their conceptualization varies and changes over time. The term, “communicator,” for example is a category of theorems which include conceptions of this function of communicating as an “encoder/transmitter” (Shanon & Weaver), “addressor” (Jacobson), “agent” (Burke), “speaker” (Austin & Searle), “source” (Berlo), and so on. For the purpose of coding, I use the category functions in an abbreviated form: communicator = “tor,” communicatee = “tee,” communicator’s pretext = “r-pxt,” and so on.

r-pxt = communicator’s pretext	C} = Cultural Codes	e-pxt = communicatee’s pretext
tor = Communicator	txt = Text	tee = < communicatee
r-cxt = communicator’s context	S} = Ref to exp (situation)	e-cxt = communicatee’s context

cognitive linguistics where the text is in itself meaningless apart from a communicative interaction. Further it is multimodal (as are channels) and can be designed as a verbal, visual, audial artifact or a combinations of sense activating aspects of a channel. A text is no more than transmitted public symbols that, as textual cues, “activate” semantic and contextual memory systems in communicatees (and also in the researchers studying the interaction).

This “core” communicating event needs to be understood as a module that is repeated so that all of its components increase in number and expand over time having both a diachronic dimension and a synchronic dimension. It is very difficult to picture this in a two dimensional space, so it has to be imagined. One way of visualizing the evolution of research conceptions about communication is to imagine a dynamic map of an evolving city. Each nine-dot square could symbolize buildings with nine rooms connected by streets forming neighborhoods. The city grows from its inner core outward extending in every direction. Mapped with GIS technology, the various geological layers of the city could be shown, marking changes in the buildings over the city’s existence. The layout of the streets and homes would have many configurations.

On the one hand, the module of a moment of communicating can be visualized synchronically as sequences of simultaneous events. On the other hand, the module can be visualized diachronically as events of the past at a specific temporal distance from the present. In each instance, the components multiply creating numerous communicators, cultural codes, contexts, texts, and communicatees. Although these can be combined in any number of ways, nonetheless, the five functions persist in all combinations—groups are several communicators and communicatees, cultural codes are derived from many cultures, and so on.

In this view, a TV audience is made up of numerous individual communicatees. Referring to them as an audience does not change this fact. This complexity is bracketed by the concept of an audience in order to simplify the situation. An audience is not different from the individual members who constitute it. Though we can speak of a “mob” as people acting in concert with each other, this does not imply that their individual differences disappear. It is a matter of convenience to treat them as one entity. But we should not mistake the concept of a crowd or a mob for the persons to whom the word refers.

In Kuhn’s post-*Structure* view of the history of science as an evolving lexicon, various conceptions change over time. Some of their elements disappear and are replaced by “newer” ones, altering the elements that are retained. To develop a conceptual scheme for organizing theorems understood as conceptions, I construed communicating as a system with nine irreplaceable functions. This is not an argument that communicating is a system, only that it can be construed as one. Doing so, allows me to identify the nine “core” functions in the system. It needs to be emphasized that the nine functions of a communicating system are not theorems (research conceptions of communicating). Rather, they are regions or areas demarcating communicating for the purpose of understanding parallels among the various theorems about communicating that have been proposed in the history of communication research.

The Communicator Function:

The function of communicators is to communicate. Whatever they communicate is influenced by the conceptual frameworks existing in their semantic memories which are not directly accessible except by inferences about the significations they make public in the texts they construct. Similarly, whatever they communicate is equally influenced by the context of their experiences stored in their episodic memories which are not directly accessible except by inferences about recognizable situations in the texts they construct.

Given the circumstance that neither the communicator's nor the communicatee's pretexts and contexts are available directly, coding their influence on these participants in a communication event has to be described with respect to the public cultural codes and reference to situations the coder [which can be a computer at the data compilation stage] identifies in the text as an interpreter. The describable public components are the traditional five.⁹⁹

The Text Function:

Texts are carriers of meaning and not meaningful in themselves. A text in a communicating event is always "activated" by both communicators and communicatees. When both are present in the situation, the activation is relatively immediate. When separated by space and time, the activation is delayed for the communicatee. In either case, by activating (conceptualizing) the symbols in the text, it becomes meaningful.

An important aspect of texts is their modality. Texts are sensible phenomenon and convey meaning mostly through sounds or images though in some situations smells, touches, and tastes contribute to the communicating event. Texts modify the meaning of a communication depending on the mode—which may be further modified by the media involved. Texts are characterized by the modalities in which they are constructed, or, in the case of communicatees, re-constructed. The typical types of modifications are:

SENSING	MODALITIES	Cognitive ability	MEDIA
seeing	visual	Reading viewing	words images, gestures
hearing	auditory	Listening Speaking	Language, music language

⁹⁹ It may be the case that pretexts and contexts may at some point be described, so the codes are retained. Though these functions are sometimes "described" in expressions such as "... therefore the person thinks that ...," what anyone other than the individual involved thinks is not publically accessible.

Touching	tactile	Distinguishing touches as significations	gestures
smelling	olfactory	Distinguishing smells as significations	
tasting	gustatory	Distinguishing tastes as significations	

The Communicatee Function:

The function of a communicatee in a communicating event is to interpret the text received, to render it meaningful. This cognitive activity is influenced by the way in which the text affects the communicatee. At any and every moment in the communicating process, communicatees are affected by the text both emotionally and cognitively. However, many, if not most, theories do not include this aspect of communicating.

The “Cultural Code” Function:

Cultural codes are construed here as semantic frameworks in (Charles Fillmore’s sense)¹⁰⁰ that characterize particular discourse communities. The default coding is that the persons in the communicating event share the same *generic* semantic framework. In instances of inter-cultural communications, the communicators and communicatees are affected by the cultural codes significant to them. The semantic framework is stored in the semantic memory but is a private cognitive activity that is accessible only in the symbols of the text.

The “Recognizable Situation” Function:

Recognizable Situations are “cognitive” events in which past experiences stored in the epistemic memory as generic or typical are evoked by the present experience. They correspond to the semantic frameworks but are not identical to them. They, like cultural codes, are cognitive activities that are only accessible in the discursive “textworld” (in Paul Werth’s sense)¹⁰¹ drawn by references in the text to typical experiences.

¹⁰⁰ In Fillmore’s view of “frame semantics,” sentences (including statements) invariably imply situations. An example of this phenomenon is a “business transaction.” One cannot understand “sell” without relating it semantically to “buy.” Fillmore’s view of semantic frameworks which reside in the semantic memory system relates easily to references in the text to contexts of experience drawn from the epistemic memory system. The former tend to be verbal and the latter visual.

¹⁰¹ Paul Werth’s conception of a “textworld” parallels Fillmore’s frame semantics in that both are conceptions of “scenarios,” but Werth’s conception favors the textual construction of them as instructions for the reader or listener to re-construct the writer or speaker’s references to experience as an interaction that can be visualized.

The “Outcome” Function:

One component of communicating that is not present in the categories discussed so far is the “outcome” or communicating “effect.” This function is not present in the moment of a communication event and occurs at the end of the communicating process and is therefore separate from the moments of the process. Granting that it needs to be included in any description of communicating, it constitutes a sixth public component. It is the accumulative result of the various ways in which the communicatee is affected emotionally and cognitively at any given moment in the process.¹⁰²

All of the above functions are theorems only to the extent that they are related to each other and cannot be understood apart from their relationship.¹⁰³ There are numerous relations that are described in communication research and need to be coded in descriptions of communicating events.

The Relationship between or among Components

Relationship Codes:

SIMPLE INTERACTIONS

> action directed at the communicatee(s)

< action directed at the communicator(s)

>< interaction

</> parallel interaction

-> outcome

≈> negative outcome

÷ antagonistic relation

<÷> argument, disagreement

} modification of component

C} cultural modification

M} & F} gender modification

@ modularity

Verbal (words) w@txt

¹⁰² In a series of communicating events, it is usually possible to identify the “instigating or source communicator(s)” and the “target communicatee(s)” even in situations where the functions of communicator and communicatee are pertain to the persons involved in the process. (See endnote #3.)

¹⁰³ I use the term “theorem” to suggest that most of the conceptions of communicating are partial theories.

Visual v@txt
 Musical m@txt
 gestural g@txt
 gustatory t@txt
 verbal & visual wv@text
 verbal, visual, & musical wvm@txt
 and other combinations
 -- unidentified relation
 + elements combined in effecting an element
 ••• duration of process
 () grouped together but functioning as a system
 [] have to be considered as an "interactive set" a micro system
 [[]]
 Bold element emphasized in model

ADVANCED NOTATIONS

>> power (commanding)
 ÷> deception
 < responsive force
 <÷ resistance
 >) expectation
 ^ expectation negated
)(dysfunctional group
 {} mutual modification—e.g., {C}tor}<>{Ctee}
 }{ tension between
 ?txt•••>txt! problem (?) solving (!) process
 ><txt•••>txt!>< collaborative problem solving process
 txt> locutionary force
 >tee perlocutionary force

[Note: Even though the codes are basically abbreviations of concepts or common symbols, they would be obtuse to most persons; however, a simple translation program could convert them into more recognizable expressions and leverage those translation abilities across various technological

implementations such as database or “big data” mining systems. This would also be very helpful to non-English speaking persons.]

Sample Markup

Given the number of papers, chapters, books, and articles already in research databases compounded by the rapid increase in digitizing new research, it is likely impossible to predict the number and type of possible results or relationships this coding approach could yield. However, certain findings are more likely than others and here I present some basic examples of the proposed coding system in action. These examples are illustrative and do not represent the extent of possible findings.

The following examples illustrate how the proposed markup language can identify similar conceptions of communicating and enumerate some of the dissimilarities between conceptions:

[Tors>]TXT>>e-pxt>tees	Maxwell McCombs & Donald Shaw	Agenda Setting Theory
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The conception of agenda setting is a communication in which communicators “tors” functioning as a group “[tors]” construct a public text “TXT” so that it commands/directs “>>” the cognitive frameworks “e-pxt>” of communicatees “tees.”

[Tors>]TXT>> e-pxt>tees	Todd Gitlin	Framing Theory
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The coding of the conceptions of agenda setting and framing reflect their similarity.

{C-r-pxt>}tor>txt<+>{tee<e-cx-C}	Stella Ting-Toomey	Face Negotiation Theory
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The conception of face negotiation involves mutual modification “{} {}” of cultural codes. “C-r-pxt” directed “>” by the communicator “tor” in the construction of the text “txt” in a reciprocal “<+>” communication where the communicatee “tee” directs “<” cultural codes “e-pxt-C” toward the communicator.

This coding identifies dissimilarities between agenda setting and face negotiation as communicative activities. Whereas agenda setting forces the communicatees to entertain a specific cognitive framework, face negotiation involves a mutual modification of cognitive frameworks with respect to cultural codes.

How is this all related to LDA? **The sample markup codes can be incorporated into LDA. The relationship between the components of a communicating event can be identified and coded in the analysis.**

How the Proposed Information System Would Work in Data Retrieval:

Retrieving Theorems about the Components of Communicating Events

Since the coding describes theorems with respect to the nine functions of communicating events, theorems about any function or combination of functions can be retrieved.

Identifying Theorems about Similar Situations

The situations in which a given concept are used are coded. For example, a search for “fram*” and “}Stxt” would retrieve all of the contexts of use for specific conceptions of frame and framing.

Tracking Conceptual Changes in Conceptions of Components

In cases where more than one article features a research conception, LDA reveals the changes made by comparing the theorems to each other. The comparisons can be made in instances where the same researcher uses a particular term in several articles. For example, Robert Entman uses the conception of framing in numerous publications. LDA reveals the changes Entman made in his conception from his landmark essay in 1993 to the present. LDA can also be used to compare the uses of a conception by different theorists. For example, Robert Entman, William Gamson, Erving Goffman, Charles Fillmore, and Marvin Minsky all use the term “frame” but hold contrasting conceptions of it. LDA reveals the difference in their conceptions of a frame and these can be coded.

Identifying Changes in the Focus of Communication Research.

Since the information system links research projects to their dates of publication, it would be possible to track changes in the Theoretical Focus of communication research. For example, intra-personal—“tor><tor”—communication virtually disappeared after the 1980s. On the other hand, the advent of the Internet increased interest not only in the modalities of communication—“wva)txt”—but also in intercultural communication—“}Ctor><txt><teeC{.”

Surveying the Proposed Range of Relations in Communicating Events

If a student or researcher wanted to know what types of interpersonal relations have been researched, she could search for “tor*txt*tee” (the asterisk serving as a wild card) and a list of entries would show the research that has been done on this relationship. The search, of course, could be easily narrowed to a specific type of interpersonal relationship, for example, by searching for “tor*C}txt*tee{C” to identify inter-cultural relationships. The search can be further narrowed, for example, by searching for “torC}><text><tee{C” to identify studies of inter-cultural conversations.

Creating Concept Webs

It would also be possible to format any of the above searches in a concept web. This would show how theorems are networked semantically. This would be a valuable resource for students to see what concepts have been related to what other concepts.

Creating Timelines

Similarly, it would be possible to format any of the above searches in a timeline. For example, it would be possible to create a chronology for the history of communication research, showing the expansion and contraction of focus as well as the key figures in those changes.

I began this proposal pointing to the difficulties students, researchers, and teachers have in finding the relationships among communication theories given the idiosyncratic naming practices used to identify research projects. This proposal shows how the difficulties can be significantly ameliorated by

developing the proposed information system to retrieve modern communication research¹⁰⁴ using existing technology.

Though the coding is quite complex only the coders (ideally authors who use the code to describe their research models), the persons who searched the database after texts have been coded would benefit from the increased precision of the search process *without having to learn to code texts*. It would not be difficult to program a search engine to read the codes after persons entered ordinary English queries—“How similar is frame analysis to agenda setting?” Just as in the case of a Google search, the searcher does not need to know how the results are obtained.

Conclusion

I focused in this chapter on four benefits of Logistical Discourse Analysis (LDA). First, most if not all of the types of LDA can be computerized. Second, it can be used to foster scientific inquiry in students. Third, it can be used to add to the existing database developed by members of the Society for Conceptual Logistics in Communication Research (SCLCR). And fourth, it can be used to create a simple information system for published research. I look forward to future developments.

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¹⁰⁴ “Modern Communication Research” is understood here in terms of Wilbur Schramm’s account of post WWII research in communication. Though Schramm’s account only goes up to 1997, I include subsequent communication research in the category. The historical category, “post-modern,” while applicable to other fields, in particular literary studies, does not describe communication research in my view.

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